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The dissertation consists of two parts. Part i maps the economic environment for 
gold exploration in Nevada from 1976 through 1988 and evaluates the potential for fu­
ture discoveries based upon historical trends. Part II identifies organizational adap­
tations to the environment and measures the extent to which particular strategies, tac­
tics and practices were associated with higher probabilities of exploration success.
Cash flow models are used to evaluate the economics of Nevada gold exploration. 
Total exploration expenditures are estimated by year and type of company. Detailed 
development and production cost and revenue data from state tax reports serve as the 
basis for estimating annual net revenues from resulting discoveries. The two cash flow 
streams are integrated to estimate expected net present values and discounted cash flow- 
rates of return on exploration investments. These economic parameters are used to 
contrast the profitability of exploration for different types of organizations, to assess 
time trends in the economics of Nevada gold exploration and development and to predict 
future profitability, and are compared with the economics of gold exploration and devel­
opment in other nations.
Data was gathered through interviews with district geologists, a mail survey of 
staff geologists and published sources to characterize strategies, management practices 
and tactics prevalent in Nevada gold exploration. Pre-discovery characteristics 
distinguishing ultimately successful from unsuccessful exploration organizations are 
treated as observations upon random variables. Two-variable linear probability models 
are used to measure their association with the probability of exploration success. 
Multivariate linear regression models are employed to weigh the overall importance of
IV
strategy, management practices and tactics in exploration productivity.
The dissertation argues that Nevada's gold exploration environment shows little 
evidence of declining productivity after 13 years of intensive exploration, but 
exploration for the average company has not been profitable. While exploration has been 
uneconomic for most organizations, traditional mining companies following long-term 
"superior skills" strategies have historically profited; their rates of discovery and 
returns on exploration investments have increased through time and promise to remain 
attractive in the future. The same companies on average also enjoy a higher level of 
success in their world-wide exploration programs. Exploration executives for less 
successful organizations may benefit from insight regarding the strategic, management 
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THE NEVADA GOLD MINING INDUSTRY
For the first three quarters of its history, Nevada's mining industry was the 
prime mover of the State’s economy. Though now overshadowed by gaming and tourism, 
it continues to be a major force behind economic development in rural areas (Dobra, 
1988). Between 1976 and 1990, Nevada became the fourth ranked gold producer in the 
world behind South Africa, the Soviet Union and Australia.
S ou th  A fr ica  609
A u s t ra l ia  208
C.I.S. 200
Nevada
Other C o u n t r ie s  86
r a z l l  119
178 Other U.S. 123
Canada 172
Figure 1. World Gold Production in 1990 (Mackenzie and Doggett, 1990). 
Values in tonnes. “C.I.S.’ is the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
formerly the USSR.
At present, Nevada dominates the U.S. gold industry, with roughly 5.7 million 
ounces of annual production, or 61% of the U.S. total. The state hold's 51% of the 
nation's demonstrated gold resources and an additional quarter of U.S. inferred 
resources.
A number of conditions have contributed to the growth of the Nevada gold mining 
industry. The end of the U. S. gold standard in 1969 and resulting price improvements 
beginning in 1971 gave companies the economic incentive to explore for gold, a target
Montana 5 *
Figure 2. U.S. Gold Production in 1990 (Dobra and Thomas, 1990). 
which had been largely neglected since the 1930's. Higher gold prices were coincident 
with the development of agglomeration pre-treatment and cyanide heap leaching as a 
viable technology for the processing of low-grade ore. Nevada's geologic environment 
has proven very favorable for low-grade gold deposits. Moreover, 86% of the state is 
federal land, eleven million acres of which have high to moderate potential for gold 
mineralization and are open to location (U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land 
Management, 1986a).
Beyond geologic merit, Nevada's regulatory and tax climates also appeal to mining 
companies. State and local tax burdens on mining are lower than in any other western 
state except Oregon (Whitney & Whitney, 1989). Equally important, Nevada's mining 
history and rural nature have resulted in environmental regulations which are more 
lenient than those of all other western states (Whitney & Whitney, 1990).
Despite the numerous advantages offered by Nevada's gold exploration 
environment, mining companies began, around 1987, to shift exploration investments to 
other western U.S. states and foreign regions, notably in Latin America and the Pacific 
rim countries. The change is variously ascribed to a perceived depletion of Nevada's 
undiscovered gold resource base, excessive competition for available land, threatened
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changes in tax, mineral entry and environmental regulations and the geologic attributes 
of other exploration environments. All of these factors weigh in the most difficult and 
perplexing question facing exploration strategists, "Where to Explore?".
PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION
Exploration is science applied toward financial ends; exploration environments 
are both geologic and economic. Therefore, knowledge of the "economics of exploration" 
- historical returns on exploration investments for various regions - may aid corporate 
strategists in selecting the most suitable regions for prospecting. The problem in Part I 
of this dissertation is to characterize the economics of the exploration environment for 
gold in Nevada, and to predict future productivity based upon historical trends. The 
purpose is to provide corporate managers with economic information upon which to base 
decisions regarding the continuation or implementation of Nevada gold exploration 
programs.
The following specific questions regarding the economics of Nevada gold 
exploration for the period 1976 through 1989 are addressed in Part I:
• What was the probability of discovering an ore deposit given a mineral 
prospect?
• What was the discovery cost per ounce?
• How profitable was exploration?
• How profitable was mine development and production?
• Is there evidence of decline of the state's gold exploration environment; 
have the foregoing parameters deteriorated with time?
• How did these parameters differ between types of organizations?
• Is Nevada's gold exploration environment competitive with other 
prospective regions?
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Selections of environments for exploration, though difficult, may be founded upon 
information regarding market, political and geologic risks, historical costs and 
discovery rates involved in the exploration process. Assessments of these risks and 
returns are facilitated by a large body of research, case studies and economic data. 
However, given the selection of an environment, those responsible for organizing and 
directing the effort do not enjoy the benefits of comparable documentation and guidelines 
for effective strategies, practices and tactics, broadly termed exploration management.
Exploration management involves department and district office organization, the 
selection of local managers and professional staff, exploration planning and budgeting, 
evaluation of the exploration effort, reviews of programs and projects, personnel 
management, staff motivation, technical guidance, and the promotion of properties and 
projects recommended by staff and district geologists and the exploration department. 
While all companies have similar overall objectives, each approaches exploration in its 
own unique way, theoretically reflecting its strengths and weaknesses.
Exploration management styles are based largely upon structures and methods 
traditionally developed within each company and acquired by individuals through 
experience. Common practices across the industry have evolved by trial-and-error and 
spread through employee migration and informal exchanges of knowledge, with little 
benefit from formal exploration management research relating past strategies, practices 
and tactics to exploration success.
The dearth of exploration management research stems mainly from a lack of 
sufficient and reliable data. Historically, exploration has been geographically dispersed 
and carried out by a relatively small number of companies facing widely varying
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market, political and geologic environments. Significant discoveries were few and far 
between; success or failure attending a particular strategy, tactic or practice might not 
be realized for years after implementation. Because of the effect of uncontrolled 
variables upon long-term exploration outcomes, and the lag between actions and 
consequences, data allowing valid tests of alternative strategies, tactics and management 
practices was lacking.
The current gold rush in Nevada affords an opportunity to overcome the 
historical barriers to exploration management research. Numerous senior companies 
exploring for gold in the state have competed in a single political subdivision and a 
relatively homogeneous geologic setting, under common market conditions and for a 
prolonged period of time. Most of the competing companies enjoyed equal access to 
adequate capital, a large and prospective public domain and a well trained labor pool. A 
significant number of resulting discoveries serve to distinguish the winners from the 
losers. Ceteris paribus, success or failure for these companies must be attributed to 
differences in strategies, management practices and tactics.
Given the controlled setting afforded by Nevada's current gold rush, the problems 
in Part II of this investigation were a) to identify and measure a number of strategic, 
management and tactical variables for successful and unsuccessful exploration groups, 
b) develop regression models to test the association between the variables and 
exploration success, and c) reach statistically supported conclusions from the models 
regarding effective strategies, management practices and tactics.
The breadth of the management study was restricted by the tolerance of district 
and staff geologists to prolonged interviews and lengthy questionnaires. The depth of 
analysis of any one variable was limited by time constraints.
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Specific questions addressed by the management study were:
• What strategic variables appear to be closely associated with successful 
exploration?
• How do local exploration managers and staff for successful companies 
differ from those of unsuccessful organizations?
• What exploration tactics and management practices have been most 
effective in Nevada's gold exploration environment?
• To what extent was each of the foregoing organizational characteristics 
associated with the statistical probability of exploration success.
• What was the role of random chance in the probability of exploration 
success?
• Are the strategies, practices and tactics which appear to have contributed 
to successful exploration in Nevada relevant to other exploration envir­
onments?
Companies were characterized by 70 variables; twenty-six of these proved to be 
significantly associated with historical exploration success at or above the 80% conf­
idence level.
The list of variables used to characterize exploration organizations was far from 
comprehensive. However, those which were identified, analyzed and proved to be 
significant were associated, in multivariate regression, with 92% of the difference in 
the probability of success between exploration groups which were effective and those 
which failed to make discoveries.
ORGANIZATION OF THE DISSERTATION
Part I of the dissertation first describes cost, revenue and time factors 
considered in assessing the economics of Nevada gold exploration, and methods employed 
for their estimation (Chapters 2 through 4). Related issues of discovery probability, 
discovery quality risk, maturity of the exploration environment, discovery and
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delineation costs per ounce and the economics of mine area exploration are also 
addressed.
A cash flow model of the state's entire gold mining industry is developed in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Development and construction costs are integrated with production 
cash flows to estimate the profitability of investment, given a discovery, in terms of 
discounted cash flow-rates of return and net present values. Trends in these parameters 
are evaluated to identify any deterioration in the economic quality of gold discoveries in 
Nevada through time.
Exploration expenditures are next charged against development and production 
cash flows to calculate the profitability of exploration investments at the start of the 
average exploration program. Returns on exploration are estimated for Canadian stock, 
junior and senior companies, companies noted for superior exploration skills and the 
mining industry as a whole (Chapter 7). Time trends in these economic parameters are 
evaluated as predictors of the future economic productivity of Nevada's gold exploration 
environment.
Mining industry wealth generated by Nevada's gold resources and the industry's 
contribution to public wealth through tax payments during the current precious metal 
mining economic cycle are estimated in Chapter 8. Finally, exploration and development 
economics for the Nevada gold industry are compared to those for Canada, Australia and 
Brazil in Chapter 9.
Historical expenditure and discovery data gathered for Part I of the dissertation 
served to identify companies which have been economically successful in the search for 
Nevada gold. Part II analyzes exploration management approaches which characterized 
effective organizations. Successful company behaviors in pre-discovery years are
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described in terms of strategies, management practices, management and staff 
bibliographic profiles and tactics. Unsuccessful organizations are characterized over 
the same range of behaviors and for matching time periods. In Chapter 11, these 
characteristics are treated as observations upon random variables and are used to 
develop linear probability regression models to measure their statistical association 
with exploration success. Characteristics found to be significantly different between 
successful and unsuccessful organizations are individually discussed in Chapters 12 
through 16. Strategic, management practice and tactical variables are also grouped in 
multivariate regression models to assess the relative weights of these broad categories of 
organizational behavior in exploration success.
The element of random chance in the long-term success of efficient exploration 
organizations is estimated in Chapter 17. Finally, applicability of the findings of this 
investigation to other commodities and environments is assessed in Chapter 18. 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
The first widely circulated research analyzing the long term expected value of 
mineral exploration was Mackenzie's contribution to "Economic Evaluation Techniques 
for Mineral Investment Decisions" (Mackenzie & Bambrick, 1978). Mackenzie 
integrated the concepts of the expected value of exploration, discovery risk and time 
trends in exploration productivity in "Looking for the Improbable Needle in a Haystack: 
The Economics of Base Metals Exploration in Canada" (Mackenzie, 1980). His 
investigations provided the framework around which Part I of this study was developed.
"Worldwide Trends in Gold Exploration", recently published by Mackenzie and 
Doggett (1992) contains up-to-date comparisons of the economics of gold exploration in 
Canada, Australia and Brazil. The most detailed report on U.S. gold exploration
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text. However, numerous minor assumptions were required and a number of regression 
models were developed, each entailing a different set of assumptions, to render results as 
accurate as possible. While not significant within the overall context of the report, they 
may be regarded as essential supporting documentation, so are described in Appendices B 
and D. Appendix D also contains a table of historic and future deflation factors and metal 
prices used and assumed in economic analyses.
Appendix C contains a list of ore and mineral deposits and operating mines 
included in various analyses. Appendix E presents the survey form used to gather data on 
exploration organization strategies and local management; Appendix F is the 
questionnaire mailed to staff geologists. The development of a typical linear probability 
regression model to measure the relationship between organizational behavior and 
exploration success is shown in Appendix G.
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
Mine
The term ''mine“ as used in this report is an operating and economic unit which 
may consist of more than one ore deposit and extraction pit, all within an economic 
haulage distance of a single processing facility, and filing a single net proceeds of mines 
tax report. Operations extracting ore from only one ore deposit, such as Round 
Mountain, and those receiving feed from numerous deposits, such as the nine pits within 
an eighteen mile radius of and supplying ore to the Jerritt Canyon Mine (district), 
illustrate the scope of the term "mine" as employed herein. Focus upon operating and 
economic units rather than discrete ore deposits was necessary owing the aggregated 
nature of the principal financial and production data bases available for this 
investigation (net proceeds of mines tax reports and corporate annual reports) and for
comparisons with the economics of exploration in other regions, developed by 
researchers who employed similar definitions for the terms ''mine", "economic unit" and 
"operating unit".
Monetary Units
All monetary values are constant 1990 U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted. The 
GNP deflator was used to convert current dollars to constant dollars. With monetary 
values in constant dollars, the 10% discount rate used in economic analyses and 
discounted cash flow-rates of return are "real" as opposed to "nominal". While year- 
to-year relationships differ, the weighted average “real" rate was about four percent 
below the weighted average "nominal" rate. Weighting in this case was on the basis of 
the ratio of annual industry expenditures to total industry expenditures during the 
historical time period of interest.
Gold Equivalents
Most Nevada gold mines produce and market silver as a co-product or by­
product. Some organizations during part of the historical time period under 
investigation conducted exploration programs specifically for silver, and some mines 
were predominantly silver producers. Because expenditures for and revenues from 
silver ventures are inextricably combined with those for gold in the available data base, 
the two metals are treated jointly. However, the vast majority of exploration 
expenditures, development and production revenues considered in this investigation 
were for gold. Because of this, and for brevity, the term "gold" is used in this report to 
mean gold plus silver converted to gold equivalents. Five operations deriving 50% or 
more of their gross revenues from silver were included in aggregate and individual mine
economic analyses.
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Pre-1991 silver production was converted to gold equivalents at each year's 
average spot silver to gold price ratio. Pre-1991 silver reserves were translated to 
gold equivalents at the current dollar average 1976-1990 silver to gold spot price ratio 
of $7.93/$356. Silver revenues beyond 1990 were estimated at silver/gold price 
ratios of $4.07/$384, $3.75/$330 and $6/$400 for the three gold price levels used 
in projections for various analyses.
Ore Deposit Grades (Recoverable Ounces)
“Recoverable gold ounces" are used as the basic unit of reserve measurement. 
"Recoverable ounces" are ounces included in the economically mineable portion of a 
geologic reserve plus ounces in low grade material constituting dilution times a 
metallurgical recovery factor. Unless otherwise noted, all ore reserves and ore grades 
are reported in "recoverable ounces". A refinery charge plus loss of 0.5% was assumed. 
Gold Prices
Historical cost and revenue data was available for economic analyses through 
1990. Economic analyses for most purposes consider post-1990 cash flows based upon 
two spot gold "price levels". "Price levels" as used here are benchmark prices. 
Revenues per ounce actually employed in cash flow projections for each company were 
above or below the specified "price level", depending upon each producers historical 
record with respect to hedging gains and losses.
Base case analyses were at a $384 per ounce future "price level". This was the 
average price prevailing in 1990 and was the price basis for ore cutoff grades used by 
companies to define mineable reserves in 1990 corporate annual reports. Cash flow 
projections were also prepared at a price level of $350 per ounce in 1991 and $330 
per ounce thereafter (referred to as the $330 price level) to more accurately reflect
market conditions at the time of report preparation (early-1993). Company cited 1990 
reserves were reduced by 15% and mined grades increased by 7% to account for the 
higher cutoff grades required by lower metal prices, as described in the Appendix B.
A third set of projections was made at $400 per ounce gold beginning in 1990, 
without adjustments for hedging practices. Both historical and projected cash flows 
were computed on a pre-tax basis for comparisons with pre-tax economic parameters 
estimated by other investigators for gold exploration and development in Brazil, Canada 
and Australia.
Costs and prices in all models were escalated 4% annually after 1990 in a 
wash-out assumption to assess tax allowances and payments correctly. Except for values 
generated for international comparisons, expenditures, revenues, cash flows, net 
present values and rates of return referred to in the text are after-tax, unleveraged 
values. Federal, state and local taxes at statutory rates and other income against which 
to write off losses were taken into account. Appendix D contains a table of current and 
constant dollar gold prices assumed in cash flow projections 
Economic Discovery
An economic discovery for the purposes of this investigation is defined as one (or 
several deposits within an economic haulage distance of each other) which will yield at 
least $15 million in gross revenues (1990 dollars) and a constant dollar discounted 
cash flow-rate of return of at least 10%. This real rate corresponds to a nominal rate of 
return of approximately 14%.
Area and Discoveries Excluded
Unless otherwise noted, exploration expenditures, discoveries and development 
cash flows from operations in the Newmont Gold Company's Area of Interest (AOI) were
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excluded from analyses. The extent of the Area of Interest is shown on Figure 3.
The goal of this investigation was to develop economic parameters and evaluate 
organizational characteristics for companies exploring in and adapting to a uniformly 
accessible environment. Newmont's Area of Interest has not been open to competition 
since the early 1980's. This separates the AOI as a distinct exploration environment 
compared to the rest of Nevada (see "Maturity of the Exploration Environment", Chapter 
3). Newmont's Rain Mine, lying outside of the AOI, is considered in all analyses.
Goldstrike/Betze was excluded from most analyses except where noted on the 
basis of discovery date. Ore reserves were first drilled at Goldstrike by Polar 
Resources, a Canadian stock company, in 1974-1975, before the exploration time 
period under investigation. Also excluded from most analyses on the basis of discovery 
dates were Round Mountain, Buckhorn, Atlanta, Candelaria, Gooseberry, Manhattan, 
McCoy, Pinson, Robinson, Santa Fe, Taylor, Toiyabe, Cortez, Gold Acres and Windfall. 
All of these mines were included in compilations of pre-1991 aggregate industry 
development and production costs, production and revenues, in assessing the maturity of 
Nevada's gold exploration environment and in estimating economic parameters for 
international comparisons. The Atlanta ore deposit, discovered in 1978 and mined from 
1980 through 1985, was omitted from all analyses. Net proceeds tax data was not 
available for the operation. Its omission should not, in view of the relatively small net 
cash flows involved, bias the results of this study.
Economic Parameters
The "Net Present Values" (NPV's) and "Discounted Cash Flow Rates of Return" 
(DCF-ROR's) reported in the text are estimated at two points in time with respect to the
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exploration-discovery-development-production process. "Development" NPV's and 
DCF-ROR's are estimated at the assumed mid-point of the year in which mine 
development began and include or exclude exploration costs as noted. "Exploration" 
NPV's and DCF-ROR's are estimated at the mid-point of the year in which an individual 
or average exploration program leading to a discovery began; exploration costs are 
included. All net present values are computed at a 10% real discount rate.
Assumed Development Year (FCY-11
To reduce the impact which a prolonged period of development, as opposed to fast- 
track construction, might have, through the discounting process, on computed NPV's and 
DCF-ROR's, development for all mines was assumed to have begun in the year preceding 
the first year of commercial production (FCY-1). "Commercial production" for this 
purpose was defined as the achievement of 50% of annual design capacity.
SME Staff Members
The number of geologists employed by various exploration organizations, their 
total years of work experience, years of attachment to a Nevada office and job change 
rates employed in some regression models and evaluations were estimated from annual 
membership rolls published by the Society for Mining, Metallurgy and Exploration 
(SME) in "Mining Engineering", 1975-1988. A comparison of the SME membership 
roll for 1987 with the 1987 Randol Directory of Exploration Contacts indicated that 
about one-half of the employed geologists working out of Nevada exploration offices were 
SME members.
List of Initials
AG Newmont Area of Interest.
BLM Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management.
BCR Benefit-Cost Ratio
CMH Canadian Mines Handbook
DCF-ROR Discounted Cash Flow-Rate of Return
FCY-1 Year preceding commercial production; development start year.
MBO Management by Objective
KM DA Known Mineral Deposit Area
NOI Notice of Intent filed with the BLM or USFS
NPV Net Present Value
S83 Society of Economic Geologists
SME Society for Mining, Metallurgy and Exploration
MSQ Minnesota Job Satisfaction Questionnaire
CONFIDENTIALITY
With few exceptions, data used in this study was obtained under confidentiality 
agreements prohibiting disclosure in any form which might identify the information 
with a specific company or individual. Attribution of some of the data not obtained under 
confidentiality agreements could misrepresent or damage the business or professional 
interests of the organizations and individuals involved, without enhancing the merits of 





NEVADA GOLD EXPLORATION EXPENDITURES 
SOURCE AND CRITIQUE OF DATA
All organizations reported as having conducted some gold exploration in Nevada 
between 1976 and 1988, and for which a current location or address could be obtained, 
were solicited for expenditure information. Resulting data was supplemented with the 
results of a survey conducted by the Nevada Mining Association in 1988, and with 
information extracted from corporate annual reports. Records for about half of the total 
gold exploration expenditures estimated for the state between 1976 and 1988 were from 
these sources.
To estimate exploration expenditures by prospectors, the names of two hundred 
individuals were randomly selected from the BLM's mining claim location records. An 
attempt was made to communicate with each by phone or mail. Of the two-hundred 
individuals, 120 were successfully contacted; sixty-nine volunteered cost information.
Despite a prolonged and intensive effort to gather accurate cost data, there are 
inherent limitations in the information base assembled for this study. First, while 
specifications for the data were clearly set forth in requests, differences in accounting 
methods between companies introduced a degree of variance. Secondly, the completeness 
and reliability of the data are functions of the antiquity of the information, the magnitude 
of expenditures and the exploration success of the reporting organization.
Because of the small number of exploration groups active before 1980, cost data 
for the 1970's is of lesser quantity and, owing to antiquity, lower reliability than later 
information. Early expenditures for gold exploration which constituted a minor part of a
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company's overall effort may have gone unreported. Unsuccessful companies proved 
reluctant to provide cost information so are under-represented in the reported data 
base. Finally, very few organizations record general expenditures on the basis of 
commodities or state boundaries. Consequently, for many companies which conducted 
multi-state programs from Nevada offices, year-by-year allocations of general (non­
project) expenditures "for gold within Nevada" are only estimates. These and other 
shortcomings in the expenditure data base reflect a compromise between the availability 
of information and the research limitations imposed by time constraints. There is much 
room for improvement. However, it is assumed that the biases which may exist are not 
large enough to affect the reliability of the overall results when used in assessing time 
trends, in comparisons between types of exploration organizations and between 
alternative exploration environments.
MINING CLAIM LOCATIONS
Estimates of the numbers of lode gold and silver mining claims newly located and 
held each year by different types of organizations and individual prospectors were 
required for regression estimations of unreported exploration expenditures. Claim 
counts were estimated by sorting files in the BLM's computer data base of mining claims 
by type of organization, then tabulating the number of new entries and annual 
assessments recorded for each type. Claims for other than precious metals were factored 
out using ratios based upon data gathered by Schreiber and Emerson (1984) and non­
precious metal exploration expenditure statistics published by the Society of Economic 
Geologists (Economic Geology, annual "Mineral Exploration Statistics", 1980-1989). 
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate estimated new gold lode claim locations and claims held from 
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Figure 4. New Gold and Silver Lode Mining Claims Located in Nevada.
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Figure 5. Previously Located Gold and 
Silver Lode Mining Claims Held in Nevada.
Between 1976 and 1990, over 2 million claims were located on federal lands in 
the United States. Nevada, containing 17% of the public domain in the western U.S., 
hosted 26% of the new locations. After 1981 when uranium exploration essentially 
ended and gold became nearly the sole commodity of interest, 33% of all new mining
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claims in the U.S. were located in Nevada (Bureau of Land Management, Division of 
Mining Law, 1989).
The BLM reported the location of approximately 44,500 and 35,000 claims in 
Nevada in 1989 and 1990 respectively. Assuming continuation of pre-1989 claim 
retention rates and an average claim size of 20 acres, about 6 million acres of Nevada 
were under location for gold and silver at the end of 1990.
The Bureau of Mines has classified roughly 11 million acres of federal land in 
Nevada as prospective for metallic minerals and open to location without restrictions 
(Bureau of Mines, 1985). Designated were broad regions encompassing all known 
mineral deposits, occurrences and evidence of possible mineralization (i.e.- 
hydrothermal alteration and geochemical anomalies), and in many cases land intervening 
between widely separated locations with evidence of possible mineralization. In view of 
the broad definition of “mineralized areas”, the extent of existing gold-silver claim 
holdings and the fact that additional claims not inventoried in this study are held for base 
metals, ferro-alloys and uranium, truly prospective federal land available for new 
locations must be rare.
EXPLORATION INVESTMENTS BY TYPE OF EXPENDITURE
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate average exploration cost distributions by four senior 
companies which began Nevada gold exploration programs in 1975-1976, separated 
into tactical and functional categories. "Surveys" in Figure 6 include regional and 
district research, reconnaissance and prospecting. "General" includes submittal and 
joint venture evaluations and all other expenditures not fitting the "Projects" or 
"Surveys" categories. "Services" in Figure 7 include expenditures for work other than 
drilling and trenching. Only significant "property lease" costs, generally those beyond
2 2
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Figure 7. Exploration Cost Distribution by Function.
Local and corporate office management, general and administrative expenses, not shown 
in the figures, averaged about 15% of total expenditures.
As opposed to tactical and functional categories, exploration expenditures
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elsewhere in this report are assigned to one of three types on the basis of differing tax 
treatment. "Expensed exploration" is exploration at the regional, district and project 
level that does not lead to or cannot be specifically allocated to a given discovery. Most 
"expensed exploration" is associated with unsuccessful effort. Prior to 1987 it was 
fully chargeable against income in the year in which costs were incurred. Since 1987, 
it has been 70% expensable in the cost year, with 30% amortized, straight line, over 
the succeeding 60 months. "Capitalized exploration" is exploration that directly con­
tributes to a specific discovery; it is successful exploration. Although initially expensed 
against income, it must later be recaptured (capitalized) to serve as part of the cost 
basis for tax depletion. “Mine area exploration" is exploration carried out by staff 
attached to an operating mine within an economic haulage distance of the mine. It is 
expensed against mine revenues whether successful or not. Capitalized, expensed and 
mine area exploration expenditures for gold in Nevada from 1976 through 1988 are 
illustrated in Figure 8.
Capitalized Exploration
Capitalized exploration expenditures for most larger mines considered in this 
study were reported by the operators or obtained from published sources. However, 
those for 5 large and 17 small mines, mostly early discoveries, required estimation. 
Capitalized exploration costs were treated separately from expensed exploration for both 
tax calculations and to serve as predictor variables in regression estimations of 
expensed exploration. The regression model developed for the estimation of capitalized 
exploration is described in Appendix B.
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Figure 8. After-tax Gold Exploration- Expenditures by Cost 
Type. The inset shows total after-tax estimation errors.
1976 and 1988 are presented in Table 1. Direct discovery, delineation and feasibility 
costs for all discoveries which supported some production, profitable or not, or were 
under development by 1990, and deposits which, though undeveloped as of 1990, were 
deemed potentially economic at the $384 per ounce gold price level, were added in 
preparing Table 1. Capitalized exploration costs in Newmont's Area of Interest are 
included.
Expensed Exploration
Records on approximately 45% of costs written-off for Nevada gold exploration 
from 1976 to 1988 were obtained directly or indirectly from responsible organizations.
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TABLE 1














































Multivariate linear regression was used to estimate expenditures by those companies 
from which direct reports could not be obtained. Unreported annual expenditures by 
different classes of organizations were independently estimated, combined with reported 
expenditures and aggregated to produce Table 2.
Categorized as expensed exploration costs are all costs which would typically 
precede a development decision, but which were incurred on projects not resulting or 
promising to result in future production. Included were prospect evaluation and 
regional survey expenses, allocated portions of corporate and local office general and 
administrative expenses, local salaries, field and office contracted services, land 
acquisition, pilot metallurgical tests, insurance, environmental base line studies, 
exploration site reclamation, land acquisition, prefeasibility and feasibility analyses. 
All non-capitalized exploration in Newmont's Area of Interest is classified as "Mine Area 
Exploration" (Nevada State Department of Taxation, Division of Assessment Standards
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Ruling) rather than expensed exploration; costs are not included in Table 2. Estimated 
expenditures by individual prospectors are included. Because regression errors could 
not be computed for estimated expenditures by individuals, aggregate errors are not 
listed in the table. They are cited for different classes of organizations in subsequent 
tables.
TABLE 2
EXPENSED NEVADA GOLD EXPLORATION COSTS
Pre-tax After Tax
Millions Millions
Year of Dollars of. Qollgr?
1988 1 60 122
1987 1 70 1 33
1 986 1 14 77
1 985 1 02 67
1 984 1 14 76
1983 94 64
1982 88 56




1 977 24 1 7
1 976 25 1 6
Mine Area Exploration
"Mine area exploration" for the purposes of this report is exploration carried 
out by staff attached to an operating mine and within an economic haulage distance of the 
mine. Exploration targets may be extensions of the producing ore bodies, satellite 
deposits or wholly unrelated mineralization. Exploration in the vicinity of an operating 
mine by organizations not affiliated with the operator is not categorized as mine area 
exploration. All mine area exploration costs are treated as fully expensable against local
2 7
or corporate income.
Data including forty-seven percent of total mine area exploration expenditures 
estimated for Nevada's gold mines from 1976 through 1988 was obtained directly from 
mine operators or extracted from corporate annual reports, publications of the Metals 
Economics Group and Canadian Mines Handbooks. To the extent possible, costs reported as 
exploration but more accurately described as development drilling were excluded. 
Reported expenditures in the data base served as dependent variables in preparing the 
regression model for unreported costs described in Appendix B. Reported plus estimated 
expenditures are summarized in Table 3. All uncapitalized exploration expenditures in 
Newmont's Area of Interest are included in the table.
TABLE 3









Error at 90% 
Confidence
1 988 42 28 3
1 987 30 20 2
1 986 13 7 3
1985 12 7 2
1 984 17 9 2
1 983 6 3 1
1 982 7 4 1
1 981 8 5 2
1 980 4 2 <1
1979 1 1 1
1 978 1 <1 <1
1 977 1 1 1
1 976 2 1 1
The low estimation errors for 1987 and 1988 in Table 3
relatively small percentage of total expenditures requiring estimation for these years,
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rather than efficiency in the regression model.
EXPLORATION INVESTMENTS BY TYPE OF ORGANIZATION
Separate expenditure estimates were required for different classes of companies 
owing to organizational variability in the quantity of information available and con­
sequent utility in regression analysis. For example, the number of mining claims 
located annually proved to be a highly significant predictor, among other variables, of 
expenditure levels for senior mining companies. In contrast, Canadian stock companies 
were found to have located comparatively few mining claims in the state; claim location 
activity was not a significant predictor of expenditures. However, Canadian stock 
company Nevada land holdings, reported annually in Canadian Mines Handbooks, proved 
to be a valuable substitute for claim location activity in regression analysis.
Separate estimates of expenditures by different classes of companies also 
permitted comparisons of returns on exploration for different types of organizations. 
For this purpose and because of limitations in the data base, four classes of exploration 
organizations were defined; senior companies, junior companies, Canadian stock 
companies, and "unclassified" organizations. Appendix A contains a list of 924 such 
companies on record as having conducted some gold exploration in Nevada between 1976 
and 1988, and whose records of expenditures were either obtained or estimated by 
regression for this investigation. The four multivariate regression models developed to 
estimate unreported expensed exploration by these organizations are described in 
Appendix B. Figure 9 illustrates total after-tax Nevada gold exploration expenditures by
each class of organization.
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Figure 9. Total After-tax Gold Exploration 
Expenditures by Organization Type.
Senior Companies
Senior companies are those which had during the relevant time period a 
significant source of operating income, not necessarily from mining or from Nevada 
operations. Included in this category are branch offices, affiliates, syndicates and 
subsidiaries controlled by one or more senior companies. All organizations with gold 
mining operations in Nevada which yielded positive cash flow were categorized as senior 
organizations. All "mine area exploration" costs reported in Table 3 and shown in 
Figure 8 were borne by senior companies. Table 4 lists their total capitalized and 
expensed exploration costs. Records for about 50% of total expenditures were obtained 
directly or indirectly from these companies; the remaining 50% were estimated by 
regression as described in Appendix B. Expenditures in Newmont's Area of Interest are 
included in Table 4.
Junior Companies
Junior companies include U.S. and foreign exploration partnerships, dba sole 
proprietorships, syndicates, joint ventures, private and public corporations, listed or
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TABLE 4
CAPITALIZED AND EXPENSED NEVADA GOLD EXPLORATION
EXPENDITURES BY SENIOR ORGANIZATIONS
Pre-tax After-tax Capitalized After-tax After-Tax
Expensed Expensed Exploration Total Error at 90%
Year SMillions SMillions SMillions SMillions Confidence
1988 110 73 31 104 2
1987 110 73 17 90 3
1986 81 44 24 68 5
1985 78 42 34 76 4
1984 82 44 35 80 4
1983 64 35 33 67 5
1982 69 37 18 55 4
1981 87 47 09 56 4
1980 37 20 18 38 4
1979 30 16 17 34 4
1978 22 12 18 30 5
1977 16 09 13 22 8
1976 19 10 11 21 7
unlisted on any exchange, which relied primarily upon subscribed capital for 
exploration funding and which were not effectively controlled by senior companies. 
Excluded are Canadian stock companies described in the next section. Information on 
about 35% of total exploration expenditures by junior companies was obtained directly 
from these companies; 65% was estimated by regression. Reported and estimated total 
Nevada gold exploration expenditures are summarized in Table 5. Since junior 
companies by definition had no operating income against which to write-off exploration 
expenses, pre-tax and after-tax values are equal and represent full cost dollars. 
Canadian Stock Companies
These are corporations, "development stage companies" in securities parlance, 
whose stock was traded primarily on a Canadian exchange and which lacked a significant 
source of operating income. Many Canadian stock companies involved in gold exploration
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TABLE 5
CAPITALIZED AND EXPENSED NEVADA GOLD EXPLORATION





SM i II ions
Total
SMillions
Error at 90% 
Confidence
1988 14 5 19 2
1987 20 6 26 3
1986 10 6 16 2
1985 9 4 12 2
1984 7 2 9 4
1983 7 2 9 3
1982 5 1 6 3
1981 5 2 6 3
1980 5 2 6 2
1979 5 2 8 2
1978 5 3 8 1
1977 3 2 5 1
1976 2 1 3 1
were small and short-lived. Very little information regarding their activities was 
published outside of an occasional press release in the Northern Miner and an annual 
summary in the Canadian Mines Handbook. Canadian Mines Handbooks provided most of 
the predictor variables used in estimating their Nevada gold exploration expenditures.
Records accounting for only 10% of total exploration expenditures by Canadian 
stock companies were obtained directly from the companies. Information on 10% of 
estimated expenditures was gleaned from Canadian Mines Handbooks. Fortunately, 
project-by-project disclosures of exploration expenditures in annual financial state­
ments provided records for an additional 20%. The remaining 60% were estimated by 
regression. Estimated total expenditures are summarized in Table 6.
Unclassified Organizations
A large number of organizations filing notices of intent with the Bureau of Land 
Management and U.S. Forest Service could not be identified as senior, junior or Canadian
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TABLE 6
CAPITALIZED AND EXPENSED NEVADA GOLD EXPLORATION








Error at 90% 
Confidence
1988 19 4 23 1
1987 24 5 29 2
1986 11 2 13 1
1985 5 2 7 1
1984 13 3 16 1
1983 8 5 13 1
1982 2 4 6 <1
1981 6 1 7 1
1980 3 <1 4 1
1979 2 <1 2 <1
1978 1 <1 1 <1
1977 1 <1 1 <1
1976 1 <1  ̂1 <1
stock companies or their affiliates. In most cases, such organizations held no mining
claims in their own name and one or a few notices of intent to explore filed with the BLM
were the sole evidence of their existence. Attempts to contact these companies for 
information were unsuccessful. Total expenditures were estimated by regression on data 
contained in notices of intent filed with the BLM. Projects for which expenditures were 
known and for which notices of intent were filed by junior and Canadian stock companies 
and individuals were used to develop a regression model, as described in Appendix B. 
Estimation errors attending application of the resulting regression model to 
"Unclassified Organizations" should be regarded as benchmark errors only. Estimated 
expenditures for unclassified organizations are summarized in Table 7.
Lacking any data on unclassified organizations prior to 1981 when notices of 
intent became required by the BLM, earlier expenditures by these organizations were
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TABLE 7
EXPENSED NEVADA GOLD EXPLORATION






1 988 1 0 8










1 977 3 *
1976 2 ★
at 90%
* Factored estimate; no statistical error computed, 
approximated as a weighted percentage of expenditures estimated for junior and Canadian 
stock companies and individuals. Weighting was in accordance with the average ratio of 
regression estimated expenditures by unclassified organizations to those of junior and 
Canadian stock companies and individuals from 1981 through 1983. No estimation 
errors attend these rough approximations.
Expenditures by unclassified organizations probably represent the most spec­
ulative gold exploration investments undertaken in the state. Owing to limitations of the 
data base, no capitalized costs are attributed to this type of company.
Individuals
Two types of expenditures are attributed to individuals; initial claim location 
costs and annual assessment expenses.
Claim location expenditures were estimated on the basis of commercial fees. The
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average contractor-quoted cost for surveying, monumenting and filing documents for 
new claims in 1990 was about $100. The same constant dollar cost is assumed for all 
years (i.e.-1976 nominal cost = $100/2.08 GNP Deflator = $48). Although the 
expense of individuals doing their own location work may not be this high, the $100 per 
claim must also encompass the cost of prospecting work done by individuals and not 
captured elsewhere in this study.
Sixty-nine randomly selected prospectors listed as individual claim owners in 
the state and contacted for information regarding annual assessment costs were willing to 
divulge expenditures. Only five reported annual expenditures above the legally required 
$100 per claim. In none of these five cases were expenditures significantly above $100 
per claim. Many of the claim owners described development work which they personally 
performed, using their own equipment, but charged at commercial rates.
No claim owner would, for obvious legal reasons, report assessment work below 
the annual statutory requirement. However, a common belief in the industry is that 
annual assessment work is recorded by a significant number of claimants who have in 
fact performed little or no actual work. Verification of this belief was beyond the scope 
of this investigation. Therefore, $100 of assessment per claim was accepted as the 
basis for estimating exploration expenditures by individuals.
Estimated pre-tax exploration expenditures by prospectors are summarized in 
Table 8. No general assumptions were made regarding their ability to write off 
prospecting costs against other income.
The goal of most prospectors is to lease or option their claims to companies which 
will undertake exploration, and perform annual assessment work in the process. 
Expenditures by lessees on claims located and held in the names of individuals were there-
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TABLE 8
PRE-TAX NEVADA GOLD EXPLORATION
EXPENDITURES BY INDIVIDUALS
Year ^M illions Year m m
1988 6 1981 5
1987 5 1980 4
1 986 4 1979 3
1985 5 1978 2
1984 6 1977 1
1 983 6 1976 1
1982 5
fore estimated and subtracted from the 'individual expenditure" account to avoid 
duplication. While remaining annual costs estimated for individuals may appear high, it 
should be recognized that individual claimants in the state outnumber organizational 
claimants by 5 to 1. The largest claim holder of record in Nevada, on the basis of annual 
assessments filed, is an individual.
TOTAL EXPLORATION EXPENDITURES
Table 9 summarizes total exploration expenditures of all types and by all classes 
of organizations and individuals, including those in Newmont’s Area of Interest, for gold 
in Nevada during the relevant time period.
TABLE 9










Error at 90% 
ConfidenceU)
1988 122 40 28 190 16
1987 132 26 20 181 15
1986 76 32 7 116 16
1985 66 40 7 113 14
1984 75 40 9 125 15
1983 63 40 2 108 16
1982 55 23 4 82 11
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TABLE 9 (CONT'D)
Expensed Capitalized Mine Area Total Error at 90%
Year SMillions SMillions SMillions SMillions ConfidenceO)
1981 68 12 5 85 13
1980 35 21 2 59 7
1979 30 20 1 52 7
1978 25 21 <1 47 8
1977 16 15 1 33 10
1976 16 11 1 29 10
(1) Estimation errors not computed for individual prospector expenditures 
and pre-1981 expenditures by unclassified organizations.
The relationship between the price of bullion and pre-tax expensed plus 
capitalized gold exploration expenditures by organizations in Nevada and throughout the 
U.S. during the 1976-1988 period are presented in Figure 10. Mine area exploration 
and individual prospector costs are not included. U.S. expenditures were modified from 
Mackenzie and Doggett (1992). Investments by small organizations were not estimated 
in the Mackenzie and Doggett data, but were included in the Nevada estimates prepared 
for this study. Therefore, the absolute values for “other states", obtained by 
subtraction, are inaccurate. The figure does, however, illustrate relative magnitudes 
and trends.
Overall gains in Nevada gold exploration expenditures only modestly support 
findings by Eggert (1983) that annual increases in gold exploration budgets by U.S. and 
foreign mining and energy companies have been predominantly a response to long-term 
(5-year average) gold price trends. His hypothesis was that long-term prices, before 
all other factors, shape perceptions of future gold mining profitability, and conse­
quently, budgets.
While total U.S. gold exploration expenditures appear to closely parallel long and 
short term (1-year lagged) gold prices, Nevada gold expenditures have increased almost
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Figure 10. Annual Pre-tax Gold Exploration Expenditures in Nevada and 
the U.S. Expenditures are in millions of dollars; gold prices are in dollars.
continuously since 1976, despite a persistent real dollar decline in the gold price since 
1980. Factors other that long and short term prices must be predominantly responsible 
for Nevada exploration investment levels. One stimulus, not evaluated in this study, 
could be the motivating effect of numerous discoveries announced in the state. These 
would lower corporate estimates of discovery risk, thus offsetting the negative influence 
of declining gold prices.
Both Canadian and U.S. federal tax regulations have also had a major impact upon 
pre-tax and after-tax exploration expenditures. A significant portion of the 66% 
increase in after-tax expensed exploration by major companies from 1986 to 1987 
may be attributed to the decrease in the maximum corporate U.S. income tax rate from 
46% to 34%. The after-tax cost of a pre-tax exploration dollar increased from 52 
cents to more than 66 cents, owing to the tax rate change and required capitalization and 
5-year amortization of 30% of corporate exploration expenses.
Major increases in expenditures by Canadian stock companies have been induced 
by the implementation of flow-through share tax laws in Canada. Flow-through shares
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permit individual investors to risk after-tax, rather than pre-tax, dollars in gold 
exploration. This enabled Canadian mining entrepreneurs to raise a large amount of 
high-risk capital in the exchanges. The first flow-through share act in 1983-1984 
coincided with a 2.2 fold increase in Nevada gold exploration expenditures by Canadian 
stock companies. Flow-through mining shares gradually fell into disfavor, owing in 
part to the nature of the tax regulations, and by 1985 Nevada gold exploration 
expenditures by Canadian stock companies had returned to near their 1982 levels.
A second Canadian flow-through share act implemented in 1986 inspired 
renewed high-risk investment. Senior as well as start-up Canadian companies took 
advantage of the capital market. A substantial portion of the 33% increase in Nevada 
gold exploration expenditures from 1986 to 1987 by senior companies may be in-part 
due to risk capital made available by flow-through shares. Canadian stock companies 
more than tripled their level of expensed exploration between 1986 and 1987.
Exploration expenditures by most companies leveled off or began to decline after 
1988, a trend which continued through 1990, primarily in response to gold prices. 
Many senior companies adopted a wait-and-see attitude with respect to gold prices and 
cut back on new exploration programs to concentrate on inventoried mineral rights, 
mine area exploration and the development of existing reserve positions. This strategy 
may prove unsound, as discussed in Chapter 7 on the economics of Nevada gold 
exploration, and Chapter 12, Productivity Cycles. Most of the organizations pursuing a 
long-term "superior skills" strategy, as discussed in Chapter 7, resisted the traditional 




DISCOVERY DATE AND CREDIT
There is no generally accepted definition of a discovery. The major criterion 
used for this study was the first reported intercept of ore grade material in a mineable 
thickness, leading to further drilling in the immediate vicinity which ultimately 
resulted in the delineation of mineable reserves. The organization which drilled the 
first intercept was given credit for the discovery, irrespective of its method of entry 
into the project or the project's final disposition. The property might have been brought 
to the attention of the discovering entity by in-house staff, a grubstaker or via a 
submittal or joint venture offering. It may have been actually developed by a later 
lessee or owner.
The overwhelming majority of gold discoveries in Nevada during the relevant 
time period were associated with previously known mineral occurrences and mineral 
deposits. Classifications of these discoveries as to the actual date of discovery and 
organizational credit were in part subjective. Assignments in some cases were based 
upon judgments regarding the continuity of previously known mineral deposits with 
subsequently developed ore deposits, and the amount and antiquity of information 
regarding the mineral deposits. For example, credit for the discovery of a bulk mineable 
thickness of low-grade gold ore surrounding an area of historically mined high grade 
vein ore, even if some previously known high grade might remain, would go to the 
organization which drilled the low-grade material. In the case of a low grade deposit 
which had been partially drilled and abandoned owing to economic conditions at one point 
in time, yet later rendered potentially viable by metal price increases and drilled out by
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another organization, discovery credit was assigned to the initial exploration group and 
time period.
DISCOVERIES
Mineral resources and ore deposits which were discovered or sustained some 
production between 1976 and 1990 are summarily described in Table 10. Ore tons and 
waste:ore ratios are in most cases those reported in conjunction with the announcement 
of a development decision. These values are metal price/time dependent and should be 
regarded as "order of magnitude" estimates only.
For deposits not yet brought to production, latest publicly or privately 
obtainable information as of the end of 1990 is reported. Where only geologic reserve 
data was available, recoverable ounces were estimated as 65% of geologic reserves. This 
factor was developed from a comparison of the relationship between reported geologic 
reserves and recoverable ounces for fifteen producing gold ore deposits in the state. 
Reserves include oxide and economically recoverable carbonaceous and sulfide ores.
For producing ore deposits, "initial ounces" were estimated as cumulative 
production plus reported reserves at the end of 1990 minus recoverable ounces added 
through mine area discoveries subsequent to production start-up. "Final ounces" 
represent initial reserves plus additions from mine area exploration. Some of the 
deposits listed in Table 10 were partially mined and closed between 1990 and 1993. In 
these cases, initial and final ounces include reserves left in-place at closure which may 
be mined in the future should gold prices reach a sustained level of $384 per ounce in 
1990 dollars. Goldstrike/Betze and operations in Newmont's Area of Interest are
excluded from the table.















S 1066 12 2.5 1069 830000 1000000
J 1070 0.6 UG 1003 84000 84000
s 1070 7.7 6 1081 454000 54IOOO
s 1070 12 2 1078 530000 7768000
s 1071 3.3 2 1084 109000 194000
s 1071 1 UG 1081 166000 166000
J 1971 6.5 2 1080 80000 80000
s 1072 6 3 1080 120000 176000
J 1072 6.5 10 1000 487000 009000
J 1074 15 3 1079 450000 1200000
c 1074 10 2.5 1008 23G000 402000
s 1074 0.0 3.2 1007 45000 75000
J 1074 1.4 3 1070 28000 170000
J 1075 0.2 OP/UG 1084 13000 13000
s 1076 0 2.5 1075 277000 413000
s 1075 11 7 1006 100000 316000
s 1078 . 7 6 1080 332000 023000
s 1076 1.5 2.5 1907 56000 190000
s 1078 8 0 1089 1240000 1267000
s 1076 12 5.2 1081 2440000 4611000
s 1076 11 3 1088 330000 335000
s 1077 12 6 1981 519000 622000
s 1077 1 10 1980 66000 176000
s 1077 1.3 6 1008 40000 71000
s 1078 15 17 1078 1030000 2463000
s 1078 5.4 1.7 1001 144000 404000
J 1078 0.3 2 1081 21000 21000
J 1078 0.5 2 1084 23000 23000
s 1078 3.1 7 1002 171000 207000
s 1070 0.7 4 1007 23000 23000
s 1080 17.7 1.1 1086 392000 813000
s 1000 1 2.5 1080 15000 15000
s 1080 6.3 2 1088 159000 370000
s 1080 8.4 8 1008 627000 827000
9 1081 1 5 1089 33000 43000
c 1001 3 6 1003 200000 236000
s 1081 2.2 12 1005 130000 206000
s 1081 6 1 1008 230000 290000
s 1001 4.7 4 1084 281000 635000
s 1081 1.3 2.8 1080 52000 71000
8 1081 2.5 1 1005 40000 163000
s 1081 5.3 2 1084 131000 131000
s 10B1 1.8 1.4 1985 138000 138000
J 1082 0.4 10 1087 02000 127000
MINERAL DEPOSIT DISCOVEniES(l)
C ap ita lized $384 Price Laval (3) $330 P r lc * Lava l (3)
Exp in . (2) NPV 0  10% DCF-non NPV 0  10% DCF-non
3.2 15 0.72 5 0.72
l . l -15 <0 •15 <0
1.2 6 0.16 5 0.15
4 64 0.17 20 0.15
3.4 •4 <0 •4 <0
0 -27 <0 •27 <0
4.6 •0 <0 •0 <0
6 -17 <0 -17 <0
3 69 1.06 51 1.6
11 •24 <0 -24 <0
6.3 1 0.13 -4 0.06
0.6 -1 0.02 •1 0.02
1.0 •2 <0 -2 <0
0.5 •3 <0 •3 <0
2.1 5 0.12 5 0.12
1.1 •1 <0 -1 <0
4.6 •13 0.06 -15 0.03
0.6 •1 <0 •1 . <0
6.1 •33 0.01 -51 <0
7.3 07 0.20 71 0.26
7.0 •3 <0 -3 <0
8.2 •13 <0 -13 <0
0.5 6 1.6 5 1.33
1.3 •5 <0 -5 <0
0.5 12 0.13 6 0.11
6.4 30 0.61 20 0.61
0.2 -3 <0 -3 <0
0.7 •1 <0 -1 <0
3.0 0 0.34 5 0.31
0.4 1 1.04 1 1.04
3.0 15 0.24 4 0.17
3 • 1 <0 -1 <0
1.2 •13 <0 •14 <0
4.6 11 0.17 -1 0.09
1.6 •2 <0 -2 <0
1.0 6 2.03 3 2.60
6.3 •5 <0 •5 <0
5 •11 <0 -13 <0
2.0 21 0.30 15 0.34
1 3 0.43 3 0.43
4.3 -0 <0 -8 <0
2 •6 <0 -5 <0
1.7 -20 <0 -20 <0
2.4 •1 0.04 -2 <0
Table 10 (Conl'd)
Co. D isc. O re Torn W :0 D eveloped In itia l F ina l Gold C apita lized 1314 P t lc t L t v t l $330 Price L t v t l
Class Year M illio n s Ratio (FCY-1) Oz. Recov. Oz. Recov. Expin. (3) n p v  a  io % DCF-ROR NPV 9  10% DCF-ROR
S 1082 2.7 5 1003 234000 668000 1 i i 0.24 7 0.22
S 1082 3 20 1087 337000 362000 6.1 -24 <0 *24 <0
j 1902 1.2 (.5 1085 60000 62000 1.3 •3 <0 -3 <0
S 1082 2.0 2 1080 81000 07000 2.1 •7 <0 -7 <0
s 1082 1 OPAJQ 1086 77000 77000 9 0 -15 <0 •15 <0
s 1082 7.5 1.5 1085 1062000 2200000 3.2 174 1.3 154 1.15
s 1083 0.0 0 1087 737000 1010000 4.6 40 0.34 24 0.29
s 1983 16.6 2 1085 1643000 1602000 6.3 05 0.41 00 0.36
s 10B3 24 2 1080 050000 1056000 5.5 33 0.43 15 0.3
J 1083 2 1.0 1087 47000 127000 5.0 •0 <0 •9 <0
s 1084 10.4 3.5 1990 439000 454000 6 3 7 0.23 -2 0.07
J 1084 0.4 5 1084 23000 23000 1.3 •2 <0 -2 <0
s 1084 1.2 2.8 1987 46000 46000 1.2 5 1.7 5 1.7
s 1084 2.7 6 1089 75000 75000 2.3 •0 <0 -0 <0
s 1084 0.5 2 1086 20000 33000 0.3 0 0.1 0 <0
s 1005 . 22 1 1007 2260000 3035000 7.1 217 0.06 154 1
s 1085 1.7 1 1900 51000 51000 2.5 •2 <0 -2 . <0
s 1085 1.0 4.6 1087 22000 32000 1.4 -1 <0 -1 <0
s 1085 t2 S 1080 607000 607000 4.0 0 0.1 -14 <0
s 1086 17 7 1089 1332000 1554000 6.0 7 0.13 -24 <0
s 1088 50 7 1086 3340000 3348000 7.5 38 0.16 -5 0.00
s 1086 8.5 3.2 10B9 97000 123000 0.6 -3 <0 -3 <0
J 1086 0.25 1.5 1067 10000 18000 0.7 •5 <0 -5 <0
s 1086 0.5 2 1086 11000 11000 0.4 1 1.6 1 1.6
s 1086 70 0.5 1086 1535000 2637000 7.2 •5 0.07 -17 <0
J 1067 1.6 3 1080 66000 108000 2.3 1 0.73 1 0.58
s 1067 47 10 1090 2096000 2096000 17.6 08 0.24 27 0.16
s 1087 10.7 0.5 1088 161000 234000 1.1 0 0.45 7 0.39
s 1080 24 0 1991 1730000 1739000 7.4 04 0.35 44 0.24
UNDEVELOPED DEPOSITS
S 1081 1.2 4 127000 2.2 6 0.06 4 0.60
S 1083 6.6 3.5 444000 5.7 10 0.19 2 0.11
S 1084 3.5 4 105000 1.2 -1 0.02 •4 0
S 1085 2.2 2.5 74000 3.3 -1 0.05 •2.5 <0
S 1087 1.6 4 77000 1.7 1 0.42 •1 <0
S 1067 0.5 OPAJQ 000000 6.0 7 0.13 -12 0.05
s 1080 2.3 OPAJQ 400000 4 36 0.31 23 0.25
(1) Discoveries In Nowmonl's area of Interest, Goldslrike/Oelze, Atlanta and deposits ol less than 10,000 recoverable ounces omlltod.
(2) Additional $43 million assumed capitalized against unlisted projects which neither produced between 1076 and 1000 
nor were deemed commercial at the gold price levels used In oconomlo analyses.
(3) Dlscoverlos with Identical economic parameters at both price levels had ceased oporallons by 1000 so were nol allocted by projected gold prices.
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TIME TRENDS IN DISCOVERY
The cumulative ounces of recoverable gold discovered each year from 1976 
through 1989 in the state are plotted in Figure 11. Values are based upon “final 
ounces", so include additions through mine area discoveries made in years after the 
initial discovery, but credited to the initial discovery year. This is in part responsible 
for the apparent declining rate of discovery during 1988-1989. Ultimate ounces 
attributed to 1988-1989 discoveries may be significantly above those used to generate 
Figure 11 owing to future increases resulting from mine area exploration. Discoveries 
in Newmont's Area of Interest and Goldstrike/Betze are excluded, as are pre-1976 
discoveries.
Oxidized Ore &  l::::::l S u lfide  Ore
C arbonaceous Ore
Figure 11. Cumulative Ounces of Recoverable Gold Discovered 
in Nevada, 1976-1989. $384 per ounce future price level.
DISCOVERY RISK
“Mineral occurrences" are uneconomic but anomalous concentrations of minerals 
that are common ore minerals elsewhere. Mineral occurrences may or may not be 
associated with mineral resources and ore deposits. “Discovery risk" is the low
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probability that exploration of a single mineral occurrence (prospect) will result in the 
discovery of a “mineral resource" or an “ore deposit". The discovery of a "mineral 
resource" is considered to occur when indications of potentially economic grades across 
mineable widths are obtained, usually by drilling. Such discoveries represent technical 
or geological successes. If sufficient grades and tonnages of ore are delineated to support 
commercial production, the discovery is an "ore deposit". This is an economic success.
The probability of discovering a mineral resource or ore deposit by exploring a 
mineral occurrence may be estimated as the historical ratio of discoveries to total 
mineral occurrences tested. For this purpose, the total number of mineral occurrences 
tested in Nevada from 1976 through 1988 was estimated in two ways.
Average direct expenditures per exploration project as reported by 10 senior 
companies and 5 junior organizations, and extracted from corporate annual reports for 
25 Canadian stock companies, were computed. For the same companies, overhead and 
general exploration costs which could not be attributed to a particular project were 
estimated by subtraction to be 40% of the average exploration budget. The ratio of non­
project costs to total expenditures was relatively constant for all types of organizations. 
Factoring these costs from annual expensed exploration reported in Tables 4 through 6 
and dividing by the unit project cost estimated for each type of organization yielded the 
estimates of non-productive prospects tested from 1976 through 1988. Successful 
project counts were added to produce the values reported in Table 11. The industry-wide 
weighted average direct cost per project was $250 thousand; the weighted average 
overhead and prospecting cost allocated to each project was $167 thousand.
To confirm estimates of the number of projects based upon expenditures, counts 
were of made of prospect names listed in the USFS and BLM notice of intent and plan of
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TABLE 11
DISCOVERY PROBABILITIES IN NEVADA GOLD EXPLORATION, 1976-1988
Probability of
Mean Direct Discoverina:
Organization Expenditure Number of Mineral Ore
Classification Per Project Projects Resource Deposit
Senior Companies $260,000 1,573 .052 .020
Junior Companies^) $150,000 504 .021 .002
Canadian Stock Companies^) $340,000 207 .025 .005
Unclassified Organizations $ 70,000 786 ? <.001
(1) Includes multi-company investments, jointly or successively, in the same project, 
operation files and in Canadian Mines Handbooks. The total, after adjustment for 
projects on non-federal land, was 3,184, compared to 2,988 estimated on the basis of 
exploration expenditures. The 7% variance was deemed reasonable; the average of the 
two counts was used to estimate the probabilities in Table 11.
The historical probability of discovering a mineral resource given a mineral 
occurrence is the ratio of the total number of mineral resources discovered by each class 
of organization to the total prospects tested by that class. Included in the tabulation of 
probabilities for mineral resources were only those 96 discoveries for which some 
grades and tonnages had been publicly reported as of the end of 1990. The historical 
probability of discovering an ore deposit (DCF-ROR >10% and gross revenue >$15 
million) given a mineral occurrence is the number of ore deposits discovered divided by 
the number of prospects tested. These probabilities are listed in Table 11. Pre-1976 
discoveries and those in Newmont's Area of Interest were excluded from the tabulations.
No "mineral resource” discoveries could be attributed to any unclassified 
organization, although some may have occurred and been unreported. Excluding 
unclassified organizations, the industry-wide average probability of discovering a
4 6
mineral resource given a mineral occurrence was about .04. The probability of 
discovering an ore deposit given a mineral occurrence was .011. This computed success 
ratio, based upon rigid criteria and an extensive data search, is surprisingly close to 
the one-in-one-hundred rule of thumb often cited throughout the exploration 
profession.
Canadian stock companies tended to concentrate their effort on a limited number 
of properties in the advanced stages of exploration, frequently pooled resources with 
other Canadian stock companies and/or cycled the same property through a series of 
successively organized corporations to raise needed capital. These practices, coupled 
with large outlays on single projects by a few organizations, are responsible for the 
higher mean direct cost per project attributed to Canadian stock companies.
DISCOVERY QUALITY RISK
Discovery quality risk is measured by the possible variability in net present 
value and rate of return given an economic gold discovery. To estimate this risk, 
capitalized project discovery and delineation costs were integrated with development and 
production cash flows (see Chapters 5 and 6) for gold deposits discovered between 1976 
and 1989 to yield the distributions depicted in Figures 12 and 13. Net present values 
for Figure 12 were estimated by future worthing capitalized project exploration 
expenditures and present worthing production cash flows to the start of development at a 
10% real discount rate.
Modified rates of return in Figure 13 were estimated by future worthing 
capitalized project exploration expenditures to the start of development at a 10% 
discount rate, summing exploration with development and construction costs, then 
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Figure 12. Histogram of Development Net 
















6% 15% 25% 36% 46% 65% 65% 76% 86% 95% 420%
Development DCF-ROR C ell M idpoin t
Figure 13. Histogram of Modified 
Development Rates of Return.
exploration plus development and construction investments.
Estimations of economic parameters at the start of development, rather than the 
start of exploration, were necessary to evaluate discovery quality risk because of the 
misleading leveraging effect which a single year's difference in the exploration period
4 8
for a project has upon present value and rate of return computed at the beginning of 
exploration. Capitalized discovery and delineation costs were integrated in what 
otherwise would be “development net present values and DCF-ROR” because these costs 
are also partial measures of overall discovery economic quality.
Only those deposits, developed and undeveloped, with positive rates of return 
(DCF-ROR > 0) at the gold base price of $384 per ounce are included in Figures 12 and
13. Those with DCF-ROR's below 10% bear negative NPV's. High rates of return and 
NPV's for a few mines are in part a consequence of limited initial production scales with 
small capitalization at start-up, followed by expansion financed from internal cash flow.
Figure 14 is a probability plot of the development net present values of economic 
Nevada gold discoveries, including capitalized exploration costs, at the $384 per ounce 
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Figure 14. Probability Plot of Development 
Net Present Values at 10% Discount Rate.
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The variability of return, given an economic discovery, is illustrated by the almost 
fifty-fold difference in value between the lower-decile and upper decile ($1.9 million 
and $96 million respectively). Given the discovery of an economic deposit, there is an 
80% chance that it will yield a lower than average return.
MINE AREA DISCOVERIES
Mine area exploration additions to known reserves are most often small 
discoveries resulting from the drill testing of targets identified during primary 
exploration, but not pursued until after production has begun for reasons of economy. 
However, not all mine area discoveries are small, and, even if small, their cumulative 
effect upon the economics of an operation may be significant.
The difference between initial recoverable ounces and final ounces in Table 10 
results from mine area discoveries. To the extent possible, additions to initial ounces 
for Table 10 were based upon published statements of newly identified reserves only, 
rather than year-to-year reserve accounting. The purpose of this approach was to 
exclude reserves uncovered in the normal course of mining, ounces added through cutoff 
grade changes, and increases resulting from improved metallurgical recovery and pit 
redesign. The accuracy achieved in these exclusions is uncertain since, in many cases, 
very generalized statements in corporate annual reports were relied upon for evidence. 
All ounces produced plus ore reserves inventoried as of the end of 1990 and not 
attributable to identified mine area discoveries were credited to the initially discovered 
ore reserve.
Figure 15 is a probability distribution showing the likelihood of increasing 
initially discovered and delineated recoverable reserves at a site by some percentage 
through mine area exploration. It is based upon historical experience at mines with ini-
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Figure 15. Ore Reserve Increases from Mine Area Exploration.
tial recoverable reserves of at least 100,000 ounces and which had operated for at least 
two years as of the end of 1990. Operations with smaller reserves were excluded 
because of typical under-exploration. Those with less than two years of production have 
had too little time to fully explore mineral properties surrounding the mine.
The best-fit cumulative frequency line in Figure 15 exhibits lognormal 
characteristics for the underlying population of satellite discoveries. Departure of the 
data from ideal lognormality below an increase of about 20% may be attributed in part 
to the selective mention of only significant reserve additions in corporate annual
reports.
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The inset to Figure 15 is a linear plot of initial recoverable reserves versus 
proportional increases from mine area exploration. It illustrates that the potential to 
significantly increase reserves through mine area exploration is somewhat dependent 
upon original reserve size. However, regression of proportional additions upon initial 
reserve sizes did not detect a statistically significant relationship.
As an example of utility, Figure 15 indicates that for a new discovery in an area 
which has been subjected to the average level of pre-development exploration, there is a
0.50 probability that recoverable reserves will be increased 45% through exploration 
within an economic haulage distance of the original find. The probability of doubling the 
initial reserve is about 0.20.
Excluding Cove, Newmont's Area of Interest and Goldstrike/Betze, the average 
addition for all mines operated between 1976 and 1990 was 45% of initial recoverable 
ounces. Cove was excluded because of the discovery sequence for the McCoy-Cove 
complex. McCoy, which could be regarded as a satellite to Cove, was discovered and 
placed into production first. Considering only mines which had been exhausted or were 
near depletion by the end of 1990, the average percentage increase from initial to final 
recoverable reserves was 52%. Total reserves for these 15 mines were increased from 
an initial 2 million ounces to 2.9 million ounces, a weighted average gain of 45%.
The greater average addition to initially discovered reserves through mine area 
exploration for mines near depletion compared to newer mines (52% versus 45%) 
illustrates a probable source of error in economic analyses in this investigation. Data 
for older mines tends to be more complete than that for newer mines, and valuations of 
ore deposits not yet in production are even less certain. Longer production histories 
afford operators a greater opportunity to identify the ultimate ore reserve potential in a
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mine area. Consequently, the newer the mine, the greater the estimation error in 
projected cash flows. Errors are significantly larger for undeveloped deposits.
Lacking a method for adjusting the current reserves at newer mines to reflect 
possible future reserve additions, unadjusted 1990-1991 reserves as reported by 
operators were employed in economic analyses. Nor were provisions made in economic 
projections for mine area exploration costs. This tends to understate the value of more 
recent discoveries compared to older discoveries. It should be noted however, that while 
for mines already depleted in the state the average percentage increase from initial to 
ultimate recoverable ounces was 52%, all operating mines (closed and standby mines 
excluded) at the end of 1990 had already achieved an average increase of 40% from mine 
area discoveries. If historical trends persist, the overall bias against newer mines in 
economic analyses should be less than 12% of gross revenues, translating to less than 
4% of constant dollar net cash flows. Discounting effects upon these possible future 
revenues should serve to further minimize the bias against newer mines.
MATURITY OF THE EXPLORATION ENVIRONMENT
Allias (1957) found that ore deposits are lognormally distributed with respect 
to size, a hypothesis recently confirmed by Cox and Singer (USGS, 1986). Therefore, in 
a mature exploration environment where many deposits have been discovered, their dis­
tribution is expected to approximate lognormality and to plot along a straight line on a 
lognormal probability scale. This has also been found to hold true for oil and gas pool 
size distributions (Arps and Roberts, 1958; Kaufman, 1962; McCrossan, 1969).
The distribution of Nevada precious metal ore deposit sizes is plotted on a 
lognormal-probability scale in Figure 16. The abscissa shows the cumulative fraction 
of deposits at or below a certain deposit size in thousands of ounces of recoverable gold
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Cumulative Frequency (%)
Figure 16. Log-probability Plot of Nevada Gold Ore Deposit Sizes.
equivalents. Included in the plot is all historically recorded gold and silver production 
in the state, some as early as the late 1800's, and the recoverable portion of reserves 
known as of 1990-1991. Ore deposits in Newmont Gold's Area of Interest and 
Goldstrike/Betze were excluded. The resulting log-probability plot defines an almost 
ideal straight line, suggesting that Nevada's gold exploration environment, excluding the
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AOI, is very mature.
Rendu and Guzman (1991) prepared a similar maturity analysis for Carlin 
Trend gold deposits, most of which occur within Newmont's Area of Interest. Their data, 
based upon geologic resources rather than recoverable ounces, and modified to exclude 
deposits outside of the AOI, is plotted as the inset to Figure 16. Larger deposits are 
over-represented, probably because they are easier to discover. A deficiency of deposits 
smaller than 250,000 ounces in this case is attributed to economic censorship. 
Newmont's Area of Interest appears immature and the process of discovery very 
incomplete compared to the rest of the state.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCOVERY AND DELINEATION COSTS
DISCOVERY COSTS
Considering only ore deposits with at least 50,000 ounces of recoverable gold, 
costs incurred only on the discovery property (successful efforts) plus an allocated 
portion of overhead and only to the point of the first economic intercept, the average 
discovery cost in Nevada from 1976 through 1988 was about $1.70 per recoverable 
ounce. Only those ounces developed in the initially discovered ore deposit were included 
in estimating this figure. It is a rough estimate because only annual exploration 
expenditures for each discovery are known, and the exact date in the year for each initial 
intercept leading to a discovery (the accounting boundary between discovery and 
delineation) is generally unknown. As an approximation, all on-site exploration 
expenditures prior to discovery years and fifty percent of discovery year expenditures 
were uniformly employed in calculating the $1.70 per ounce cost.
If total exploration expenditures by economically successful companies making 
discoveries in Nevada are considered, the average discovery cost was $8.50 per ounce 
between 1976 and 1989. Twenty-one discoveries by 12 companies and total 
expenditures of $234 million underlay this estimate. Total discovery plus delineation 
costs per ounce by economically successful exploration organizations are plotted against 
ounces discovered in Figure 17. Each bar in Figure 17 represents discovery and 
delineation costs for a single company; millions of recoverable ounces discovered by 
each company are plotted on the x-axis. In some cases, discovered ounces include more 
than one ore deposit.
Inclusion of total exploration expenditures by all companies credited with an ore
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Figure 17. Economically Successful Company 
Discovery and Delineation Costs per Ounce.
discovery in the state brings the computed discovery cost to $30 per recoverable ounce. 
Companies responsible for the large cost increase located mineable ore, but exploration 
expenses exceeded the net value realized from development and production. Thirty-six 
discoveries by twenty-six companies and total exploration expenditures of $442 million 
underlay the $30 per ounce figure.
Even the $30 per ounce discovery cost estimated above for all companies making 
discoveries, both economically successful and unsuccessful, fails to indicate the true 
sunk cost in an ounce of gold before development and extraction. Expenditures by 
companies which conducted gold exploration in the state but discovered neither mineral 
resources nor ore were not included in calculating the $30 per ounce cost. If industry­
wide Nevada gold expenditures from 1976 through 1988, excluding mine area 
exploration, are averaged over initially discovered recoverable ounces, the cost becomes 
$37 per ounce. Adding ounces discovered through mine area exploration and mine area 
exploration expenditures to the equation decreases estimated cost per ounce to $33. This 
hierarchy of “discovery cost per ounce" is repeated in Table 12 for clarity. Discovery
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costs in Canada, Australia, Brazil, South Africa and "other countries", as estimated by 
Mackenzie and Doggett (1992), are listed for comparison.
For a true measure of "discovery cost per ounce" the time value of exploration 
investments, both successful and unsuccessful, must be charged against recoverable 
ounces. This additional cost is considered in Chapter 7, Economics of Nevada Gold 
Exploration.
TABLE 12
DISCOVERY COSTS PER OUNCE OF GOLD 
(Pre-tax direct and indirect costs)
Recoverable
N EVA DA .1976-1988 OunceU)
Successful efforts only $ 2
Economically successful companies only $ 8
Economically and technically successful companies $30
All companies, including mine area exploration and ounces $33
All companies, excluding mine area exploration and ounces $37
Reserve
NATIONAL. 1969-1990(1)(2) Ounce






(1) Costs to point of first ore intercept; delineation costs not included.
(2) From Mackenzie & Doggett (1992).
The U.S. discovery cost of $35 per ounce estimated by Mackenzie & Doggett 
(1992) was based upon expenditures reported by senior companies and a few larger 
junior exploration organizations. As much as 20% of sunk costs, representing 
expenditures by non-reporting junior and unclassified organizations and individuals,
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may have been excluded. Total U.S. discovery costs in the range of $40-$50 per reserve 
ounce, or $50-$60 per recoverable ounce, may be more accurate.
ORE RESERVE DELINEATION AND FEASIBILITY COSTS
Ore reserve delineation and feasibility costs are defined as including all expenses 
incurred after an initial economic intercept but prior to a development decision on 
successful projects. Delineation and feasibility are treated as exploration functions, but 
on successful projects are transitional between exploration and development. On 
projects ending with insufficient ore to support development and production, delineation 
drilling and feasibility costs are wholly charged to exploration. Only successful efforts 
delineation and feasibility costs are considered here.
Figure 18 relates successful-efforts delineation and feasibility costs per ounce 
to ore deposit size, in terms of recoverable ounces, for gold deposits containing at least 
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Figure 18. Ore Reserve Delineation and Feasibility 
Cost Per Ounce Versus Deposit Size.
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Costs are those directly attributed to the initial discovery at each site; additions from 
later mine area exploration and delineation are excluded. The weighted average cost was 
$6.40 per ounce. At the weighted average in-place grade of 0.06 ounces per ton 
reported for Nevada mines (Dobra and Thomas, 1990) and an average metallurgical 
recovery factor of 90% for Nevada operations, this translates to about $0.35 per ton of 
mineable ore.
Thirty-eight discoveries containing 23 million ounces with incurred delineation 
costs of $148 million are represented in Figure 18. The relationship between 
delineation cost per ounce and contained ounces is lognormal, reflecting economies of 
scale primarily controlled by the underlying lognormal distribution of ore deposit sizes. 
MINE AREA DISCOVERY AND DELINEATION COSTS
Figure 19 illustrates reserves added annually through mine area exploration, 
compared to annual mine area exploration expenditures. Expenditures are lagged by one 
year, based upon a best fit, assuming principal investments preceded the announcement 
of newly discovered reserves by one year. Production-stage reserve additions at Cove, in 
Newmont's Area of Interest and by Barrick at Goldstrike/Betze are excluded, as are large 
additions at Round Mountain achieved through metallurgical advances. The inset to 
Figure 19 shows cumulative average discovery and delineation costs per ounce and 
cumulative ounces discovered, illustrating a small decline in mine area discovery cost 
per ounce through time.
Between 1981 and 1988 the average mine area discovery and delineation cost 
per recoverable ounce was about $6. The comparable successful-efforts cost for newly 
discovered and delineated reserves was about $8.10 per ounce ($1.70 + $6.40), and 
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Figure 19. Annual Mine Area Exploration 
Expenditures versus Discovered Ounces.
$6.80 per ounce for economically successful companies. The total expected cost of 
reserve replacement through new discoveries was therefore $14.90 per ounce ($6.80 
+ $1.70 + $6.40) versus $6 per ounce through mine area exploration.
TIME TRENDS IN ORIGINAL DISCOVERY COSTS
Cumulative discovery and delineation costs per ounce for new discoveries through 
time are shown in Figure 20. These are based upon industry-wide capitalized and 
expensed, successful and unsuccessful exploration investments. Ultimate recoverable 
ounces known as of 1990-1991 were credited to the initial discovery year, but mine 
area exploration costs were excluded, in preparing Figure 20. It is apparent that while 
the rate of discovery has gradually increased, the industry - wide difficulty and expense
s
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Expensed l I C apita lized
Figure 20. Cumulative Pre-tax 
Exploration Expenditures per Ounce.
of discovery have increased at a more rapid pace.
Most discoveries during the early phase of the current gold rush were associated 
with exposed mineralization in the immediate vicinity of historical gold and silver 
producers; the rapid rise in average discovery costs from 1976 through 1981 reflects 
the progressive exhaustion of this type of target. During the cost plateau from 1981 
through 1986, exploration efficiency was at its highest as concealed targets with more 
obscure geologic signatures were tested. Cumulative discovery and delineation costs 
hovered around $30 per ounce. Higher costs which would reflect increasing target 
depths and ore deposit complexity are not evident. Cumulative capitalized exploration 
cost per ounce increased from $8 per ounce in 1987 to $9 per ounce in 1988, re­
flecting the delineation of deeper sulfide mineralization.
The large increase in expensed (unsuccessful) exploration cost per discovered 
ounce beginning in 1987 could be due in part to declining productivity of the exploration 
environment, but other factors may perhaps be even more responsible. The average 
pre-discovery exploration period for a gold ore deposit has been five years. Some of the
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more recently expensed exploration reflected in Figure 20 may eventually result in 
discoveries and be capitalized (i.e.- Waterpipe Canyon).
In addition to the investment/discovery time lag possibly reflected in 1987- 
1988 discovery costs per ounce, the business efficiency of exploration in the state is 
also believed to have declined significantly during the same years; effective exploration 
for invested dollar declined as expenditures by Canadian stock companies and junior 
organizations increased (see Chapter 7). Finally, deeper sulfide targets which recently 
became popular are more costly to pursue. Overall discovery costs per ounce must have 
increased accordingly.
It is widely held that the cost of discovery in an exploration environment 
increases progressively through time because surface and near surface deposits are 
located and the search must penetrate greater depths. If this were true for oxidized gold 
ore deposits in Nevada, waste:ore ratios should be higher for presumably deeper, more 
recent discoveries than for earlier and shallower discoveries. Figure 21, plotting 
initial waste:ore ratios for oxide ore discoveries through time, does not support 
"common wisdom". Waste:ore ratios for more recent discoveries do not differ system­
atically from those of earlier discoveries. It appears that weaker and more complex 
geologic signatures and a veneer of pediment cover, rather than greater depths, must be 
responsible for the higher cost per discovery through time. In short, while greater 
exploration skills may be required, Nevada's ability to yield near surface gold discov­
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CHAPTER 5
DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION CASH FLOW 
SOURCES AND CRITIQUE OF DATA
The principal source of information on production, capital and operating costs 
and revenues for Nevada's gold mines was the Nevada State Department of Taxation's net 
proceeds of mines tax files. Special authorization was obtained from the Director of the 
Department of Taxation to extract information from the files under an agreement of 
confidentiality. This data was supplemented with information from corporate annual 
reports and information obtained directly from operators. Standard engineering and 
econometric methods were used to estimate unreported costs, as described in Appendix D.
A large amount of data was collected for each ore deposit of interest in this study. 
However, cost information for older mines tends to be more complete than that for newer 
mines, and information on physical parameters which would permit reliable economic 
modeling of potentially economic but undeveloped ore deposits is even more questionable. 
Consequently, the newer the mine, the greater the estimation errors in development and 
production cash flow projections.
Statistical errors stemming from regression estimations of missing data for 
development and production cash flow projections are also reported in Appendix D. 
These represent measurable, stochastic errors only. The tabulation of total possible 
errors is not feasible for the engineering cost estimating methods employed to project 
future cash flows. Numerous assumptions regarding equipment replacement, fixed 
production rates, future taxes and inflation, etc. were required. However, every effort 
was made to employ unbiased assumptions, and to target a bench-mark accuracy of at
most ±15% in annual cash flows for each mine model. It is believed that neither bias
6 5
nor absolute errors materially affect conclusions based upon industry-wide results in 
this study.
Nevada gold industry-wide development, construction and production costs from 
1976 through 1990 are summarized in Table 13. Production and revenues are reported 
in Table 14. These are aggregations of individual mine data for each year. Information 
underlying the tables is the historical evidence upon which future projections of 
production and cash flows were based.
T A B L E  1 3 . N E V A D A  P R E C IO U S  M E T A L  M IN E  E X P E N D IT U R E S  
(E x p e n d itu re s  In m illio n s  o l 1 9 9 0  U .S . d o lla rs . T o ta ls  in e x a c t d u e  to  ro u n d in g .)
C O S T  T Y P E ______________________ 7 ? 7 7 79 7 9 90 91 92 93 84 95 88 97 00 09 90
M in e  A re a  E x p lo r a t io n 2 1 1 1 4 10 15 11 15 18 24 41 68 77 7 8
N e w  P la n t  C a p ita l 5 0 0 48 1 146 198 4 13 34 2 2 0 115 8 6 644 673 224
E x p a n  &  R e p l.  C a p t l. 5 6 3 9 2 7 31 35 57 28 91 112 166 214 105
C a p i t a l iz e d  D e v e lp 't  (1 ) 5 0 0 7 34 16 3 1 2 3 2 0 6 31 8 29 3
E x p e n s e d  D e v e lp 't  (1 ) 0 0 0 30 15 15 0 19 47 1 23 64 91 104 191
M in in g  &  H a u la g e  (1 ) 16 18 21 20 55 7 9 101 134 129 161 189 2 8 0 3 7 8 5 9 6 584
E x t r a c t io n  a n d  R e f in in g 12 13 13 36 56 84 103 103 115 138 184 271 3 8 6 4 6 7 5 2 5
In s u ra n c e  (2 ) 2 2 2 6 7 13 14 19 2 0 21 26 3 7 40 51 56
M a r k e t in g 0 1 0 1 2 14 19 15 12 9 25 4 0 35 41 2 9
M is c e l la n e o u s  (3) 4 3 5 6 11 10 19 21 23 2 0 36 4 0 7 6 104 110
R o y a lt ie s 2 2 2 3 4 7 6 9 7 10 30 53 78 85 84
P r o p e r t y  T a x 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 3 4 5 9 15 16
N e t P ro c e e d s  T a x 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 4 3 3 6 13 15 36 3 8
R e p o r te d  S a lv a g e ____ Q . 0 ____ Q -1 -3 -1 -1 •2 -? -0 -2 -9 -1 0
S U B T O T A L  (4) 90 48 90 122 3 4 0 4 6 2 3 2 3 305 487 6 6 7 7 5 7 1 0 9 0 1990 2484 2 0 3 2
F e d e ra l T a x  P a y m e n ts 1 9 6 17 41 2 6 2 6 63 27 21 66 110 123 96 115
IT C  & L o s s  W r i t e - o f f  (5 ) -2 0 -11 -0 -13 -4? -54 -2 8 -1 3 -3 5 -54 -? 8 -2 8 -34 -87 -8 7
N e t F e d e ra l T a x -1 9 -2 -2 4 _ -0 __ :2 0 ____ -2 . 5 0 -8 -3 3 38 82 89 9 28
T O T A L  E X P E N D IT U R E S  (4 ) 7 9 4 5 96 126 3 4 0 4 3 4 3 2 0 4 3 5 4 7 9 6 3 4 7 9 5 1 1 7 2 2 0 8 0 2 4 9 3 2 0 6 0
(1 ) ‘ C a p ita liz e d ’  d e v e lo p m e n t p re c e d e s  th e  l l r s l  y e a r o l p ro d u c t io n ; ’ e x p e n s e d ' d e v e lo p m e n t o c c u rs  d u r in g  th e  f irs t y e a r  o l p ro d u c t io n . 
S u m  o l e x p e n s e d  d e v e lo p m e n t a n d  m in in g  c o s ts  as re p o rte d ; s e p a ra t io n  In to  ’ E x p e n s e d  D e v e lo p m e n t ’  a n d  ‘ M in in g  & H a u la g e ’  e s t im a te d .
(2 ) In c lu d e s  h a za rd , s o c ia l s e c u r ity , u n e m p lo y m e n t a n d  w o rk m e n s ' c o m p e n s a t io n  In s u ra n c e  o n ly .
(3 ) E s tim a te d  lo ca l co s ts  n o t a llo w e d  a s  n e t p ro c e e d s  tax  d e d u c t io n s  (s e e  A p p e n d ix  D ).
(4 ) C o rp o ra te  g e n e ra l a n d  a d m in is tra t iv e  c o s ts  n o t in c lu d e d .
(5 ) A s s u m e s  in v e s tm e n t ta x  c re d its  u s e d  in  y e a r  e a rn e d  a n d  o th e r  in c o m e  a g a in s t w h ic h  to  w r i le -o l l  lo s s e s .
Table 13 (Cont'd)
O P E R A T IN G  C O S T  P E R  O U N C E  O F  G O L D  P R O D U C T IO N  (1 )
(C o s ts  a n d  re v e n u e s  In 1990  U .S . d o lla rs  p e r  o u n c e . T o la ls  In e xa c t d u e  to  ro u n d in g .)
C O S T  T Y P E ____________________ - 7 6 77 7? 7 9 90 81 82 83 8-1 86 86 87 88 89  90
O re  D e v e lo p m e n t  (2 ) 12 13 12 13 12 9 9 9 8 7 7 7 6 7
M in in g  & H a u la g e  (2 ) 60 62 81 7 9 191 153 136 140 126 114 91 102 9 8 115 98
P ro c e s s in g 46 44 50 143 196 162 138 107 113 9 8 88 96 100 90 8 8
In s u ra n c e  (3 ) 7 8 10 2 2 25 24 19 2 0 19 15 12 13 10 10 9
M a rk e t in g 1 2 2 4 6 28 26 15 12 7 12 14 9 8 5
M is c e l la n e o u s  (4 ) 9 14 17 13 27 19 12 10 11 11 9 8 11 12 10
R o y a lt ie s 7 7 7 11 13 13 8 9 7 7 14 19 2 0 16 14
P ro p e r ty  T a x 4 3 6 4 7 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
N e t P ro c e e d s  T a x 1 1 2 3 7 2 2 4 3 2 3 5 4 7 6
C o rp o ra te  G & A 5 13 12 10 _____ 9 . 7 8 8 ___a 8
O p e ra t in g  C o s t  J /O z . 139 158 194 2 9 7 4 9 9 4 2 9 3 6 2 3 2 5 311 2 7 3 2 4 6 2 7 3 2 6 9 2 7 6 2 4 8
C o s h  C o s t  $ /O z . (5 ) 128 135 165 2 6 7 4 5 2 371 3 1 3 2 8 5 2 7 6 2 4 6 2 1 5 2 3 0 2 3 9 244 2 1 9
D e p re c ia t io n  (6 ) 27 23 31 2 9 34 36 29 24 3 3 32 27 24 2 7 3 0 2 9
T o ta l C o s t $ /O z . 166 101 2 2 5 3 2 0 5 3 3 4 6 5 391 3 4 9 344 3 0 5 2 7 3 297 2 9 6 3 0 6 2 7 7
R e v e n u e  $ /O z . (7 ) 259 2 0 7 3 4 9 5 0 9 934 606 501 5 4 9 4 4 2 381 4 2 5 496 4 7 5 4 0 7 3 9 4
(1 ) C o s ls  a p p o r t io n e d  to  b y p ro d u c t s ilv e r  b a s e d  u p o n  g ro s s  re v e n u e  ra tio s .
(2 ) P re p ro d . "o re  d e v e lo p m e n t ’ + 'm in in g  & h a u la g e "  c o s ls  o s  re p o r le d ; s e p a ra llo n  In to  "o re  d e v e lo p m e n t"  a n d  "m in in g  & h a u la g e "  e s tim a te d .
(3 ) In c lu d e s  h a z a rd , s o c ia l s e c u r ity ,  u n e m p lo y m e n t a n d  w o rk m e n s ' c o m p e n s a tio n  In s u ra n c e  o n ly .
(4) E s tim a te d  lo c a l c o s ls  n o t a llo w e d  as n e t p ro c e e d s  la x  d e d u c t io n s  (se e  A p p e n d ix  D ).
(5 ) O p e ra tin g  c o s t p e r  o u n c e  m in u s  m a rk e tin g , c o rp o ra te  G & A  e x p e n s e s , ta x e s  a n d  a m o r t iz e d  p re p ro d u c tio n  d e v e lo p m e n t.
(6 ) N .P . ta x  s tra ig h t- l in e  d e p re c ia t io n ; 2 0 , 10 a n d  5 y e a r  liv e s  lo r  p ro p e r ty + s lru c lu re s ,  h e a v y  e q u ip m e n t a n d  l ig h t  e q u ip m e n t  re s p e c liv e ly .
(7) W e ig h te d  a v e ra g e  re a liz e d  re v e n u e , In c lu d in g  h e d g in g  g a in s  a lte r  1980.
TA B LE 14. PRODUCTION AND
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
GOLD
Gold P roduction  (1) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 496872 713880 925145
Ounces Sold 250418 280761 247780 243097 274237 482550 712001 916431
Inven to ry  Change (3) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 1879 8714
C um u la tive  In ve n to ry (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 14322 16201 24915
Au Sales, {M illio n 65 80 87 124 256 293 357 503
Mean Realized {/O z . 259 287 349 509 934 606 501 549
London Average Spot 261 290 352 515 943 645 496 538
SILVER
S ilve r P ro d u c tio n  (1) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 24 38400 3445400 4700700
Ounces Sold 214171 201742 640210 481353 576003 2437500 3402200 4087400
Inventory  Change (3) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 43200 613300
C um u la tive  In ve n to ry (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) 900 44100 657400
Ag Sales, {M illio n 2 2 6 9 18 46 43 68
Mean Realized $/Oz. 8.82 8.77 9.57 18.05 30.80 18.68 12.63 16.60
Handy & Harm on Spot 9.04 9.00 9.82 18.51 31.59 14.70 10.43 14.46
Total Sales, {M ill io n s 68 82 70 133 274 338 400 571
(1) Ounces based upon net smeller returns. Base metal mine by-product gold and silver excluded.
(2) Pre-1981 site production and inventory changes unknown; only sales reported.
(3) Inventory in circuits, gold rooms and at refineries.
R EVEN UES (Constant $1990)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
981317 1351825 2004233 2715086 3707377 4965688 5731608
982638 1337434 2000750 2684788 3690236 4922644 5735843
-1321 14391 3483 30298 17141 43044 -4235
23594 37985 41468 71766 88907 131951 127716
434 510 851 1332 1753 2005 2260
442 381 425 496 475 407 394
441 377 426 501 475 398 384
5036800 5130200 6923800 12357000 18643300 19366100 20490700
4980100 5603600 6907000 12514200 18674700 19127100 20557700
56700 -473400 16800 -157200 -31400 239000 -67000
714100 240700 257500 100300 68900 307900 240900
57 35 41 99 128 112 118
11.41 6.22 5.87 7.92 6.83 5.85 5.74
9.93 7.26 6.31 7.84 7.07 5.72 4.07





Cash flow models prepared to estimate net present values and rates of return on 
gold mine development and production were based upon individual mine costs and
revenues reported in tax files for years prior to 1991, and computer model projections 
for years thereafter. Detailed modeling procedures and assumptions are described in
Appendix D. Appendix D also contains a step-by-step example of the process of 
historical data reduction, unreported cost estimations, future cash flow projections and 
discounting involved in estimating the NPV's and DCF-ROR's for a single mine. 
Significant features of economic analyses were:
Consideration of recoverable 1990-1991 ore reserves, milling and 
leaching recovery factors, stripping ratios, mine and mill capacities, 
preproduction capital costs, the length of preproduction development, 
working capital, taxes, closure and reclamation expenses.
The use of publicly announced expected costs for mines lacking an 
operating history but in development in 1990. These were checked for 
reasonableness by analogy with similar operations.
Costing by analogy for ore deposits not yet developed but potentially 
economic. Those failing to offer a DCF-ROR of at least 10% and gross 
revenues of at least $15 million were deemed uneconomic.
Projected capital replacement based upon historical costs specific to the 
Nevada industry and depending upon initial plant costs and production 
rates at each mine.
Consideration of planned expansions announced as late as December 
1991.
Projected revenues based upon a constant dollar gold price level of $384 
per ounce for one scenario and alternative cash flow models in which the 
constant dollar gold price level was $350 per ounce in 1991 and $330 
per ounce thereafter.
Dynamic grade-cutoff strategies were uniformly assumed in adjusting 
reserves for the differing gold price levels.
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Revenues calculated above or below the aforementioned price level based 
upon each operator's historically realized gains and losses from hedging.
Statutory federal, state and county specific tax rates in force each year 
before 1991 and 1990 rates thereafter. Operators were assumed to 
have other income against which to charge losses.
4% annual cost and revenue escalation.
Uniform annual mined ore grades, waste:ore ratios and recoveries based 
upon conditions reported for each mine in 1990-1991. Mine-specific 
development sequencing was not considered.
Industry-wide analyses are based upon aggregations of cash flows and economic 
parameters from individual operations.
Computer output from mine economic analyses included gross revenues, net cash 
flows and gold and silver production, among other variables, for every mine model year. 
Each operator in the state estimates and reports these same values one year in advance to 
the State Department of Taxation. Comparisons were made between 1991 estimates 
reported by operators and 1991 values projected for this investigation. If dis­
agreement for any variable exceeded 10%, models were first reviewed for errors, then 
reconciled on the basis of differences between 1990-1991 mined grades and waste:ore 
ratios and remaining average reserve grades and waste:ore ratios. Where these 
reconciliations did not appear reasonable, operators were contacted for information 
regarding 1991 investment, development and mining plans which might have introduced 
variances.
When the foregoing procedures failed to correct apparent differences between 
estimated and reported values, computer model parameters were uniformly adjusted in 
small increments until projected results for 1991 were in agreement with operator 
estimates of 1991 gross revenues, net proceeds and production levels. Concurrence
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between projections for this investigation and operator estimates lent some degree of 
validity to subsequent analyses, economic parameters and conclusions based upon the 
cash flow models. The goal was to portray, as accurately as possible, true industry 
financial conditions.
CAPITAL INVESTMENT
Dobra and Thomas (1991) estimated that capital expenditures during 1989 and 
1990 for plant, equipment and development by the twenty-one largest gold producers in 
the U.S. exceeded $1.4 billion. With all companies and all mines in production or under 
development included, total capital investment in Nevada alone during those years, 
excluding exploration and preproduction development costs, was about $1.5 billion. 
Annual capital investments are illustrated in Figure 22. The purchase price of capital 
plant and equipment in service per ounce of production by Nevada's gold industry, 
excluding exploration assets and mine development costs, is shown in the inset to Figure 
22. Values are at original install/delivered costs, stated in constant 1990 dollars, 
including sales taxes and minus retirements.
Figure 22 includes costs for new plant capacity, plant expansions and equipment 
replacement. The average capital cost (in 1990 dollars) of new plant and equipment 
exclusively over the period 1981-1990 in Nevada was $238, $404 and $328 per 
ounce of annual production capacity for heap leach, milling and integrated heap 
leach/miliing operations respectively. Pressure oxidation and roasting facilities are not 
included in these cost figures. The capital cost per ounce of new plant capacity exhibited 
no apparent time trend. A trend, if it exists, was masked by radical differences in 
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Figure 22. Capital Investments in Mine and 
Ore Development, Plant and Equipment.
OPERATING COSTS
Operating cost categories in Table 13 differ in detail from those conventionally 
used for managerial and tax accounting purposes owing to the limitations of the data base. 
These differences are explained in Appendix D. Except as noted, they are not significant 
to the following discussion.
Operating cost per ounce provides an indicator of the viability of a mine as a 
business entity and encompasses the variables of production cost per ton of ore mined, 
ore grade and recovery. It is also a function of gold market prices via grade-tonnage and 
cut-off grade relationships. Figure 23 plots average annual operating costs per ounce 
for all mines in the state, irrespective of discovery date and including those in 
Newmont's Area of Interest. "Mining" is both mining and haulage; "Gen. & Admin." costs
7 3
include corporate and mine-site general and administrative expenses, marketing, hazard 
and workers insurance (social security, workmens' compensation, unemployment); 
■Royalties & Taxes" include state and local taxes only.
High operating costs per ounce between 1979 and 1982 resulted from the mining 
of very low grade ores permitted by high gold prices. Despite high production costs, 
operators realized their greatest profit margins during this period, as shown by the 
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Figure 23. Average Annual Operating Costs 
Per Ounce of Nevada Gold Production.
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REVENUES
Figures 24 and 25 illustrate annual gross revenues from Nevada gold and silver
sales respectively. The insets to these figures show industry-wide hedging premiums
and losses compared to average annual spot metal prices. The indicated gains and losses
per ounce, averaged over both hedged and un-hedged sales, are gross values only,
without deductions for trading costs and the expense of corporate staff needed to carry
out hedging strategies.
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F ig u r e  2 4 . A n n u a l N e v a d a  G o ld  R e v e n u e s .
An increasing number of Nevada gold producers have engaged in some hedging
since 1981. Figure 26 illustrates the impact of hedging upon gross revenues per ounce
for individual producers, as reported to the State Department of Taxation.
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Figure 25. Annual Nevada Silver Revenues.
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Figure 26. Individual Nevada Producer 
Average Revenues Per Ounce of Gold.
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Producer gold hedging resulted in significant gross losses only during 1980 and 1987. 
About 50% of production is now hedged through gold loans, forward sales and options. 
PRODUCTION
Figures 27 and 28 illustrate historical and projected gold production at Nevada's 
gold mines from 1976 through 2022, when measured reserves and discoveries known as 
of 1990-1991 will have been exhausted. Historical production differs from sales, 
which are net of inventory changes. Results from individual mine economic models were 
aggregated to estimate future production. Output from all operating mines - those in 
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Figure 27. Historical Gold and Silver 
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Figure 28. Production to Depletion of Nevada 
Gold Mines, $384 per Ounce Price Level.
Twenty-two mostly small operations that were active at the start of 1990 ceased 
mining by the end of the year, but expansions at larger mines were predicted to sustain 
state-wide output in 1991 near the 1990 rate. As previously mentioned, projected 
annual output at the lower price level, illustrated in the inset to Figure 28, assumed
that all operations raise mined grades in response to lower gold prices after 1990. In 
view of the uncertainty regarding this factor, actual production is expected to be 
somewhere between the rates expected at the $384 and $330 per ounce price levels.
At a constant 1990 dollar gold price of $384 per ounce, all mines considered in 
this study are expected to produce about 83 million ounces of gold after 1990 and before 
depletion. Included are reserves in Newmont's Area of Interest, Goldstrike/Betze and ore
7 8
deposits not yet developed, but deemed economic at $384 per ounce gold. At a constant 
1990 dollar gold price reduced to $330 by 1992 and remaining at that level, post- 
1990 production by currently operating mines is estimated at 69 million ounces.
CASH FLOWS
Figures 29 and 30 depict net development and production cash flows from 1976 
to depletion estimated for all gold mines operating or under development in Nevada 
between 1976 and 1990, including Goldstrike/Betze and those in the AOI. To include 
mines developed prior to 1976, their straight-line depreciated capital value at the end 
of 1975 was added to aggregate capital costs in 1976. The insets in Figures 29 and 30 
show potential contributions from undeveloped ore deposits.
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Figure 29. Development and Production Net Cash Flow to Depletion 
of Nevada Gold Mines, $384 per Ounce Future Price Level.
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Figure 30. Development and Production Net Cash Flow to Depletion 
of Nevada Gold Mines, $330 per Ounce Future Price Level.
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CHAPTER 6
DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION ECONOMICS 
EVALUATION METHODS
"Net present value" and “rate of return" on investment, both based upon 
discounted cash flow models, are the principal economic parameters used to assess time 
trends in the productivity of Nevada's gold mines.
Discounted Cash Flow Model
The time value of money requires that higher value be attached to earlier payoffs 
than to later ones. This may be expressed as the present value of a sum of money to be
received one year in the future. Let,
PV = Qt/ ( l+ r ) t
PV = discounted present value at time zero 
r = interest rate
Qt = cash value to be received at the end of period t 
PV is analogous to the amount of current dollars that must be invested at r rate of 
interest compounded annually to receive a sum equivalent to Qt at the end of period t.
For n years the present value equation is written:
PV = Q 1/(1+r)1 + Q2/(1+r)2 + Q3/(1+r)3 ... + Qn/(1+r)n
or in notational form, 
n
PV = Z  Qt(1+r)-t
t=1
Net Present Value
The net present value of a stream of future benefits is the sum of each year's cash 
outlays and inflows during the life of an investment, each discounted to the start of the 
investment-revenue cycle at an assumed interest rate, r. That is:
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n n
NPV = X . Kt(1+r)-t + I  Qt(1+r)-t (Q = Rt - Ct)
t=1 t=1
where
NPV = net present value
Kt = initial capital investment
Qt = net cash flow in time t
Rt = cash value of receipts
ct = cash cost of production, including expansion and replacement capital
r = discount rate or opportunity cost of capital
These are calculated on an after-tax basis unless otherwise noted.
When NPV > 0, cash flows are sufficient to repay both principal and interest on 
invested capital at the end of t periods. Net present value therefore measures the level of 
economic profit above a basic minimum return on capital.
Selection of Discount Rate (
In practice, selecting an appropriate discount rate in estimating net present 
values is fraught with difficulty. Discount rates as conventionally used consist of two 
components, a risk free component representing the time value of money, often taken as 
the real rate of return on U.S. Treasury Bonds, and a risk premium which reflects the 
variability of market demand, prices and other characteristics peculiar to a given 
industry, company and project. However, the time value of money (risk-free 
component) changes over time, and risks to be considered in estimating the risk 
premium are often difficult, if not impossible, to quantify.
Some economists believe that a firm's marginal cost of funds is the appropriate 
discount rate to be used at a level of risk associated with the firm's normal mix of 
projects. However, risk is project specific. The correct discount rate for a project only
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equals the firm's cost of capital if the risk-return characteristics of the project are the 
same as the composite characteristics of the firm's existing projects. Otherwise, a 
project's appropriate discount rate may be higher or lower than the company's marginal 
cost of capital. Because risk, and therefore the risk premium component of a discount 
rate, varies between projects, use of a single discount rate is not appropriate.
While employment of a single discount rate may be inappropriate at the level of 
the firm, a uniformly applied rate was necessary within the context of this 
investigation. In applying a single discount rate, the entire Nevada gold mining 
industry's average cost of capital was assumed to be the average rate offered by other 
investment opportunities with a reasonable (acceptable) level of risk, and available to 
all competitors in the industry. Historical consensus was relied upon to fix this rate.
Mackenzie (1985) reported that the real cost of equity capital for base metal 
investments in Canada typically varied from 6% to 15% in the early and mid-1980's. 
Whitney & Whitney (1982) reported that real discount rates used by mining companies 
in the late 1970's ranged between 7 and 12 percent. Donald (1974) cited a nominal 
rate of return of 10% to 15% as a commonly quoted objective for high risk undertakings 
in the mining industry in the early 1970's. The average of these ranges is about 10%.
Mackenzie and Doggett (1992) recently selected 10% as appropriate for 
analyses of the economics of gold exploration in Canada, Australia and Brazil. Since their 
work represents the only published source of information against which the results of 
this investigation may be compared, and 10% appears to be the average of those cited by 
other researchers, their selection of a 10% discount rate for estimating net present 
values was also used in this investigation.
Net present values calculated in this study based upon the assumed 10% real
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discount rate are used primarily for comparisons. In these comparisons, higher 
discount rates work to the disadvantage of longer-lived mines. This most significantly 
impacts calculated net present values for Goldstrike/Betze and operations in Newmont's 
Area of Interest. Because these are excluded from most economic analyses for reasons 
described elsewhere in this study, discount rate selection within a reasonable range 
becomes inconsequential, so long as the same rate is used consistently.
For the period 1976-1990, a 10% real discount rate corresponds to a weighted 
average nominal discount rate of about 14% for investments by the Nevada gold industry. 
This was calculated as the sum of 10% plus each year's GNP Implicit Price Deflator, 
times the industry-wide capital investment each year, divided by total capital invest­
ments during the 1976-1990 period.
Rate of Return
The discounted cash flow rate of return, or DCF-ROR, is that rate of interest that 
reduces future revenues and costs to a net present value of zero such that:
n n
X - Kt (1+r*)-t + X Qt(1+r)-t = 0 
t=1 t=1
The rate of return r* is calculated on the amount of unamortized investment 
remaining at the end of each successive year. It is a measure of the true annual rate of 
return on the capital invested in a project, and is found iteratively by trial and error. 
Cash flows are discounted over a range of rates until a single rate which balances the 
present value of investments and revenues is identified.
DEVELOPMENT NET PRESENT VALUE
Development net present value converts the anticipated time distribution of net
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cash flows from development and production into an equivalent dollar value at the start 
of development. Annual net cash flows are discounted back to this point at a real 10% 
rate. The present value components are then summed to yield the expected net present 
value. Exploration and delineation costs are not considered.
The net present value of Nevada's gold mines at the assumed start of development 
(FCY-1), without deductions for the cost of discovery, is a measure of the economic 
efficiency of investments in development and production from the standpoint of the firm. 
Figure 31 shows time trends in net present values (10% discount rate) from revenues 
based upon the $384 and $330 per ounce future gold price levels, with prices and costs 
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Figure 31. Cumulative Net Present Value of Development and 
Production Cash Flows at 10% Discount Rate, Mines Developed 
between 1976 and 1990. The inset figure shows the average 
net present value for mines under development in each year.
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NPV's for all mines, irrespective of profitability or discovery date but excluding those 
in the AOI and Goldstrike/Betze, were added to generate Figure 31. Values are plotted by 
year preceding commercial production (FCY-1). The number of mines in development 
each year is shown below the year on the X axis. Annual values are the sums of both 
profitable and unprofitable (NPV < 0) operations.
The average net present value of mines developed per unit of time over the 
relevant period has not diminished. The slopes of the cumulative NPV curves in Figure 
31 indicate no deterioration in the economic quality of ore deposits brought to 
production. It should be realized, however, that progressively greater operating scales 
and attendant economies are in part responsible for the sustained profitability. The 
relationship between net present value and ore deposit size, the principal factor in scale 
economies, is illustrated in Figure 32. All mines operated between 1976 and 1990 
except Goldstrike/Betze and those in the AOI are included in the figure.
<0co
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Figure 32. Net Present Value Versus 
Recoverable Ounces for Nevada Gold Mines.
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The sum of all net present values, positive and negative, is Nevada gold mines' 
development and production contribution to industry wealth. At the base price of $384 
per ounce and including Newmont's operations and Goldstrike/Betze. this contribution 
would be about $1.7 billion in 1990 dollars. If the base price of $330 per ounce more 
accurately reflects the long term price trend, the contribution will be about $1 billion. 
Neither of these values consider either the present value cost of exploration or the 
industry's contribution to public wealth through taxes.
It is interesting to note that the sum of net present values for only those mines 
regarded as economic in this study at the $384 per ounce price level, excluding 
operations in the API and Goldstrike/Betze. is about $1.15 billion. The sum for mines 
which failed to meet the minimum criteria for profitability, a DCF-ROR of at least 10%, 
is negative $346 million, offsetting nearly a third of the net present value of profitable 
mines ($1.15-$.35=$.8 billion). Most of the unprofitable operations had ceased 
mining by the end of 1990, so post-1990 gold price declines may not be held 
responsible. This represents corporate losses which must be attributed to unfortunate 
development and production decisions.
DEVELOPMENT RATE OF RETURN
The rate of return for mine development is the discount rate which equates the 
present value of cash flows from production with the present value cost of development 
and construction. Discovery and delineation costs are not considered. Rates of return 
are estimated from constant dollar cash flows so represent real rather than nominal 
rates. Nominal rates of return are, on average, 4% higher than real rates of return.
Figure 33 piots discounted cash flow rates of return versus development year for 
mines showing zero or positive rates of return at the $384 gold price level. No time
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Figure 33. DCF-ROR Versus Development 
Year, $384 per Ounce Future Price Level.
trends are apparent. Mines developed later in the current gold rush, on average, yielded 
returns equaling those of the earlier mines.
Figure 34 plots discounted cash flow-rates of return versus total recoverable 
ounces for mines operated or under development between 1976 and 1990 and projected 
to have positive rates of return at the base price of $384 per ounce gold. Ten of the 34 
mines, mostly those yielding a return of 16% or less at $384 gold, offered less than a 
10% rate of return at $330 per ounce gold, below the assumed cost of capital.
Mines with larger ore reserves and longer lives are able optimize cash flows via 
cut-off grade changes to obtain both an acceptable rate of return and maximize long term 
profitability. Operations realizing extreme rates of return, say above 30%, could be 
accused of high-grading in pursuit of short-term profits at the expense of long-term 
profitability. It may equally be argued that the high rates of return for these few mines 
only serve to offset other company losses, and losses by other organizations, and are 















Figure 34. DCF-ROR Versus Recoverable 
Ounces, $384 per Ounce Future Price Level.
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CHAPTER 7
ECONOMICS OF NEVADA GOLD EXPLORATION
The economics of exploration can be measured by the relationship between 
exploration expenditures required to find and delineate an economic deposit and the net 
return associated with its subsequent development and production. Economic parameters 
associated with the development and production of gold in Nevada were estimated in 
Chapter 6. This chapter analyzes the economics of exploration by charging direct, 
indirect and time-related costs of discovery against net cash flows resulting from 
development and production.
ACCURACY
Two major factors affect the possible accuracy of the following economic 
evaluations. First, ore deposits are classified on the basis of their discovery dates for 
time trend analysis. The discovery date occurs part-way through what in reality is a 
discovery process. Thus it is possible that exploration expenditures in the economic 
assessment of one year may result in discoveries included in the following year. 
Although such discrepancies tend to cancel and should not significantly alter perceived 
time trends, they could be important if, as a result, possible economic deposits are 
excluded from the overall study period. For this reason, two ore deposits with reported 
discovery dates in early 1989 were included in the study, while 1989 exploration 
expenditures are excluded.
Inputs to the analysis of exploration economics are exploration expenditures 
estimated in Chapter 2 and development and production cash flows estimated in Chapter 
5. All of the estimation errors described in those chapters are also incorporated in the 
following evaluations of exploration economics. However, while the range of estimation
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errors attending factors of analysis should be borne in mind when considering individual 
data points, the errors are believed to be unbiased. Conclusions stemming from overall 
results should be reasonably reliable.
EXPECTED VALUE OF EXPLORATION
The expected value of exploration measures the average value that exploration 
yields in the long term, when the successes and failures associated with a very large 
number of exploration organizations, programs and discoveries are considered. An 
exploration expenditure E is required on average for the discovery and delineation of an 
economic deposit, yielding an average return R, Thus:
~V = R-E
V = expected value per economic discovery
R = average net return from development and production
E = average exploration cost required to find and delineate an economic deposit
R and E are expressed as discounted 1990 dollars at the start of the average 
exploration period preceding discovery.
Expected values for Nevada gold exploration were estimated in a method modified 
from Mackenzie (1985):
• Total gold exploration expenditures for the period 1976-1988 were 
estimated in Chapter 2. Included were both the capitalized and expensed 
costs of successful and unsuccessful organizations.
• Deposits discovered during the relevant historical time period which 
realized a gross revenue of at least $15 million and a development rate of 
return of at least 10% at the $384 and $330 per ounce future price 
levels as estimated in Chapter 6 were classified as economic deposits.
• Year-by-year cash flow characteristics of the development and 
production phases of the economic deposits, producing and undeveloped, 
were averaged for the two price levels.
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• Estimates for successful (capitalized) exploration (discovery and delin­
eation) expenditures directly attributed to the average economic 
deposit were integrated with average characteristics for development and 
production phases to portray the time distribution of average costs and 
revenues from the start of exploration to the end of production for the two 
price levels.
• Total expensed (unsuccessful) exploration costs which could not be 
directly associated with specific discoveries were divided by the number 
of discoveries, yielding expensed exploration associated with the average 
discovery. Exploration expenditures by individuals and mine area 
exploration costs were excluded. Indirect exploration expenditures were 
assumed to be uniformly distributed over an average six year explor­
ation program preceding development.
• Expected net present values and rates of return were estimated from the 
total expensed and capitalized exploration costs, development and 
production cash flows computed for the average economic deposit at the 
two price levels.
The expected net present value of exploration converts the anticipated time 
distribution of cash flows into an equivalent dollar value at the start of the average 
exploration program. The expected rate of return to exploration is the discount rate 
which equates the present value of expensed and capitalized discovery, development and 
construction costs with positive cash flows from production.
INDUSTRY AVERAGE EXPECTED VALUE OF EXPLORATION
To estimate expected (average) returns on Nevada gold exploration investments 
at the start of a successful exploration cycle, averages of net cash flows for 32 mines at 
the $384 per ounce price level and 26 mines at the $330 per ounce price level were 
calculated to characterize the typical Nevada gold discovery. Model parameters and 
economic indices computed from the average cash flows are summarized in Table 15. 
Expensed (unsuccessful) exploration costs are not included in the computations.
Expected rates of return in Table 15 are real rates corresponding to nominal 
rates of 24.5% and 27.7% for $330 and $384 per ounce gold respectively at the start
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of a successful exploration program. Initial recoverable ounces and development costs 
are greater for the average economic mine at the $330 per ounce gold price level. At the 
lower gold price, some smaller, less capital intensive operations which were only 
marginally profitable at $384 per ounce gold were dropped from the computation.
TABLE 15
PARAMETERS FOR THE AVERAGE 
NEVADA GOLD DISCOVERY, 1976-1989
Characteristics @ $384 Gold Price Characteristics @ $330 Gold Price
Capitalized Capitalized
Year Exploration Year Exploration
0 $0.11 0 $0.12
1 $0.21 1 $0.24
2 $0.39 2 $0.45
3 $0.81 3 $0.94
4 $0.88 4 $1.02
5 $1.13 5 $1.30
$3.53 $4.07
Producing Life: 17 years Producing Life: 15 years
Initial Recoverable Ounces: 855,000 Initial Recoverable Ounces: 888,000
Final Recoverable OuncesO): 1,066,000 Final Recoverable OuncesO): 1,060,000
Development Investment: $28 Million Development Investment: $34 Million
Undiscounted Net Revenue: $80 Million Undiscounted Net Revenue: $70 Million
ECONOMIC INDICES
Post-1990 Number of Net Present ROR at Net Present ROR at
Spot Gold Economic Value at Start Start of Value at Start Start of
Price/Oz. Discoveries of Exploration Exploration of Development Development
$330 26 $12.7 .205 $22.1 .213
$384 32 $17.4 .237 $30.4 .248
(1) Initially discovered reserves plus additions resulting from mine area exploration.
After-tax expensed exploration for gold in Nevada from 1976 through 1988, 
excluding expenditures by prospectors, was estimated as $738 million, or $23 million
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for each of 32 economic discoveries made during that time interval based upon the $384 
per ounce gold price level. For the smaller number of discoveries deemed economic a 
$330 future price level, the average expensed exploration cost was $28 million. The 
cash flow characteristics of the average economic discovery with capitalized exploration 
costs and prorated expensed exploration at the $384 per ounce gold price level are 
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Figure 35. Net Cash Flow Characteristics, Average 
1976-1989 Economic Gold Discovery, Including Prorated 
Expensed Exploration, $384 per Ounce Price Level.
The drop in net cash flow in the third year of production for the average mine is a 
consequence of capital investment associated with expansion. Three large mines entering 
into the average added milling facilities and/or roasting/pressure oxidation in the third 
year of production.
Based upon the cash flows depicted in Figure 35, at a sustained post-1990 
constant dollar gold price of $384 per ounce, the industry-wide expected rate of return 
on exploration investments in that portion of the state generally open to competitive
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exploration from 1976 through 1989 will be about 9.5% (nominal rate 13.5%). The 
associated net present value at the start of the typical exploration program, at the 
assumed real 10% discount rate, is minus $1 million. These are expected returns on 
exploration investments for all organizations as a group.
Assuming that a constant 1990 dollar gold price of $330 represents a long term 
trend, the industry wide expected real rate of return on exploration will be 6.5% 
(nominal rate 10.5%).; the associated net present value is minus $9.4 million at the 
10% discount rate. The expected industry-wide returns to exploration do not appear to 
justify the risks.
EXPECTED VALUE OF EXPLORATION FOR SENIOR COMPANIES
To estimate expected values for senior organizations, 1976-1989 economic 
discoveries not made by senior companies, their subsidiaries or affiliates, were deleted 
from the cash flow data base to generate new average cash-flow models. The changes from 
the original models were insignificant. Exploration costs which were expensed by 
senior companies were divided by the remaining discoveries and the resulting average 
expensed exploration costs per discovery were charged against the $384 and $330 per 
ounce price level cash flow models. Exploration expenses were distributed uniformly 
over average 6 year pre-discovery exploration periods.
The resulting expected rate of return at the $384 per ounce gold price level was 
12.4% and the expected net present value of exploration investments at a 10% discount 
rate was $5.5 million at the start of the typical senior company exploration program. 
At a post-1990 sustained constant dollar gold price of $330 per ounce, the expected 
values were estimated as 9.5% DCF-ROR and million NPV respectively.
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EXPECTED VALUE FOR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
Junior companies, Canadian stock companies and unclassified organizations are 
estimated to have spent $277 million dollars on exploration for gold in Nevada from 
1976 through 1988. This amount does not include exploration costs on delineated gold 
resources, assumed to be capitalized in this study, which may or may not ever sustain 
economic production. With the exception of Goldstrike/Betze, only one modest initial 
discovery has been accredited to a junior exploration organization and one to a Canadian 
stock company. Subtracting the undiscounted $10 million net cash flow generated by 
these discoveries from exploration expenditures of $277 million leaves a $267 million 
charge against the overall economic productivity of the state's gold exploration and 
mining industry. The negative expected economic indices associated with this loss were 
not estimated.
A number of "gold resource" deposits have been found by junior and Canadian 
stock companies and promoted to production. Instead of contributing to wealth, they have 
produced operating losses, resulting in a drain on risk capital. Associated capitalized 
exploration expenditures with questionable recovery baring substantially improved 
future gold prices may increase expensed exploration by $60 million, for a total loss of 
$327 million.
These findings are surprising in view of a report by Bailly (1977) that small 
exploration organizations expended only about 28% of exploration funds in Canada from 
1951 through 1974, but made 62% of the discoveries (see Table 25, Chapter 12). The 
conflict may lie in the classification of organizations used for this study, versus the 
nature of "small organizations" historically involved in Canadian exploration. Many of 
the small Canadian exploration companies surveyed by Bailly were in fact syndicates
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organized by one or more senior mining companies. Their "small" size was often related 
to initial capitalization, rather than staying power, management skills, technical 
capability and an underlying corporate culture attuned to the process of metal 
exploration. In contrast, many of the small exploration organizations which participated 
in the current Nevada gold rush were largely promotional, with little chance of economic 
success. They were not sufficiently financed to develop viable exploration programs, 
depending instead upon a "windfall" strategy. Even those with capable management and 
staff were defeated by the low probability of discovery given their limited budgets.
Returns to junior and Canadian stock companies, unclassified organizations and 
individuals, in the form of lease/option payments, purchase payments and royalties, 
were not estimated in the course of this investigation. With the exception of major 
payments by Newmont Mining for the Area of Interest, payments relevant to 1976- 
1988 discoveries were either insignificant in view of total exploration expenditures by 
non-senior organizations or are regarded as inter-industry cash flows, so don't affect 
the overall economics of Nevada's gold mining sector. Nor were any of sufficient 
magnitude to alter the risks and returns estimated for any class of organization. 
EXPECTED VALUE FOR SUPERIOR SKILLS ORGANIZATIONS
In exploration environments characterized by unacceptable overall expected 
returns, the selection of opportunities of above average merit is a necessary condition 
for long term exploration success. This can only result from the application of superior 
exploration skills, developed within a mining company over time (Mackenzie, 1985).
Based upon strategies, management and tactical practices discussed in Part II of 
this dissertation, ten organizations representing mature mining companies and pursuing 
long-term, sufficiently funded gold exploration programs in Nevada were identified as
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superior-skills organizations. All made economic discoveries; not all economic 
discoveries are credited to this group. For some of these organizations, discoveries 
which they made were developed by other corporations, so did not profit their parent 
companies. They are none-the-less credited with the discoveries.
Expensed exploration by the superior-skills group from 1976 through 1988 
totaled $188 million, with a mean annual budget of $1.7 million. The group is credited 
with 18 economic discoveries, at an average expensed exploration cost of $10.4 million 
per discovery. With this exploration expense distributed uniformly over the typical 6 
year program, the expected net present value for the superior-skills group at the start 
of exploration was estimated as $18.3 million at the $384 per ounce future gold price 
level. Their average rate of return on exploration investments was 18.2% (nominal 
rate approximately 22.2%).
At the $330 per ounce future gold price level, four of the discoveries credited to 
the superior skills group were estimated to be non-economic, even though several will 
continue to produce because cash costs are below $330 per ounce. Absent these deposits, 
the mean expensed discovery cost per ore deposit is $13.4 million, the expected net 
present value at the start of exploration is $12.4 million and the real rate of return on 
exploration investments is 15.3% (19.3% nominal). If historical discovery costs and 
returns for superior-skills organizations are sustainable, Nevada will remain a pro­
ductive exploration environment for gold despite low prices.
TIME TRENDS IN THE EXPECTED VALUE OF EXPLORATION
"Exploration, guided by geologic concepts and skills, is a systematic process in 
the long run, tending to detect first those deposits that are largest, highest grade and 
closest to the surface. The best deposits will, on average, be discovered and mined first. 
Lower quality or smaller deposits remain for the future. Thus depletion causes
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increasing costs and a deterioration in the economics of mineral exploration."
Mackenzie, 1984
Time trends in the economics of exploration reflect the interplay of four dynamic 
elements:
• Changing rates of discovery of economic deposits
• Depletion effects in terms of increasing exploration difficulty
• Real changes in the costs of exploration
• Advances in geological concepts and exploration technology
Because exploration expenditures in one year may contribute to discovery at 
some unknown point in the future, year-by-year calculations of returns on exploration 
may be misleading. However, cumulative trends over the entire period of study, 1976 
through 1988, should capture the relationship between expenditures and the 
productivity of the exploration environment. Figure 36 compares cumulative pre-tax 
expensed exploration in the state and the cumulative net present values of economic 
discoveries entered by discovery year. Goldstrike/Betze and discoveries in the Newmont 
Area of Interest are excluded. Net present values, for profitable operations only, include 
deductions for capitalized discovery and delineation costs, taken upon development.
Figure 36 suggests that the economic productivity of Nevada's gold exploration 
environment has not been significantly diminished by 13 years of increasingly intense 
exploration. While discovery costs per ounce have increased , most notably since 1986 
(see Figure 20), the economic quality of discoveries, as measured by net present values, 
has improved. Any apparent small deterioration in the relationship between the net 
present values of discoveries and expensed exploration in 1987-1988 must be weighed 
against the bias, inherent in the data base, to undervalue more recent discoveries 
(newer deposits aren't fully drilled). In view of the discovery of the Waterpipe Canyon
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Figure 36. Cumulative Pre-tax Expensed Exploration 
Costs and Cumulative Discovery Net Present Values,
1976-1989 Discoveries, $384 per Ounce Price Level.
ore deposit by Placer in 1991, depletion effects appear to remain at bay. It should be 
noted however, that the fairly recent inclusion of sulfide gold ores in the list of 
exploration targets, coupled with progressively increasing scales of operation and 
attendant economies, have contributed to sustained exploration productivity as measured 
by the net present values of discoveries.
Within the 1976-1988 period of Nevada gold exploration the expected value of 
exploration for organizations identified as conducting sufficiently funded and well 
managed programs in the state has also improved. The hypothesis that the economics of 
mineral exploration must inherently deteriorate with time is not supported, at least for 
gold in Nevada.
For organizations exhibiting a superior skills strategy, the application of better 
geologic models for area selection and ranking of targets, a growing geologic data base and 
greater cumulative professional experience in the exploration environment, together 
with refined exploration techniques, have been more than successful in countering
100
rising land acquisition and exploration costs and sampling without replacement. Figure 
37 plots cumulative expensed exploration costs and discovery net present values through 
time for this group of organizations. Net present values are at the start of development, 
and are for economic operations only (NPV > 0, Gross Revenues_> $15 Million).
------C um ulative NPV Cum ulative ExpLS
Figure 37. Cumulative Pre-tax Expensed Exploration Costs 
and Cumulative Discovery Net Present Values for "Superior 





Preceding analyses dealt with the economics of exploration, development and 
production for individual firms and types of companies and addressed the question of 
investment incentives for continuing exploration. Economic parameters for the mining 
sector as a whole represent the worth of Nevada's precious metals endowment to the 
industry during the entire current gold economic cycle.
To estimate total sector performance, state-wide exploration, development, 
production and closure expenditures and annual net revenues were evaluated as of 1976, 
the approximate beginning of the present gold mining boom. All ore deposits, including 
pre-1976 discoveries, were included in the compilation. For mines which began 
operations before 1976, the depreciated book values of capital investments at the end of 
1975 were estimated and added to 1976 costs. Their net cash flows were added to those 
of post-1975 discoveries. Discovery costs for these mines were not estimated and 
added, but are considered insignificant in view of overall cash flows.
Figure 38 depicts total industry net cash flows based upon the $384 and $330 
per ounce gold price levels. Expenditures by individual prospectors in locating and 
maintaining mining claims were included as costs. Negative net cash flows in 1990 for 
the $384 price level, versus positive net cash flows projected at $330 per ounce gold, 
reflect greater capital investments which would have been made in new mines at the 
higher metal price.
Figure 39 illustrates total industry net present values at the two future gold 
price levels, with and without discoveries in the AOI and Goldstrike/Betze, over a range
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of nominal, as opposed to real, discount rates. Total sector economic parameters at both 
the $384 and $330 gold price levels are summarized in Table 16.
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Figure 38. Total Nevada Gold Industry Cash Flows, 1976 to Depletion.
Current Dollar (Nominal) Discount Rate
_g_ All M ines  S 3 3 0  
Au P r ic e  L e v e l
M ines  E xc lu d in g  AOI  
S 3 3 0  Au P r ic e  L e v e l
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M ines Excluding. AOI  
S 3 8 4  Au P r ic e  L e v e l
Figure 39. Total Nevada Gold Industry Nominal 
Net Present Value Versus Discount Rate.
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TABLE 16
NEVADA PRECIOUS METAL EXPLORATION AND MINING 
ECONOMIC PARAMETERS
(NPV of Industry in 1976, Millions of 1990 Dollars,1976 to Depletion of Mines) 
Real $384 Per Ounce Gold Price Level $330 per Ounce Gold Price Level
Discount All Newmont AOI & All Newmont AOI &
Rate Mines Goldstrike Excluded Mines Goldstrike Excluded
4% 3,298 603 1,938 142
6% 1,895 215 1,090 -64
8% 1,070 -20 586 -186
10% 552 -164 268 -256
12% 282 -255 61 -301
Real DCF-ROR .147 .078 .131 .053
The net present values in Table 16 represent private wealth generated by the 
precious metal endowment of Nevada during the current gold mining economic cycle. 
Values are based upon after-tax net cash flows.
Public Wealth
Nevada's gold industry contributes directly to public wealth through payments of 
federal, state and local taxes. Indirect contributions through the creation of jobs and the 
multiplier effect of mining revenues upon personal income, state and national production 
have been reported by Dobra and Thomas (1992) and are not considered here.
Table 17 summarizes and Figures 40 and 41 illustrate historical gold mining 
industry tax payments for the period 1976 through 1990 and projected payments to the 
depletion of ore reserves known as of 1990-1991.
Sales and use taxes apply to equipment, materials and supplies which are 
believed to constitute about 66% of both capital and operating costs (Personal 
Communication, N.A. Degerstrom Inc. and Mine Development Associates, 1993). Taxes 
were estimated at 6% of these costs, assuming all local jurisdictions add an allowed
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.25% transportation tax to the state-wide 5.75% tax rate.
TABLE 17
NEVADA PRECIOUS METALS INDUSTRY TAX PAYMENTS 
(Millions of 1990 Constant Dollars)
Projected Projected
Historical 1991-2020 Total at 1991-2022 Total at
Tax Tvpe 1976-1990 $330 Gold $330 Gold $384 Gold $384 Gold
Sales and Use Tax 408 579 987 695 1,1 03
Net Proceeds Tax 1 24 505 629 749 873
Property Tax 66 144 21 0 148 214
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Figure 40. State and Local Taxes on the Gold Industry, Based Upon a $330 
per Ounce Future Gold Price Level. The inset compares total state and 
local taxes expected at the $330 and $384 price levels beyond 1990.
105
Future net proceeds taxes were estimated in accordance with a scale escalating 
from 2% to 5% of gross revenues minus allowed cost deductions, the rate for each mine 
depending upon the ratio of net proceeds to gross revenues. Companies with annual 
Nevada net proceeds in excess of $4 million are taxed at the 5% rate irrespective of 
their net proceeds/gross revenue ratio. The 5% rate was applicable at both future price 
levels to most operations considered in this study. The large difference in expected net 
proceeds taxes at the two future gold price levels stems mostly from shortened mine 
lives and reduced net proceeds at the lower gold price rather than lower tax brackets.
Property taxes were estimated at 35% of plant and equipment capital costs minus 
straight line depreciation times the property tax rate applicable in each local taxing 
jurisdiction. As with sales taxes, the small drop in expected property taxes between the 
$384 and $330 future gold price level reflects shortened mine lives with an attendant 
reduction in assessable replacement equipment.
Employer payments to social security, workmens' compensation and unemploy­
ment funds ranged between 1% and 2% of gross revenues from 1976 through 1990. 
The status of these contributions as taxes (on labor) or operating costs is debatable 
(Personal Communication, J. Dobra, 1993); they are omitted here.
Federal income taxes were estimated at the pre-1987 rate of 48% and 34% 
beyond 1986 for each mine, with due consideration for investment tax credits, loss 
carry-forward and alternative minimum taxes. Federal taxes show a greater sensitivity 
than net proceeds taxes to gold prices because of pre-1991 accelerated depreciation and 
the threshold effect of the 50% of net income limit on the 15% depletion allowance. 
Negative federal taxes in Figure 41 reflect un-depreciated plant which may be written 
off against other income with early closure of some mines at the lower gold price level.
106
-$ 5 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2  2 
9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0  
7 7 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 0 0  
6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8
P ro jec ted  •  $ 3 3 0  Au 
I • :l P ro jected •  $ 3 8 4  Au
H is to rica l
Figure 41. Federal Income taxes on the Nevada Gold Industry.
WEALTH SHARING
Table 18 compares precious metal industry net revenues to taxes paid from 
1976 through the depletion of reserves known as of 1990-1991. Values are 
undiscounted 1990 dollars.
TABLE 18
NEVADA GOLD INDUSTRY NET 
REVENUES AND TAXES, 1976-2022
Post-1990 
Gold Price





$5,800 Million $3,660 Million
$9,950 Million $6,100 Million
If social security, workmens' compensation and unemployment contributions are 
considered to be taxes, the apportionment of wealth generated by Nevada's gold mines is 




Economic parameters such as net present value and DCF-ROR have their greatest 
utility in comparing financial opportunities. Alternatives considered in this chapter are 
other environments which may be selected for gold exploration programs. 
EXPLORATION EXPENDITURES
Mackenzie and Doggett (1992) reported gold exploration expenditures in the 
western world from 1969 through 1990 to be about $17 billion. Exploration activity 
was shown to have accelerated from about $100 million annually in 1969 to a peak of 
$2.4 billion in 1987, before falling back to about $1.5 billion in 1990. Table 19, 
modified from Mackenzie & Doggett, lists the geographic distribution of expenditures.
TABLE 19
PRE-TAX GOLD EXPLORATION EXPENDITURES IN THE WESTERN WORLD0)
Cumulative Expenditures. 1969-1990
Countrv $U.S. 1990 Millions 2k
Australia 2,963 1 8
Brazil 685 4
Canada 4,968 29
South Africa 1 ,707 1 0
U.S. except Nevada 1,612 9
Nevada 1 ,822 1 1
Other Countries 3,125 1 9
( 1 ) Mine area exploration and individual prospector costs excluded.
Pre-1976 and post-1988 expenditures in Nevada for Table 19 were estimated 
on the basis of the ratios of 1976 Nevada to U.S. and 1988 Nevada to U.S. expenditures. 
Figure 42 compares the temporal distribution of gold exploration investments in Nevada
with those for other nations.
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Figure 42. Pre-tax Goid Exploration Expenditures 
in Nevada and Some Western Nations.
DISCOVERY RISK
Discovery risk was defined in Chapter 3 as the low probability that exploration
of a single mineral occurrence (prospect) will result in the discovery of an ore deposit. 
Table 20 compares the discovery probability for gold in Nevada with those for gold and 
other metals in alternative environments.
TABLE 20
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF DISCOVERY PROBABILITIES 






Nevada Gold 1976 -1 9 88 .011
CanadaO) Gold 1969 -1988 .005
BraziK1) Gold 1969 -1988 .018
AustraliaO) Gold 1969-1988 .007
Canadian Shield(2) Base Metals 1951-1974 .018
Canadian Cordillera(3) Base Metals 1951-1970 .020
Southwest U.S.(3) Porphyry Cu 1951-1970 .040
Austra lia^) Base Metals 1955 -1972 .006
Austra lia^) Nickel 1955 -1 9 72 .005
(1 ) Estimated from number of discoveries and total gold 
exploration expenditures reported by Mackenzie & Doggett (1992).
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( 2 ) Snow and Mackenzie, 1981.
(3 )  Mackenzie, 1980.
Discovery risk alone is an incomplete parameter for investment decision­
making. It does, however, provide some guidance for organizations with a high aversion 
to risk or a limited supply of high risk exploration capital.
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
Mackenzie and Doggett (1992) evaluated the economics of gold development and 
mining in Canada, Brazil and Australia for the period 1969 through 1988. Analyses 
were on a pre-tax basis, absent exploration and delineation costs, and at a constant U.S. 
1990 dollar gold price of $400 per ounce. Standardized discovery through depletion 
cash flow models were tailored for each significant gold ore deposit in these nations based 
upon published ore tonnage and grade, mineral type, processing methods and 
underground versus open-pit extraction. The cash flow characteristics of deposits with 
gross revenues of at least $15 million and a real rate of return of at least 10%, 
excluding exploration costs, were combined to yield an average model. Reclamation costs 
beyond those expensed as a normal part of operations were not considered.
For comparisons of the economics of Nevada gold development and production with 
Mackenzie and Doggett's results, previously described Nevada cash flow models were 
revised to yield pre-tax values and reclamation costs at closure were deleted. Cash flows 
for pre-1976 Nevada discoveries were included. Future projections of pre-tax cash 
flows were at $400 per ounce gold. However, historically realized (1976-1990) 
metal prices and resulting revenues were retained. This introduced a state-wide $30 
million in excess revenues over the amount that Mackenzie and Doggett would have 
estimated for Nevada's ore deposits. The amount, less than $1 million for the average 
mine, is small in view of the total revenues involved in aggregate cash flow projections.
i
More substantive differences between projection techniques employed by 
Mackenzie and Doggett and those used for Nevada were in capital investment patterns. In 
Mackenzie and Doggett's more idealized models, mines are developed and begin production 
at optimum operating scales, with only replacement capital costs incurred thereafter. 
Historical development-production-expansion investment patterns were retained in the 
Nevada mine cash flow models. Results are more conservative than those prepared by 
Mackenzie and Doggett for other regions, but are believed to be sufficiently comparable 
for the conclusions which they are used to support.
Of more than 100 gold deposits discovered in Nevada from 1969 through 1989, 
forty-four were determined to be economic based upon the revised cash flow models. The 
economic characteristics of those mines operating, under development or potentially 
economic at $400 per ounce gold were averaged, resulting in a time distribution of 
average cash flows for the typical Nevada discovery. Discoveries in Newmont's Area of 
Interest and Goldstrike/Betze were included in computations. The time distributions of 
average mine cash flows for gold exploration and development in Nevada and the other 
environments are illustrated in Figure 43.
Table 21 lists average economic parameters for gold mine development and 
production in the alternative environments, without considering discovery costs. The 
table also contains economic indices estimated by Mackenzie et. al. for other commodities 
and time periods.
Economic gold deposits in Nevada and the three nations studied by Mackenzie and 
Doggett (1992) clearly represent worthwhile development targets based upon rates of 
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Figure 43. Time Distribution of Exploration Through Depletion Pre-tax Cash Flows for 
Economic Gold Deposits in Nevada, Canada, Australia and Brazil; $400 per Ounce Gold.
Table 21. International Comparison of Development Economics























Nevada 1969-1988 Au & Ag $400/$6.00 44 45 946 333 95 37%
Canada (a) 1969-1988 Au & Ag $400/$6.00 43 39 406 169 44 29%
Brazil (a) 1969-1988 Au & Ag $400/$6.00 23 28 495 218 57 38%
Australia (a) 1969-1988 Au & Ag $400/$6.00 42 22 182 69 23 39%
Canada (b) 1946-1977 Pb $.62,Zn $.59,Cu $1.45 106 84 3986 835 283 N.R.
Australia (b) 1955-1978 Pb $.56,Zn $.60,Cu $1.63 17 96 3185 1517 413 N.R.
S.W. U.S. (c) 1951-1970 Copper $1.48 15 N.R. 2732 N.R. 63 14%
Australia (c) 1955-1972 Sn $757 tonne 4 N.R. 158 N.R. 13 14%
Australia (c) 1955-1972 Ni Sulfide-Price N.R. 11 N.R. 243 N.R. 9 16%
Australia (c) 1955-1972 Uranium-Price N.R. 5 N.R. 1081 N.R. 66 28%
(a) MacKenzie & Doggett, 1992
(b) MacKenzie, 1987





profitable than those in Canada over the 1969-1988 period. The average net present 
value per economic discovery was more variable, ranging from $95 million in Nevada to 
$28 million in Australia. The economics of gold development in Nevada appear to be 
more favorable than those for Southwestern U.S. porphyry copper development during 
the earlier mining era, offering comparable gross revenues and net present values and 
higher rates of return. The movement of large mining companies into gold development, 
albeit late in some cases, has proven well justified.
Time trends in expected net present values and rates of return for gold mine 
development are compared in Figures 44 and 45. Development economics are broken 






















•A u s tra lia  1983-1986
Figure 44. Time Trends in Pre-tax Net Present 
Values for Gold Mine Development in Nevada, Canada,
Australia and Brazil; $400 per Ounce Gold.
The overall economics of gold mine development and production in Nevada and
Canada appear to have held steady or improved modestly during the second half of the 
current gold rush and are more favorable than those for Australia and Brazil.
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Figure 45. Time Trends in Pre-tax Rates of Return 
for Gold Mine Development in Nevada, Canada,
Australia and Brazil; $400 per Ounce Gold.
EXPLORATION ECONOMICS
Table 22 compares statistical and economic parameters for exploration 
investments in Nevada, the Southwest U.S., Canada, Brazil and Australia. All of the non- 
Nevada analyses were performed by Mackenzie et. al. Procedures used to translate 
average development and production cash flows to rates of return and net present values 
at the start of the typical exploration program were similar to those described in 
Chapter 7.
To estimate non-Nevada values for Table 22, total successful and unsuccessful 
exploration expenditures for a commodity in each environment were prorated over only 
those deposits which met minimum development and production criteria of size (gross 
revenue) and profitability. The resulting average exploration expense for each discovery 
was divided by an estimated efficient annual exploration budget to fix the number of 
years of exploration for use in cash flow models (Mackenzie and Doggett, 1992). 
Distributed exploration expenditures, development and construction costs and production
Table 22. International Comparison of Exploration Economics
(Pre-tax, at start of exploration, including prorated discovery costs, in millions of constant 1990 U.S. dollars)
Total Count of Average Average Mean NPV
Time Exploration Economic Discovery Years to at 10% Expected
Realon Period Commoditv C08t8 Discoveries Cost Discoverv Discount ROR
Nevada 1969-1988 Gold 1302 44 30 6 28 16%
Canada (a) 1969-1988 Gold 2899 43 67 13 -24 4%
Brazil (a) 1969-1988 Gold 338 23 17 3 28 19%
Australia (a) 1969-1988 Gold 526 42 13 3 12 18%
Canada (b) 1946-1977 Base Metals 3129 106 30 6 137 22%
Australia (b) 1955-1978 Base Metals 1187 17 70 14 67 12%
S.W. U.S. (c) 1951-1970 Porphyry Copper 1454 15 97 3 -34 3%
Australia (c) 1955-1972 Lode Tin and Tungsten 91 4 23 3 -4 Negative
Australia (c) 1955-1972 Nickel Sulfide 661 11 60 3 -41 Negative
Australia (c) 1955-1972 Uranium 177 5 35 6 40 N.R.
(a) MacKenzie & Doggett, 1992
(b) MacKenzie, 1987
(c) MacKenzie & Woodall, 1987
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revenues were then discounted back to the assumed start of exploration to estimate 
"Expected Net Present Value" (E) at the start of the typical exploration program. 
Expected rates of return were also estimated at the start of exploration and likewise 
considered prorated exploration, development and construction costs and production cash 
flows.
Total Nevada pre-tax gold exploration expenditures from 1969 through 1988, 
excluding mine area exploration and individual prospectors' costs, were estimated at 
$1.33 billion. Expenditures divided by the 44 resulting economic gold discoveries (at 
$400 per ounce gold) made in the state during that period yielded a discovery cost of 
$30 million for each economic deposit. Economic gold discoveries in all regions, as 
previously defined, were those with a minimum gross revenue of $15 million and a 
minimum DCF-ROR of 10%. Discoveries in Newmont's Area of Interest and 
Goldstrike/Betze were included in the Nevada computations. Both capitalized and 
expensed exploration costs were prorated uniformly over a 6 year pre-discovery period 
following the method of Mackenzie (see Figure 35).
Total gold exploration expenditures in Table 22 differ from those cited in Table 
19. The tables cover different time periods; Mackenzie and Doggett (1992) also used a 
more limited data base in assessing exploration economics for other nations than they 
employed in estimating total gold exploration expenditures in each nation as reported in 
Table 19. Variations in average exploration expenditures per discovery cited in Table 
22 are attributed either to differences in endowment characteristics or to differences in 
exploration difficulty arising from near surface cover conditions, or both.
Figures 46 and 47 illustrate time trends in the numbers of discoveries and 
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Figure 46. Time Trends in the Numbers of Economic Gold Discoveries 
in Nevada, Canada, Australia and Brazil; $400 per Ounce Gold.
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Figure 47. Time Trends in Average Discovery Costs for Gold 
in Nevada, Canada, Australia and Brazil. $400 per Ounce Gold.
The average undiscounted costs of discovering an economic deposit were $13 
million in Brazil, $17 million in Australia, $37 million in Nevada (capitalized plus 
expensed investment) and $67 million in Canada. The expected values of exploration
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$28 million, $12 million, $3 million and -$24 million in Brazil, Australia, Nevada 
and Canada respectively. Goldstrike/Betze has a notable impact upon exploration and 
production in Nevada; Hemlo has a similar effect upon the economics of Canadian 
exploration.
Figures 48 and 49 compare trends in the expected net present values and rates of 
return for gold exploration in Nevada, Canada, Brazil and Australia for two time 
intervals. Except for Australia, the economic productivity of gold exploration dropped 
sharply during the later 1983-1988 interval, even though the number of economic 
discoveries held nearly steady or increased. Mackenzie attributes the decline in Canada 
largely to unwise exploration investments and unsound programs encouraged by excess 
risk capital made available through Canada's flow through share tax laws. Canadian tax 
regulations may have similarly contributed to a decline in the expected value of Nevada 
exploration investments.
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Figure 48. Expected Pre-tax Net Present Value of 
Gold Exploration Investments in Nevada, Canada, 
Australia and Brazil; $400 per Ounce Gold.
Figure 49. Expected Pre-tax Rates of Return on 
Gold Exploration Investments in Nevada, Canada, 
Australia and Brazil; $400 per Ounce Gold.
For the post-1982 period, the rate of return on gold exploration in Nevada 
appears second only to that of gold exploration in Australia. Viewing larger expected net 
present values at the start of development and higher gross revenues as significant 
factors in gold market risk reduction, the economic attributes of gold exploration in 
Nevada may be said to exceed those in Australia.
Focusing upon U.S. mining activity only, gold succeeded porphyry copper and 
molybdenum as the exploration targets of choice in the early 1970's. Some of the 
larger, traditional U.S. mining companies were reluctant to undertake gold programs, 
believing potential discoveries to be too small to affect corporate cash flows. However, 
as shown in Table 21, gross revenues from the average Nevada gold discovery have been 
higher than those from the average Southwest U.S. porphyry copper discovery. 
Moreover, while the expected rate of return on Southwestern U.S. porphyry copper 
exploration for the period 1951-1960 was estimated by Mackenzie (1978) at 31%,
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discoveries after 1960 were decidedly uneconomic from the standpoint of exploration 
investment. The overall 1951-1970 expected rate of return for porphyry copper 
exploration was only 3%, compared to an expected 16% rate of return on Nevada gold 
exploration investments during the 1969-1988 period.
121
CHAPTER 10
ECONOMIC SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A large amount of public land open to mineral entry, favorable state and local 
taxes, reasonable environmental regulations and an impressive record of gold discov­
eries have made Nevada one of the most attractive gold prospecting regions in the world. 
About 3,000 individual mineral occurrences in the state were explored for precious 
metal between 1976 and 1988. Twenty-eight to thirty-two economic deposits were 
found, depending upon future gold prices.
Although intensely prospected, the productivity of Nevada's gold exploration 
environment does not appear to have diminished significantly since 1981, the beginning 
of the most active phase of the current gold rush. Discovery rates have kept pace with 
"effective" exploration investments and industry-wide average discovery costs have 
remained relatively constant at about $35 per ounce. Nor has the economic quality of 
discoveries diminished with time. Average returns on economic discoveries developed 
late in the current gold mining boom equaled those of earlier discoveries. Production 
from these ore deposits added about $1.15 billion to the wealth of the mining industry. 
Unfortunately, development and production investments in non-economic mineral 
deposits of gold concurrently reduced mining sector wealth by about $346 million.
While the quality of Nevada's exploration environment appears to have remained 
stable since 1981, exploration has been unprofitable for the average organization, 
taking senior, junior and promotional companies into consideration. Excluding New- 
mont's Area of Interest, the industry wide constant dollar expected DCF-ROR on 
exploration investments from 1976 through 1988 was only 6.5% (about 10.5% 
nominal). Average economics appear to have deteriorated even further beginning in
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1987 as more costly sulfide ore targets gained attention and expenditures by inefficient 
organizations increased dramatically. In total, about $1.5 billion pre-tax dollars were 
spent on gold exploration in the state between 1976 and 1988; roughly one-third of this 
amount is believed to have been wasted on "ineffective" programs.
Economics for the average senior organization exploring for gold were more 
favorable than those for the industry as a whole. The expected DCF-ROR for adequately 
funded senior exploration groups was 9.5% (about 13.5% nominal), near the assumed 
opportunity cost of capital and again based upon a future gold price of $330 per ounce. 
Returns to senior organizations following a "superior-skills" strategy were still more 
promising. These select, largely traditional mining organizations realized an average 
real rate of return of 15.3% (about 19.3% nominal); the expected net present value of 
their typical Nevada gold program was $13.4 million at the start of exploration.
Regarding the current Nevada gold rush as a single economic cycle of exploration 
and development beginning in 1976, the state-wide net present value of the cycle at a 
10% discount rate is estimated at $268 million ($330 per ounce future gold price 
level). This is the net present value of all exploration, development and construction 
investments and resulting cash flows from the beginning of 1976 to the depletion of all 
currently known economic gold deposits in the state, discounted at 10% to the start of 
1976. Although $268 million is not impressive in view of the total investments 
involved in the industry during this period of time, overall profitability compares well 
with the economics of exploration and development in other nations for which similar 
analyses are available.
Nevada's share of world gold output should increase in the future. Gold 
exploration and production are declining rapidly in both South Africa and the former
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Soviet Union in the face of political and financial uncertainty. The economics of gold 
exploration in Canada are so unfavorable that mined reserves are not being replaced by 
new discoveries. While rates of return on exploration investments in Australia slightly 
exceed those for Nevada, the average size of an Australian discovery is less than one- 
fifth that of a Nevada discovery; market and technical risks are accordingly greater in 
Australia. Returns on exploration investments in Brazil, while promising early in the 
current gold mining cycle, have deteriorated badly since 1982.
in summary, Nevada's gold exploration environment continues to be one of the 
most promising in the world. Exploration organizations which curtailed their Nevada 
gold programs beginning in 1988 may have erred in basic strategy. It is noteworthy 
that most traditional mining companies exhibiting a "superior skills" strategy have 
either maintained or increased their Nevada exploration expenditures since 1988. 
Other distinguishing characteristics of these successful organizations are investigated in






Economic parameters and probabilities developed in Part I apply to the average 
exploration organization. However, the "average" organization is a fiction. Some types 
of companies are more successful than others. For exploration groups representing the 
same types of companies in an environment, some make discoveries and others do not. 
The goal of Part II of this investigation was to identify and measure characteristics 
which distinguished the winners from the losers.
Exploration success is variously attributed to management and strategy, to highly 
qualified staff or dollars spent, tactics, or to random chance. Values for variables 
partially describing each of these areas of organizational behavior were gathered for a 
number of corporations which conducted gold exploration in Nevada between 1976 and 
1988. Linear probability regression is used to estimate the association of individual 
variables with exploration success. The overall importance of strategy, management 
practices and tactics is evaluated through multivariate regression.
SOURCES AND CRITIQUE OF DATA
Information on strategies, corporate and local management practices was obtained 
through personal interviews of sixty district geologists representing companies with 
offices in Reno during 1989-1990. The interview form is duplicated in Appendix E. 
For relocated or closed offices or those in which the exploration manager had been 
replaced subsequent to a discovery, the manager in-place preceding and during the 
period of discovery was contacted by phone for an interview, if possible.
Data on exploration tactics and staff characteristics was gathered during 1988
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and 1989 via a mail survey of geologists who had at one time been employed in Nevada 
gold exploration. The survey questionnaire (Appendix F) was mailed to 800 and 
completed by 120 geologists reporting on 179 companies; each responding geologist 
described experience at an average 2.5 organizations.
Data from the mail survey and interviews was supplemented with information 
from annual SME membership rolls published in Mining Engineering Magazine.
For each exploration organization, staff geologist questionnaire information and 
values extracted from SME membership rolls, notice of intent and plan of operation files 
for each variable for each year of exploration activity relevant to this study was 
averaged. Averaging was also applied to management interview data where more than one 
district geologist represented a company. The results were contingency tables of pooled 
data containing the mean values of a variable for each company for each year. Entire data 
sets were used to estimate principal moments for variables for the industry as a whole.
Companies reported upon by at least three staff geologists (mailed survey) and a 
district geologist (interview) were selected from the data base for regression analyses 
of the relationship between organizational characteristics and exploration success. 
While a large quantity of information on numerous companies was gathered, data sets 
deemed sufficiently complete to support statistically valid comparisons of organizations 
were obtained for only 29 senior companies.
SAMPLE SELECTION
Of the 29 companies with sufficient data support, three were found to have had 
non-competitive budgets, so were excluded from comparative analyses. An average 
annual budget of less than $1 million was determined to be non-competitive. This was 
approximately the average annual budget of the lowest funded "successful" exploration
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group in the state (see Budgets, Chapter 12). Three additional organizations were 
excluded because their exploration programs were mainly limited to specific, large 
blocks of land for which mineral rights had been acquired. Of the remaining companies, 
10 were estimated to be clearly economically successful in Nevada gold exploration 
during the relevant time period. These were matched with 10 decidedly unsuccessful 
companies with comparable exploration expenditures and program durations. 
"Successful" companies were identified as those for which the net present values of 
discoveries exceeded the present worth cost of total exploration investments, computed 
at a 10% discount rate, at the start of each organization's Nevada gold exploration 
experience (see Chapter 7). The remaining three companies with sufficient budgets and 
data support were marginally unsuccessful or neutral with respect to exploration 
investments and returns. These were substituted for three decidedly unsuccessful 
organizations in developing some regression models.
An insufficient number of staff geologist responses were received for one of the 
ten successful organizations for use in regression analyses of those variables dependent 
upon staff input. To maintain an equal number of successful and unsuccessful 
organizations in regression modeling, an unsuccessful organizations was also eliminated 
from the relevant regression data sets, leaving a sample population of 18. All other 
analyses are based upon a sample of 20 companies.
METHOD OF ANALYSIS
Trial regression analyses were performed on a number of characteristics 
employing raw and transformed data. This served to identify the two-variable linear 
probability model (LPM) as the most efficient means of determining statistical 
relationships between organizational characteristics and exploration success.
127
Linear probability regression models in their simplest form may be described 
as:
Y it = B 1 + B2 Xit + u it
where X = value of the variable for company" i" in period T
Y = 1 if the company's exploration was successful in any year
Y = 0 if the company's exploration was unsuccessful in all years
In this model the conditional expectation of Yj given Xj [E(Y jlX j)] can be 
interpreted as the conditional probability that the event (success) will occur given Xj; 
that is, Pr(Yj = 11Xj).
Industry-wide trends were evident in some strategies, tactics and practices 
when considering the entire 1976-1988 time period under study. A number of 
variables were tested in linear probability auto-regressive models of the form:
Yt = a + BqXq + B1Xd. 1 + R2x d-2 + ^3XD-3 + ut’ 
with "D" representing the year of discovery by successful companies, to accommodate 
potential time trends. However, coefficients for the one to three year pre-discovery 
periods under consideration were mostly erratic and inconsistent with perceived overall 
trends. As an alternative means of correcting for trends, the value (company average) 
for each variable for each company was transformed to a standard deviation within each 
year. Individual values in contingency tables then represented a company's deviation 
from the year's all-company mean with respect to a practice or condition. Subsequent 
analyses employed linear probability models using standard deviations of company 
characteristics as independent variables and indicators for exploration economic success
(1) versus non-success (0) as dependent variables. Resulting coefficients bear a
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common unit of measure (standard deviations from mean behavoir); they are directly 
comparable between characteristics in assessing the relative importance of variables to 
exploration success.
Figure 50 graphs a typical linear probability regression model. The general 
form of the model is:
Success Probability=.50 + (X-Coeff.)((Company Value - All Company Mean)/Std.Dev.)
Success probability  in this context is the probability that the company's 
exploration program for gold in Nevada between 1976 and 1988 was economically 
successful. By inference, similar strategies, practices and organizational behaviors 
should promote exploration success in the future.
To prepare the data base for LPM regression, standard deviations of 
organizational variables in the year of and each of the three years preceding the 
discovery (Dt_0 to Dt_3) of an economic ore deposit by each of the 10 successful 
companies were matched with the standard deviations of these variables during identical 
time periods for unsuccessful companies.
Transformed explanatory variables for each company were then averaged for 
each period Dt.0 to Dt_3, Dt.0 to Dt_2, Dt_0 to Dt_.j. Regression was performed on these 
averages and Dt.0 successively to detect time trends potentially signifying conditions 
resulting from rather than preceding discovery events. Such trends might indicate 
reporting bias. Statistically significant relationships between company characteristics 
and exploration success which appeared no earlier than the year of or the year before 
discovery (Dt.0 or were attributed to organizational changes resulting from
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discovery and were rejected. Those which were clearly pre-discovery conditions and 
proved to be statistically related to exploration success at the 80% confidence level 
(two-tail t test) are individually discussed in the following chapters. Variables for 
which x-coefficients did not prove to be statistically significant at the 80% confidence 
level are not discussed unless their lack of significance conflicts with findings by other 
researchers or commonly accepted "industry wisdom". Two-tail t tests were used in the 
absence of expected signs for the coefficients. Appendix G contains an example of the 
step-by-step process of data transformation and regression leading up to final results. 
r-squared
Because each of the variables used to characterize behaviors represents only one 
of a large number of attributes defining an exploration organization, coefficients of
determination for the LPM models are relatively small. Moreover, r2 is of limited value 
in dichotomous response (0,1) models because all of the dependent variables lie either 
along the X axis (Y = 0) or along a parallel axis corresponding to Y = 1, as illustrated in
Figure 50. In most practical applications, r2 in highly efficient [multivariate] dicho­
tomous response models ranges between 0.2 and 0.6, compared to 0.90 to 0.99 for 
models based upon scalar dependent variables (Gujarati, 1988). The regression models 
developed upon single independent variables for this study are not expected to be 
efficient. They do, however, afford a means of comparing the relative goodness-of-fit 
between the various models.
Significance of Regression Coefficients
Standard errors of regression coefficients for LPM models suffer the same 
limitations as do coefficients of determination (Gujarati, 1988). Accordingly, the re­
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gion of acceptance for statistical significance in two tail t tests was set at the relatively 
low 1-P value of .80, compared to the more conventional .95 value used for 
multivariate models based upon scalar independent variables.
The null hypothesis, H0:82 = 0, was applied in testing all regression co­
efficients; that is, the slope coefficient expressing the relationship between each 
variable and historical exploration success was assumed to be zero. If the 1-P value for 
a variable was found to be .80 or greater, the null hypothesis was rejected, and the 
variable was deemed to be associated with success at a statistically significant level. 
SUMMARY OF REGRESSION MODELS
The results of LPM regression analysis for all of the predictor variables 
developed for this investigation are summarized in Table 23. Of the 70 empirical 
variables used to characterize exploration organizations in this study, only 26 were 
found to differ significantly between successful companies in their pre-discovery years 
and unsuccessful companies. The x-coefficients of the models for these variables 
express the extent to which one standard deviation from the mean with respect to a 
strategy, practice or tactic was associated with the probability of exploration success. A 
positive coefficient indicates that more of a variable was associated with success; a 
negative coefficient indicates that less of a variable was associated with success.
The information content of those variables not found to be significantly associated 
with successful exploration should not be wholly discounted. They represent normative 
strategies, practices and tactics from which successful organizations have not deviated in 
achieving their goals. Companies which emphasize these non-differentiating behaviors 
in their exploration approach may be wasting management energy, talent and investment
dollars on unnecessary practices.
TABLE 23. LPM REGRESSION MODELS
(* Denotes variable significantly associated with exploration success at or above the 80% confidence level)
DISTRICT GEOLOGIST INTERVIEW DATA
Unit or Raw Standard X Coefficient 1-P Sample
____Seale_______Mean..,. Deviation r-squared___ Coefficient Std. Error.. ... Value___ _ __Size. N__
Bibliographic Information
Total Exploration Experience years 20.0 7.4 0.17 -0.12 0.09 0.76 20
Nevada Exploration Experience years 9.4 5.6 0.01 -0.05 0.14 <.50 20
Number of Prior Employers* count 2.8 1.3 0.11 -0.16 0.12 0.80 20
Business & Management Training weeks 5.0 7.7 0.04 -0.13 0.15 0.58 20
Academic Degree* B=1,M=2,D=3 1.8 0.7 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.80 20
Task Time Distribution
Total Field Time* percent 22% 11% 0.15 0.18 0.10 0.91 20
Staff Admin. Management percent 12% 7% 0.01 -0.06 0.13 <.50 20
In-office Project Monitoring percent 20% 7% 0.02 0.07 0.13 <.50 20
Acquisition/J.V. Prep. & Eval. percent 15% 9% 0.01 -0.06 0.14 <.50 20
Budgeting & Cost Control percent 11% 7% 0.09 -0.13 0.11 0.77 20
Corporate Reporting Time* percent 8% 4% 0.12 -0.15 0.09 0.80 18
Project & Program Planning percent 12% 6% 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.55 20
Autonomy/Authority Variables
Input to Staff Size Decisions Y=1,N=0 0.8 0.4 0.00 0.00 0.27 <.50 20
Input to Annual Budget Decisions Y=1,N=0 0.7 0.5 0.01 0.11 0.25 <.50 20
Local Hiring Authority* Y=1,N=0 0.8 0.4 0.33 0.37 0.22 0.89 20
Corporate Contact Frequency* per month 2.4 1.9 0.16 0.19 0.10 0.92 20
Corporate Project Involvement Y=1,N=0 0.6 0.5 0.00 0.00 0.26 <.50 20
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Table 23 (Cont'd)
Unit or Raw Standard
Scale Mean Deviation
Company Strategies & Practices
Beginning of NV Gold Exploration year(s) 1979 6.8
Minimum Gold Target* thousands of oz. 436 342
Employed Staff professionals 8.4 5.8
Percent of Staff Contracted* professionals 24% 23%
Staff Time in NV Exploration* percent 76% 23%
Count of Strategy Changes 1984-1988 2.1 1.5
Opportunity Response Time* weeks 6.0 7.0
Formal Technical Support Group* Y=1,N=0 0.6 0.5
Opinion of Company Strategies
Clear Plans & Objectives* VL=1 ,VH=4(1) 2.8 0.9
Exploration Geographic Focus VL=1,VH=4(1) 3.3 0.8
Exploration Commodity Focus VL=1,VH=4(1) 3.4 0.6
Minimum Gold Target Criteria VL=1,VH=4(1) 3.2 0.7
Opinion of the Productivity of Exploration Tactics
Submittals LI=1,MI=3(2) 1.5 0.7
District Level Exploration* LI=1,MI=3(2) 2.4 0.6
Regional Exploration* LI=1,MI=3(2) 2.4 0.6
Opinion of the Productivity of Exploration Techniques
Conceptual Geologic Models U=1,MI=3(2) 2.4 0.8
Geophysical Exploration LI=1,MI=3(2) 1.5 0.6
Structural & Alteration Mapping LI=1,MI=3(2) 2.6 0.6










0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.94 20
0.21 0.22 0.11 0.94 20
0.04 -0.09 0.10 0.60 20
0.19 -0.22 0.11 0.94 20
0.23 0.24 0.14 0.89 20
0.05 -0.12 0.10 0.74 20
0.10 -0.33 0.23 0.83 20
0.10 -0.33 0.23 0.83 20
0.14 0.21 0.12 0.90 20
0.01 0.05 0.14 <.50 20
0.00 0.02 0.13 <.50 20
0.01 0.04 0.13 <.50 20
0.02 0.08 0.14 <.50 20
0.20 -0.21 0.10 0.95 20
0.09 0.18 0.14 0.80 20
0.01 0.04 0.12 <.50 20
0.00 0.03 0.14 <.50 20
0.04 -0.13 0.10 0.78 20




Importance of Staff Characteristics & Staff Management
Staff Technical Skills LI=1,MI=3(2) 2.6 0.6
Staff Exploration Experience* U=1 ,MI=3(2) 2.3 0.7
Management of Staff U=1,MI=3(2) 1.6 0.9
STAFF GEOLOGIST QUESTIONNAIRE
Prediscovery Raw Standard
Period (3) Mean Deviation
Staff Bibliographic Information
Exploration Experience -1 to -3 8.5 years 5.3 years
College Degree (B=1,M=2,D=3) -1 to -3 1.8 0.6
Tenure with Company* -1 to -3 8.9 years 3.1 years
Senority at Discovery Date* -1 to -3 3.3 years 2.8 years
Intra-group Experience Spread* -1 to -3 2.7 years 1.5 years
Task Time Distribution
Total Time in Office* -1 to -3 46% 15%
Data Analysis -1 to -3 19% 8%
Submittal Reviews 0 to -3 10% 10%
Generative Research 0 to -3 11% 6%
Field Reconnaissance -1 to -3 21% 11%
Mapping & Sampling -1 to -3 16% 9%
Drilling -1 to -3 15% 9%
Total % Time NV Exploration -1 to -3 55% 27%
Company Practices and. Policies
Minimum Gold Target* 0 to -3 480K 280K
Opportunity Response Speed 0 to -3 1.8 0.7
Clear Plans & Objectives* 0 to -3 2.1 0.5
Table 23 (Cont'd)
0.06 0.11 0.11 0.65 20
0.16 0.20 0.11 0.91 20
0.00 0.00 0.15 <.50 20
DATA, AGGREGATED BY COMPANY AND YEAR
X C oeffic ien t 1-P Sample
r-sauared C oeffic ient Std. Error Value Size. N
0.00 -0.04 0.15 <.50 18
0.00 0.01 0.13 <.50 18
0.14 -0.18 0.12 0.84 18
0.13 -0.21 0.15 0.82 18
0.31 -0.30 0.16 0.91 16
0.35 0.40 0.13 0.99 18
0.07 0.12 0.11 0.69 18
0.01 0.06 0.11 <.50 18
0.03 0.07 0.09 0.54 18
0.05 -0.11 0.11 0.64 18
0.02 -0.06 0.11 <.50 18
0.07 -0.15 0.14 0.68 18
0.04 0.11 0.12 0.61 18
0.16 0.20 0.12 0.88 18
0.01 0.05 0.12 <.50 18




Table 23 (Cont'd) Prediscovery Raw Standard X Coefficient 1-P Sample
__Period 13)__ Mean Deviation r-squared Coefficient Std. Error Value Size. N
Exploration Tactics (Percentage of staff involved in each approach at least 25% of time)
Regional Exploration* 0 to -3 76% 28% 0.19 -0.23 0.12 0.92 18
District Exploration 0 to -3 46% 37% 0.00 -0.02 0.14 <50 18
Submittal Evaluations* 0 to -3 50% 39% 0.30 0.27 0.10 0.99 18
Reserve Acquisitions* 0 to -3 13% 20% 0.22 -0.30 0.15 0.93 18
SME MEMBERSHIP ROLLS, BLM CLAIM LOCATION AND NOTICE OF INTENT DATA
Prediscovery Raw Standard X Coefficient 1-P Sample
Period ( 3 ) Mean Deviation r-sauared Coefficient Std. Error Value Size. N
Land Policies
Annual New Claim Loctions -1 to -3 306 352 0.03 0.12 0.16 0.53 20
New Claims per $1M Exp./Year -1 to -3 190 229 0.01 0.05 0.11 <.50 20
Claims Held per $1M Exp./Year -1 to -3 350 396 0.02 -0.10 0.15 <.50 20
Average Staff Characteristics
Total Exploration Experience 0 to -3 9.6 years 5.5 years 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.65 20
Nevada Exploration Experience 0 to -3 4.4 years 2.5 years 0.01 0.06 0.14 <50 20
AIME Staff Size (Unmod.)*(4) 0 to -3 3.4 3.5 0.10 -0.16 0.11 0.83 20
AIME Staff Size(Modified)*(4) 0 to -3 2.4 2.2 0.16 0.26 0.14 0.92 20
Expenditure/AIME Staff Member 0 to -3 930K 85k 0.09 -0.18 0.13 0.81 20
(1) Very Low (VL)=1; Very High (VH)=4.
(2) Least Important (Ll)=1; Most Important (Ml)=3.
(3) Years preceeding discovery year; discovery year = 0.





Three broad strategies typified organizations engaged in Nevada gold exploration:
• Some organizations perceived that the expected value of exploration was 
greater than zero and committed what they believed to be sufficient 
resources to assure a reasonable probability of success. This approach 
was characteristic of many energy companies.
• Under-financed companies, and those unwilling or insufficiently 
informed to adequately fund competitive Nevada gold exploration, 
pursued short-term windfall strategies. Most junior organizations and 
Canadian stock companies fell into this category, as did seven senior 
companies which, though financially able, wasted their resources on 
under-budgeted programs.
• Most senior companies with a long history of metal exploration and 
corporate cultures oriented toward discovery rather than acquisition 
pursued long-term superior skills strategies. With few exceptions, 
valuable gold discoveries in the state were made by this group of 
organizations.
While a number of companies may have similar overall strategies, each 
approaches exploration in its own, unique way, theoretically reflecting its strengths and 
weaknesses. Nine key strategic decision areas, common to all mining companies, serve 
to distinguish individual company styles :
• Whether to explore for or acquire new reserves
• The appropriate level of geographic and commodity focus
• The minimum size of ore deposit suitable for development
• When to begin exploration programs
• Decentralization and control
• Exploration budgeting and staffing
• Project Screening
• Strategic flexibility
• When to end exploration
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Significant relationships between empirical behaviors in each of these decision 
areas and the probability of historical exploration success are individually discussed in 
the following sections.
EXPLORATION VERSUS ACQUISITION
The economics of acquisition versus exploration have been investigated by a 
number of researchers - Robinson & Mackenzie (1987 ), Cook (1983 ) and Robinson 
(1985) - to mention a few. Exploration versus acquisition preference at the corporate 
level is treated here as an independent variable potentially associated with Nevada 
exploration success rather than in quantitative economic terms.
Table 24, modified from Cook (1983), compares worldwide corporate records 
of discoveries as a percentage of mines placed in production (discoveries plus acqui­
sitions) for 16 senior companies. Company names are not cited.
TABLE 24
COMPANY INTERNATIONAL AND NEVADA 























Regression of the number of Nevada discoveries by each company on the 
company's ratio of worid-wide discoveries to total mines developed yielded the following:
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Number of Nevada Discoveries = .20 +(.10)(Portion of Operations on Own Discoveries)
X-coefficient = .10 Standard Error of X-Coefficient = .05
r-squared = .23 1-P Value = .92
Corporations exhibiting a stronger exploration orientation in worldwide oper­
ations had significantly greater probabilities of success in Nevada gold exploration.
These results are independent of Nevada acquisition and exploration expenditures. All of 
the companies reported exploration as their primary Nevada strategy, and exploration 
expenditures were uniformly at or above the level necessary for effective programs.
The numbers of Nevada discoveries were not correlative with expenditures.
The greater success of companies which focus upon exploration, as opposed to
I
those embracing a mixed exploration and acquisition approach, is not unexpected.
According to Porter (1980), companies that pursue a clear strategy are likely to 
perform well. Firms that do not pursue a clear strategy - middle-of-the-roaders - do 
the worst.
COMMODITY AND GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS
ill
Whitney & Whitney (1985), in evaluating world-wide exploration productivity 
for 12 of the senior organizations considered in this study, found that concentration on a 
single metal, rather than commodity diversification, enhanced productivity. Their hypo­
thesis was not specifically tested in this investigation, but some information was 
gathered on commodity focus in conjunction with questions regarding strategic changes.
According to district geologists as of 1989, half of the senior companies surveyed 
in Reno continued to regard gold as the sole metal of interest. Twenty-four percent had 
recently added base metals, primarily volcanogenic massive sulfide targets, to their 
hunting list. Seven percent of the companies had renewed interest in porphyry copper
139
prospects. One-fourth of the senior companies had continued to pursue base metals and 
industrial minerals, along with gold and silver, throughout the 1976-1989 period.
The relationship between success probability and exploration geographic focus 
was tested at the regional level by evaluating the percentage of time which each 
company's locally headquartered staff devoted to Nevada, as opposed to adjacent states and 
other metallogenic provinces. Relevant data was gathered from both district and staff 
geologists. According to local managers, twenty percent of the senior companies 
surveyed in Reno as of 1989 restricted their gold exploration activities to Nevada. Half 
of the remaining companies, identifying Nevada as their previous search area, had 
expanded their region of interest to include the entire western U.S. in the middle or late 
1980's. Forty percent had historically included all of the western states in their region 
of interest. Eight percent of the companies had recently gone international, with Latin 
America drawing the most attention.
Regression of indicator variables on the percentage of locally headquartered staff 
effort devoted to Nevada based upon district geologist input resulted in the following 
model. All of the companies in the regression data base were deemed to have had 
adequate, competitive budgets for their Nevada programs, irrespective of the percentage 
of staff time invested in Nevada.
Success Probability = .51 + ,24((Proportion of effort in Nevada - .76)/.23) 
X-coefficient = .24 Standard Error of X  Coefficient = .14
r-squared = .23 1-P Value = .89
The significant and pronounced association of a Nevada exploration focus with 
Nevada exploration success according to district geologist input may be in part an effect
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rather than a cause. Local managers reported upon strategies and practices in 
retrospect, in some cases many years after the successful organizations in the 
regression data base had made economic gold discoveries in the state. These companies 
would be more prone to concentrate exploration effort in the region of their prior 
successes. The regression data base may therefore be biased by the greater impact of 
more recent geographic focus upon the selective memories of the reporting geologists. 
This is further suggested by the results of the staff geologist survey. While successful 
companies exhibited a moderate tendency toward greater Nevada focus during their pre­
discovery years (X-coefficient = .11), results were statistically significant at only the 
61% confidence level in a two-tail t test. If geographic focus is accepted a priori as 
conducive to success and a one-tail t test is appropriate, the association is still 
significant at only the 80% confidence level. A positive relationship between geographic 
focus of exploration effort and success probability is therefore only modestly supported. 
MINIMUM TARGET CRITERIA
Small deposits are inevitably discovered along with large ones. The critical 
question is whether or not a size cutoff should be imposed in screening projects based 
upon the sizes of deposits a company will ultimately consider for development. Most 
companies impose both minimum acceptable size and profitability criteria. These 
criteria can have an important effect on exploration economics.
The conventional rationale for minimum size and profitability requirements is 
that a company's senior management, considered to be a fixed resource, should focus its 
attention on larger deposits which have the potential to make a significant contribution 
to overall corporate performance. Verluen and Mackenzie (1988) argue that this 
reasoning begs the question of why responsibility for small projects should rest with
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senior management in the first place. They suggest that the minimum size requirement 
is really one of organizational structure. However, results of this investigation indicate 
that minimum deposit size requirements may be justified as much, if not more, by 
production economics.
Figure 51 illustrates the relationship between deposit recoverable ounces and 
the net present values of Nevada gold discoveries at the start of development. With one 
exception, no find of less than 130,000 recoverable ounces (In 130 [K] = 4.87) bore a 
positive net present value; that is, all but one failed to provide a real 10% discounted 
rate of return on development and production investments. Significant net present 
values have not accrued to any deposit of less than 400,000 recoverable ounces, roughly 
translating to about 600,000 geologic ounces.
Figure 51. Recoverable Ounces Versus Net Present 
Value at the Start of Development. NPV's at 10% 
discount and $384 per ounce future gold price level.
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The best fit relationship between recoverable ounces and net present value for 
the deposits represented in Figure 51 is a polynomial of the form:
NPV = 109 - 54 (x) + 6.12(x)2 r?= .45
x = Natural log of thousands of recoverable ounces 
NPV in U.S. $Millions
According to this model, net present value is 45% dependent (r2 = .45) upon 
recoverable ounces alone, illustrating the importance of economies of scale.
When discovery costs are also charged against development and production cash 
flows, ore deposits of less than 400,000 recoverable ounces are shown to be decidedly 
uneconomic exploration targets in Nevada, not only for large companies, but for all 
organizations. Whether through this economic insight, or based upon conventionally 
cited optimum utilization of corporate talent, companies which have been successful in 
the state have consistently maintained larger minimum target criteria, both before and 
after their discoveries.
The relationship between historical exploration success and larger minimum 
target criteria is illustrated in Figure 52, which also shows minimum target criteria 
distribution for the industry as a whole. Regression on pre-discovery data gathered 
from staff geologists for the eighteen successful and unsuccessful organizations selected 
for detailed analysis yielded the following relationship between minimum target 
criteria, in mineable ounces, and the historical probability of exploration success:
Success Probability = .52 + .20((Minimum Target - 480 K ounces)/280 K ounces) 
X-coefficient = .20 Standard Error of X Coefficient = . 12
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Figure 52. Minimum Target Criteria, Successful 
and Unsuccessful Organizations.
Because the successful and unsuccessful exploration groups contained a roughly
equal mix of large and medium size parent companies, differences in minimum target 
criteria may not be attributed to the optimization of corporate management resources or 
exploration or development funding capability.
Despite the apparent association between larger minimum target criteria and 
economically successful exploration, half of the senior companies surveyed in Reno in 
1989 had reduced their requirements during the prior four years. The universally cited 
reason was the belief that a larger number of smaller potential discoveries offered 
greater expected returns to exploration in a depleted environment. Evidence developed 



















technical success, but not higher returns on investment. On the other hand, most of the 
smaller companies surveyed in Reno in 1989 had recently increased their minimum 
target criteria, perhaps having learned from earlier development and production losses. 
PROGRAM INITIATION
For many mining and energy companies, improved gold prices beginning in 1974 
resulted in the hasty organization of exploration groups and programs in an effort to beat 
the competition (see inset to Figure 60). Corporate executives fell victim to gold rush 
psychology, a condition which reappeared during the 1980-1981 gold price peak.
To assess the wisdom of their haste, the number of discoveries for 12 econo­
mically successful and 15 economically unsuccessful senior organizations (1969-1988 
time period) were regressed on each company's exploration start-up date and program 
duration. For unsuccessful companies, dependent variables were zero. Beginning dates, 
ranging from 1969 to 1982, were represented as the number of years before 1988 that 
each company had explored in the state (S = 1988 - Start Year +1). It should be noted 
that this is not the linear probability model summarized in Table 23.
Discoveries= 1.51 + (-.193)( S) + (.138) (Program Life)
Coefficient Errors: .098 .094
Coefficient 1-P Values .960 .84 0
"Program Life" was included in the two-variable model to isolate the positive 
effect which a greater number of years of exploration have on the probability of 
discovery, independent of when each company began exploration. One-third of the 
companies in the regression data base, including some successful organizations, had 
terminated their programs in various years prior to 1988. The negative coefficient on
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the index for program initiation (S), holding program lives equal, implies that 
companies which began gold exploration in Nevada early, instead of gaining a competitive 
advantage, enjoyed lower levels of success than those which began later. The rela­
tionship is statistically significant at the 94% confidence level. An LPM model, re­
gressing program start years only and summarized in Table 23, yielded similar, equally 
significant results.
One reason for this seeming reversal of common sense is apparent given know­
ledge of the companies involved (names with-held). Three of the early entrants were 
overfunded and quickly developed very large staffs and bureaucratic organizations. For 
these and other early exploration groups, while general geology in Nevada was known, 
conceptual geologic models which could serve as guides in exploration had not been 
developed. The value of geochemical exploration had not been totally appreciated, and 
optimum methods for applying and interpreting the results had not been perfected. 
False leads absorbed much of the energy and resources of early explorers. By the time 
the exploration industry as a whole had overcome these hurdles and progressed up the 
learning curve to a point of efficiency, groups representing early entrants in the gold 
rush may have passed their prime (see Productivity Cycles).
In summary, the absence of a positive relationship between exploration success 
and the year in which exploration effort began is in part a product of cyclical group 
productivity, but also resulted from the interaction of advances in exploration tech­
nology, cumulative knowledge of the environment and changing metal prices. After about 
1981 these kept discovery rates relatively constant so that early entrants in the state's 
gold rush gained no particular advantage over later competitors in finding an ore deposit. 
It should be noted that prior to about 1981, based upon the historical record expressed
in the above regression model, each added year of opportunity gained by an early start 
cost an exploration organization about 6 percentage points in discovery probability 
[.138 + (-.193) = -.06]. Other analyses indicate that competitors who were in the 
game longer after 1981 had a greater total chance of success.
These findings contain two messages for exploration strategists. The first is that 
gold rush psychology is counter-productive. Secondly, the historical practice of 
maintaining permanent exploration offices in a number of regions may not be effective. 
The presumed value of an existing organization is that when conditions render 
exploration for a particular commodity or type of target attractive, an in-place team 
with experience in the environment will have a competitive edge. This does not appear to 
be the case. Centralized specialists focusing upon exploration in particular geologic 
environments and which are relocated to those environments when market or 
technology-driven opportunities arise may be more economically efficient.
LOCAL AUTHORITY
Implementation of corporate strategy requires that some degree of authority be 
afforded local management. Quoting Mackenzie & Snow (1981), “The most successful 
types of exploration organizations are decentralized, with maximum local authority, 
because this places decision making capability at the lowest possible level. 
Decentralized groups typically get results by having the greatest and most directly 
applicable knowledge and the most timely understanding brought into play on the greatest 
number of decisions."
Two measures of local authority included in the survey of district geologists for 
this investigation were 1) the presence or absence of significant influence in estab­
lishing annual budgets and staff sizes, and 2) the final decision in the selection of
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individuals for new staff positions. District geologists for both successful and 
unsuccessful companies claimed, on average, about the same level of influence regarding 
budgets and staff sizes; influence was small. However, all successful company district 
geologists had final authority in selecting new hires, while final selection was the 
prerogative of corporate management and personnel departments for many unsuccessful
companies. Figure 53 illustrates the relative distributions.
Figure 53. Local Authority in the Employment 
of Specific Individuals for New Staff Positions, 
Successful Versus Unsuccessful Companies.
The regression model for the relationship is:
Success Prob.=.50+(.37)((1=local hiring authority, O=corporate authority)-.8)/.4) 
X-coefficient = .37 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .22
r-squared = .33 1-P Value = .89
Some of the association between local hiring authority and successful organ­
izations may be direct cause-and-effect. Team-building is an essential process for any
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group effort and would be facilitated by drawing upon individuals known to local 
management and/or existing team members for additions to the group. However, the 
association is believed to be mostly an efficient negative measure, reflecting 
bureaucratization in unsuccessful organizations, with the attendant host of ineffective 
practices.
While some decentralization and local authority appear conducive to exploration 
success, autonomy taken to extremes becomes isolation. Pelz and Andrews (1976) 
report that most scientists, though self-motivated and desiring full control of their own 
activities, perform best with a moderate level of control. In confirmation, Regan 
(1971) found that successful company exploration managers have flexibility for 
moderate portions of their budgets, usually less than 50%, while the managers for less 
successful companies either had little flexibility (less than 5%) or nearly total 
authority.
As one measure of potential isolation, the average number of contacts per month 
between local managers and corporate managers was analyzed. Frequent informal 
exchanges of information, phone conversations and visits by corporate management to 
local offices were found to be more common among successful than unsuccessful 
organizations. The distribution of monthly contact frequencies for successful and 
unsuccessful organizations is illustrated in Figure 54. The regression model is:
Success Probability = .51 + (,19)((Corporate Contacts per month - 2.4)/1.9) 
X-coefficient = .19 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .10
r-squared = .16 1-P Value = .92
In addition to measuring potential isolation of unsuccessful company district 
geologists, the association between contact frequency and successful organizations may be
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Figure 54. Frequency of Monthly Contacts Between Local and 
Corporate Management, Successful and Unsuccessful Companies.
in part directly related to better decision-making afforded by information exchange. 
Regan (1971) stated that the quality of intra-company communications was better in 
the more successful companies he surveyed.
Finally, the frequency of contacts between ultimately successful exploration 
groups and corporate management may be a neutral value above the mean, while 
diminishing contacts may characterize local managers who have met with a series of 
failures and are “in avoidance". In a perhaps related behavioral pattern, while the 
frequency of informal corporate-local management contacts is lower for unsuccessful 
organizations, the amount of time which managers for unsuccessful groups invest in 
formal corporate reporting is on average greater, as shown by Figure 55. The associated 
regression model is:
Success Probability = .49 + (-.28)((Time % Formal Reports - .08)/.04) 
X-coefficient = -.28 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .10
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Figure 55. Percentage of Local Management Time on Formal 
Corporate Reporting, Successful and Unsuccessful Companies.
Two additional measures of local autonomy which were tested in this study were 
the directness of communications between local managers and each company's 
exploration vice president, and the extent to which corporate level managers offered 
specific advice regarding ongoing local exploration projects. There appeared to be no 
difference in the number of levels of authority between senior geologists and the 
exploration vice presidents for successful and unsuccessful companies. Nor did the 
amount of corporate level involvement in local projects, to the extent which allowed 
recommendations for program changes, differ significantly.
EXPLORATION BUDGETS
Regan (1971) found that exploration budgets for more successful companies 
were based primarily upon long range plans; those for less successful companies 
stemmed mostly from short-term considerations. Successful companies had larger 
exploration budgets. These findings were confirmed by Eggert (1983). If exploration 
budgets are too small, exploration organizations are not able to mount modern, efficient
programs.
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Optimum annual budgets vary widely between different environments and target 
types, applicable exploration technology, commodity markets and financial conditions. 
Some of the earliest research on the problem of efficient budgeting was done by Bailly 
(1977), who analyzed the relationship between exploration expenditures and the 
number of economic metal deposits discovered as a function of exploration budget size in 
Canada between 1958 and 1973. His results are compared to those for Nevada gold in 
Table 25. The common denominators between the two sets of data are the approximately 
equal percentages of total exploration expenditures in each budget range.
TABLE 25
DISCOVERY RECORDS GROUPED BY COMPANY ANNUAL BUDGETS
Annual Budget Range Percentage of Total Percentage of Percentage of
U.S. 1990 Millions Exploration Expenditures Discoveries Nevada NPV in 
CanadaU) Nevada CanadaU) Nevada CanadaU) Nevada Nevada Discoveries
>7.3 >1.3 44 45 15 45 84
2.9-7.3 1.0-1.3 14 15 35 32 9
1.4-2.9 .7-.9 13 13 40 3 1
<1.4 <.7 29 28 10 20 6
(1) Modified from Bailly, P.A., 1977.
The larger Canadian compared to Nevada budgets in each range stem in part from 
the fact that most Canadian exploration was for new mineral occurrences, often through 
a cover of glacial debris, lake sediment and water, while that in Nevada was more often 
around historically known mineral occurrences with a relatively high percentage of 
outcropping bedrock.
The "Percentage of Total Nevada NPV (Net Present Value) in Nevada Discoveries" 
for each budget range is the net present value of each group's discoveries at the start of
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development, computed at a 10% discount rate, divided by the net present value of all 
economic discoveries in Nevada between 1976 and 1989.
Companies spending the most enjoyed the most success in Nevada gold 
exploration, in both the numbers and values of discoveries. Average annual budgets of 
less than about $1.3 million each year proved unproductive for most organizations. The 
seemingly anomalous percentage of discoveries (20%) attributed to companies with 
annual budgets of less than $700 thousand results from six small discoveries early in 
the historical period under study.
Figure 56 shows the distribution of average 1976-1988 annual budgets for 
Nevada gold exploration. Organizations with estimated total 1976-1988 expenditures of 
less than $100 thousand were excluded from the computations. Also depicted on Figure 
56 are investment benefit/cost ratios for expenditures and returns on exploration. 
These were calculated as the sum of undiscounted constant dollar net cash flows from 
discoveries divided by the sum of undiscounted constant dollar exploration expenditures 
by companies in each average annual budget cell.
The optimum average annual exploration budget between 1976 and 1988 appears 
to have been in the $1.25 to $1.75 million range. This range reflects the mean of 
escalating average annual expenditures by economically successful "superior skills" 
organizations in the state between 1980 and 1988, illustrated in the inset to Figure 56. 
Most discoveries made by companies following a "superior skills" strategy (Chapter 7)
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Figure 56. Average Annual Exploration Budget 
Histogram and Exploration Benefit/Cost Ratios, 
Nevada Gold Exploration, 1976-1988.
Larger budgets for Nevada gold exploration offered two advantages beyond 
obviously greater success probability attending the evaluation of more prospects. By 
reputation, well funded organizations were able to attract more and better submittals 
and joint venture offers from which to select projects. Also, competition for viable 
prospects became progressively more intense during the 1980's. Only organizations 
with substantial budgets, willing to make up-front payments and agree to large 





While Nevada's exploration environment favored larger budgets, the apparent 
improvement in discovery probability associated with increasing annual budgets was not 
in fact realized when budgets exceeded the bounds of organizational efficiency. This is
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well illustrated by the fact that the three companies with the largest average annual 
exploration budgets in the state from 1978 through 1988, exceeding $3 million each, 
were responsible for more than 15% of total gold expenditures, yet their aggregate 
discoveries represented only 5% of the net present value of total discoveries. 
Exploration costs exceeded net cash flows realized from development and production. 
STAFF SIZE
The average exploration group in Nevada gold exploration from 1976 through 
1988 consisted of 7 to 10 professionals. According to Mackenzie and Woodall (1987), 
this is near the range of the optimum organization size. They cited a group of five to 
eight geologists with an annual budget of $2.5-$7 million (U.S. 1990 dollars) as the 
most efficient for exploration in Canada, retaining the characteristics of an entre­
preneurial organization while avoiding the weaknesses of a bureaucracy.
The association between historical success probability and staff size was 
evaluated in this study from both district geologist input and SME membership data. 
While district geologists' reports for the later 1980's did not yield significant results 
(1-P Value = .60), analyses of data from SME Membership rolls for the entire 1976- 
1988 period proved more diagnostic in the following model.
Success Probability = .51 + (-.16)((SME Staff Count - 3.4)/3.5) 
X-coefficient = -.16 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .11
r-squared = .10 1-P Value = .83
This suggests that smaller staffs have been more effective. However, three of the 
organizations represented in the “unsuccessful" group regression data set had both 
anomalously large budgets and staffs and suffered a full range of negative effects
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attending bureaucratization. Staffs were more than three times the mean for all 
companies. Replacement of these organizations by more typical "unsuccessful" to 
marginal groups in regression analysis resulted in:
Success Probability = .50 + (,26)((SME Staff Count - 2.4)/2.2) 
X-coefficient = .26 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .14
r-squared = .16 1-P Value = .92
The conclusion is that staffs which are larger but not so large as to induce 
bureaucratization have been more effective. This condition is apparent in Figure 57, 
which compares staff sizes for successful and unsuccessful to marginal organizations. 
Findings are in accord with the previous determination that larger budgets have been 
more conducive to economic success in Nevada gold exploration than smaller budgets. 
Staff size distributions for 54 senior and junior organizations headquartered in Reno, 
including those depicted in the main figure, are illustrated in the inset to Figure 57. 
BUDGETS AND PROJECTS PER STAFF MEMBER
A test of the relationship between staff size, budgets and success probability was 
performed by regression of the 1-0 indicators on annual average expenditures per staff 
member by successful and unsuccessful organizations. As for the preceding analysis, the 
three organizations with anomalously large staffs and budgets were replaced in the data 
base by more typical unsuccessful to marginal companies.
Success Probability = .51 + (-.18)((Exp. per AIME Staff - 930K)/85k) 
X-coefficient = -.18 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .13
r-squared = .09 1-P Value = .81
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Figure 57. Exploration Staff Sizes, SME Members Only, Successful 
and Unsuccessful Organizations. Contractors and temporary hires 
were also excluded. The inset shows total staff size distribution 
among 54 exploration organizations headquartered in Reno in 1988.
According to this model, successful organizations, previously shown to have had 
larger budgets, had proportionately even larger staffs, so that expenditures per staff 
member were smaller. The average for both successful and unsuccessful companies was 
about $400 thousand per year per staff member (including SME members and non­
members). For comparison, Perry (1969) reported average expenditures of about 
$500 thousand (1990 dollars) per staff member by senior U.S. mining companies 
during the 1960's.
One potential cause for the association between lower expenditures per staff 
member and improved success probability may lie in the greater use of applied science.
A higher portion of the annual budget of an organization with a large staff and lower 
expenditures per staff member must go to the fixed cost of geoscientist salaries as 
opposed to the direct costs of land acquisition, drilling and other contracted services.
An alternative argument for the association might be that managers of successful 
groups more effectively screen exploration opportunities. Officers of Canadian junior 
and intermediate size companies have rated management's technical ability to assess 
projects as the single most important factor in success (Mineral Economics Group, 
1986). Greater selectivity in prospect screening would advance fewer non-commercial 
properties to the costly drilling stage and permit the maintenance of larger staffs within 
fix annual budget limits.
To independently test this as a contributing factor, the number of unsuccessful 
drilling projects per staff member by each company was estimated from notices of intent 
filed with the Bureau of Land Management. Regression on this data indicated that 
successful companies undertook more, not fewer unsuccessful projects per staff 
member, but results were significant at only the 70% confidence level. While the null 
hypothesis (no difference between successful and unsuccessful companies) could not be 
rejected, the opposite hypothesis, that successful companies undertook fewer projects 
per staff member, may be confidently discarded.
A global explanation for the association of lower expenditures and a higher 
number of unsuccessful projects per staff member and exploration success may be that 
while managers for successful organizations may more effectively screen opportunities 
before advancement to the project stage, they advance an equal or greater number; 
subsequent exploration before re-evaluation must be more cursory, and marginal 
projects must be more quickly dropped. The purely statistical impact of this tactical
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approach would be that more prospects are tested within a given budget and the 
organizational probability of discovery increased accordingly. _
PROJECT SELECTIVITY
The minimization of exploration costs under conditions of high risk requires that 
only the few opportunities perceived as most favorable be selected for further work at 
the end of each sequential exploration stage; all other opportunities are rejected. 
Because the selection process is imperfect, good opportunities are often rejected. 
Therefore, efficient exploration inevitably results in the rejection of situations that 
may result in later discoveries by competing organizations.
If, as suggested in "Budgets and Projects per Staff Member", historically 
successful exploration organizations undertake more projects, they must also review 
more opportunities and, in the absence of greater selectivity in acquiring or advancing a 
property to project status, they should also reject more good opportunities. To test this 
hypothesis, the numbers of exploration errors of omission committed by successful and 
unsuccessful organizations were tabulated from reports by staff geologists (see Staff 
Geologist Questionnaire, Appendix D). Exploration errors of omission were defined as 
the rejection of an available property, program or joint venture which later produced 
an economic discovery for another company.
The twenty-nine senior companies on which adequate reports were received 
rejected 44 subsequently productive properties between 1970 and 1988. With the 
exception of Sleeper, every property which eventually hosted an economic gold mine in 
Nevada was reported as having been offered and turned down by at least one company; 
half had been rejected by two or more companies and a third by three or more 
organizations. Record numbers of participation refusals (>5 each) were recorded for
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Round Mountain, Jerritt and Goldstrike, three of the state's most profitable mines.
Linear probability regression of the 0-1 indicators for historically successful 
and unsuccessful organizations on reported errors of omission failed to detect any 
statistically significant relationship between error counts and historical success or 
failure. Although undertaking and presumably researching more projects, successful 
organizations did not, on average, reject more good opportunities. They must, therefore, 
have exercised greater skill and judgment in selecting properties to explore and projects 
in which to participate.
PROPERTY TURN-BACK
Many of the properties on which discoveries are made are held by a number of 
companies before being successfully developed. In many instances, properties are 
dropped because of a perceived lack of potential, because they fall into the cracks of the 
organization, or because of rigid corporate concepts of suitable profits and cash flows.
The exploration and relinquishment of seventeen subsequently developed and 
profitable properties by 22 senior organizations were reported by staff geologists can­
vassed for this investigation. In contrast to entry refusal, multiple reports of acquisi­
tion or participation, exploration and relinquishment for a given property (errors of 
commission) were rare. Most were apparently explored and dropped by only one senior 
company before being successfully explored and developed.
If, as previously suggested, historically successful organizations undertake more 
projects, perform more cursory exploration and more rapidly terminate unpromising 
projects, they should, on average, turn-back more properties which later yield 
discoveries. However, LPM regression failed to detect a statistically significant 
relationship, at any level of confidence, between rates of erroneous relinquishment and
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exploration success or failure. The hypothesis that successful organizations conduct 
more cursory exploration at the project stage and more readily terminate un-promising 
projects is not supported. Since successful organizations on average undertake more 
projects, but do not turn-back more valuable properties than unsuccessful companies, 
the opposite may be true. Historically successful exploration groups may more thor­
oughly explore properties before relinquishment.
In summary, it appears that successful organizations advance more prospects to 
the project stage per exploration dollar, exhibit greater skill in selecting properties for 
advancement and conduct more thorough evaluations before relinquishing properties. 
This is achieved through larger budgets and staffs, but with lower expenditures per staff 
member. More intensive applications of science, greater productivity demands upon 
staff and management and more cost effective exploration are implied for successful 
organizations.
TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND DEVELOPMENT GROUPS
According to Regan (1971), 71% of the more successful companies as opposed to 
14% of the less successful companies which he surveyed maintained permanent 
technical support and development groups to assist in the engineering aspects of explor­
ation and to effect the transition of discoveries to operating mines. Of the twenty com­
panies selected for detailed analysis in this investigation, 13 maintained technical 
support groups and 7 did not. Fewer successful than unsuccessful organizations main­
tained such groups.
Prior to the 1980's, multi-disciplinary teams were often assembled from 
various departments in a mining company or newly hired to oversee the development of 
discoveries. Having achieved that task, they evolved or were converted to centralized
technical support groups. Regan's findings are therefore believed to be largely a result 
of, rather than contributory to, exploration success.
While some transition teams were organized from within companies in the 
1980's, they were most often dissolved once production was achieved. More commonly, 
transition was effected by consulting organizations with the oversight of one or two 
corporate managers. This has proven more cost effective and is now common practice. 
MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE
District geologists were queried regarding the extent to which they agreed with 
their companies' exploration geographic focus, target commodity selection and minimum 
target criteria, and were asked to rate corporate managements' formulation and clear 
expression of realistic long-term exploration plans and objectives. As a further test of 
corporate/local management fit, they were asked to estimate the annual budgets and 
number of years they believed necessary to make a Nevada gold discovery acceptable for 
development by their companies. Concurrence between actual budgets and perceived 
needs were used in regression as a measure of goodness-of-fit between local managers 
and executive managers.
Regression on these variables found a statistically significant difference between 
managers for successful and unsuccessful organizations only with respect to the "clear 
definition of realistic goals and objectives". District geologist ratings of their companies 
are illustrated in Figure 58. The associated regression model is:
Success Probability = .49 + (,21)((Rating - 2.8)/.9)
X-coefficient = .21 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .12
r-squared = .14 1-P Value = .90
Rating Scale: Very Low =1, Low = 2, High = 3, Very High = 4
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Figure 58. District Geologist Ratings of Companies 
for Clear Objectives and Realistic Goals, Successful 
and Unsuccessful Companies.
This variable is an aspect of "Management by Objective". According to Michels & 
Associates (1978), "The better corporations set strategies and goals, the easier it is for 
exploration groups to set objectives and perform effectively. Several oil companies have 
withdrawn from metal exploration, not because of financial restrictions, but because 
exploration performance was impossible to measure as no clear objectives had been 
established."
The enhancement of scientific productivity through "Management by Objective" 
was also investigated by Miller (1986). Miller concluded that applied scientists 
(geoscientists) expect to be participants, or at least so perceived, in decisions which 
affect them directly. However, they contribute most when strongly influenced by key 
decision makers. Goals and tasks evolved and accepted jointly by the explorationist and 
his supervisor are preferred.
The failure of local managers for successful and unsuccessful exploration 
organizations to differ in their agreement or disagreement with corporate strategies
suggests that joint goal-setting at the management level may not enhance the probability 
of exploration success. Apparently, exploration managers need not agree with corporate 
goals, plans and strategies to be effective, but clear knowledge of what those strategies, 
goals and plans are may significantly improve performance.
CHANGES IN STRATEGY
Because of the lead times involved in planning and implementing exploration 
programs, changing goals or strategies every few years is unlikely to yield fruitful 
results (Mineral Economics Group, 1986). Regan (1971) states that the more 
successful companies which he investigated considered long-range exploration planning 
and its co-ordination with total corporate goals to be more critical than did less success­
ful companies. However, a large number of companies have undergone major reorgani­
zation of their exploration strategies and objectives, structure and financing since the 
time of Regan's investigation, particularly in the 1982-1986 period. Exploration 
programs exhibiting long-term consistency are therefore the exception rather than the 
rule. Corporate goals on average appear to reflect a survival mode rather than planning 
for growth.
To assess the effect of fluctuating strategies, district geologists were asked to 
report the number of changes in commodities of interest, geographic focus, minimum 
target criteria, district versus regional exploration emphasis and interest in 
acquisitions, joint ventures, farm-ins and farm-outs by their companies since 1984. 
As of 1989, half of the senior companies evaluated in this study had not changed basic 
exploration strategies in the prior five years. Twenty-two percent had increased 
emphasis on district level exploration while 16 percent had shifted emphasis from 
district level to regional programs. Twelve percent of the companies had added
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acquisition to exploration as a strategy; an equal number had added regional exploration 
to prior district level exploration and vendor property evaluations. Overall, no 
systematic pattern was apparent in strategic changes. While successful companies 
showed a slightly lower tendency to change than did unsuccessful companies, regression 
results were statistically significant at only the 74% level of confidence.
EFFICIENCY CYCLES
Productivity is low during the take-off stage of exploration in a new commodity 
or setting (Mackenzie,1987). Initial costs for equipment and facilities, staff reloca­
tion, new staff hiring and inefficiencies attending team-building and familiarization 
with the environment may be partially responsible. In all organizations, after a period 
of maximum efficiency, group effectiveness begins to decline (Saxberg and Slocum, 
1968). For most applied research teams, performance improves for the first five 
years, then declines rapidly (Saxberg and Slocum, 1968).
To evaluate cyclicity in the effectiveness of exploration groups, discoveries were 
categorized by year of program maturity for 19 economically and/or technically 
successful senior companies. Figure 59 illustrates this data. Figure 60 shows program 
starting years for these organizations. The inset to Figure 60 is the distribution of 
program beginning years for 52 organizations, including those depicted in the main 
figure.
Values plotted at the top of Figure 59 represent the probability that an 
ultimately successful company made a discovery in the year of its program maturity 
shown in the corresponding position on the lower x-axis. This is simply the number of 
discoveries in a given year of maturity divided by the number of companies having
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Figure 60. Program Beginning Years for Nineteen 
Economically and/or Technically Successful Exploration 
Organizations. The inset shows the Nevada gold 
exploration industry-wide distribution of start-ups.
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Attractive success probabilities appear to be achieved after two years of effort. 
Part of the pre-discovery investment represents time spent in program organization 
and ascent up the learning curve, while a portion may go to efficient general exploration, 
target selection and the sequential reduction of search areas before the identification of 
specific drill sites leading to discovery.
Discovery rates begin to decline after three years of program life, and don't turn 
upward again until year 6. One contributing cause may be the diversion of successful 
exploration group interest and effort to the development of their discoveries. A human 
tendency to rest after victory may accentuate the decline.
With regard to organizations unsuccessful in the first 4 years of program life, 
Saxberg and Slocum (1968) note that the demoralizing effect of repeated failures by 
research groups accelerates performance decay. For a few of these groups, dramatic gold 
price increases in 1979-1980 may have provided a timely stimulus to renewed 
interest, effort and optimism, thus indirectly contributing to discoveries forming the 
second productivity node in Figure 59. Gold prices were not a significant direct and 
immediate cause of the peak discovery rates in maturity years 3 and 4 because only four 
of the nineteen companies under consideration were in their third or fourth year of 
maturity in 1979-1980 and only two of the twenty-six discoveries involved in the 
analysis are credited to 1979-1980.
Probabilities in the second discovery node of Figure 59, though perhaps in part a 
result of effort during earlier years combined with gold price improvements, portray 
the effects of long-term superior skills strategies in exploration. A number of 
discoveries in the first performance node were associated with well known, pre-World 
War II gold producers. Most discoveries in the second node stemmed from the application
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of accumulated knowledge in screening less obvious opportunities and perfected 
techniques in exploring more obscure targets. It should be noted that many of the 
discoveries underlying success probabilities in the second node were made by previously 
successful organizations. As with peak discovery rates in the first node, the 
distributions of absolute discovery and maturity years do not suggest gold price peaks to 
be significant direct factors in the configuration of the second node of Figure 59.
Based upon these results, Nevada gold exploration programs of less than four 
years have been economically inefficient. Part of the investment sunk in assembling and 
honing an exploration group is lost by sacrificing one or more years of effective 
performance. Expectations for discovery after 3 years of failure, however, decline. The 
data suggests that, baring a metal price increase or technological breakthrough, 
consideration should be given to the reorganization of unsuccessful groups after 4 years.
Arbitrary program term ination following four years of failure is neither 
supported nor countered by the results of the foregoing analyses. First, the expected 
marginal value of an annual exploration investment by a senior company in the worst 
year of program maturity was approximately zero (year 5); all other years have 
positive expected returns (disregarding previously sunk exploration costs). Secondly, 
the experience gained during years 1 through 4 by organizations unsuccessful during 
their early period may have been essential to successes in the second discovery node of 
Figure 59. What may be supported following four years of failure, however, is the 
positive termination of programs already destined to be phased out.
While arbitrary program termination at the end of four years of failure may not 
be justified on the basis of expected marginal returns, greater risk could support such 
actions. Continuing effort after a prolonged period of failure may bear costs beyond
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economically inefficient exploration. A surprising side effect of group decline is an 
increase in risky decisions (Streufert & Streufert, 1970). This may in part account 
for the promotion of marginal projects to the development and production stage by some 
exploration groups which have failed to make truly economic discoveries after years of 
effort in Nevada. As reported in Chapter 6 (Development and Production Economics), 
uneconomic projects cost the industry about $350 million in development and 
production losses between 1976 and 1990.
This study suggests that the four to five year cycles estimated for successful gold 
exploration in Nevada stem mostly from group behavior rather than characteristics of 
the exploration environment, and may be equally applicable to other commodities and 
other regions. Planned four or five year programs, with staff sizes and budgets adjusted 
according to the difficulty of the terrain and target, may be more economically efficient 
than longer programs requiring the same investment.
MULTIVARIATE MODEL OF STRATEGIC VARIABLES
Multivariate linear probability regression was performed to estimate the extent 
to which the foregoing strategic factors jointly predict the proportion of the total 
variation in success probability between successful (Ps=1) and unsuccessful (Ps=0)
exploration organizations. The multiple coefficient of determination ( R 2 ) ,  or goodness- 
of-fit, is the most commonly used measure for this purpose.
Many of the previously discussed predictor variables exhibit a high level of 
multicolinearity. Stepwise regression was performed to identify highly correlative 
variables and reduce multicolinearity. Then, from a number of possible efficient models, 
one was selected for both maximum goodness-of-fit, correct sign and statistical
significance for each x-coefficient at or above the 80% confidence level. Parameters of 









Constant .53 .37 .81
Corporate Exploration Orientation (% Discoveries) .12 .06 .95
Local Management Authority (Hiring Authority) .27 .08 .99
Corporate Contact Frequency ( Isolation Measure) .16 .08 .93
Percent o f Staff Contracted (Exploration Commitment) -.17 .09 .92
Minimum Target Criteria (Sound Economics) .13 .06 .96
Staff Size (Budget) .38 .13 .99
Expenditure per Staff Member (Applied Science) -.42 .10 .99
Clear Plans & Objectives (Long Range Planning) .13 .06 .95
Cases Included 20
Overall F-value 1 3
Adjusted R2 .83
Correlation Coefficient .91
The regression model constant (.53) represents the probability that a randomly 
selected company from the data set, which contained an equal number of successful and 
unsuccessful organizations, would be a successful (or unsuccessful) company; its 
departure from .50 (50-50 chance) stems from a small cumulative deviation of the 
distributions of the dependent variables (characteristics) from normality.
The characteristics included in the model are directly associated with exploration 
success and may also reflect some portion of other, unspecified strategic and management 
variables typical of successful organizations. According to this model, 83% of the
difference (R2) in the historical probability of economic discovery between companies
which have succeeded and those which have failed in their Nevada gold programs may be 
explained by strategies and corporate level practices. Ninety-one percent of the 




Strategic, management and tactical variables were analyzed to determine if 
particular organizational behaviors were characteristic of oil company mineral 
subsidiaries as opposed to traditional mining companies and to compare foreign owned 
companies with domestically controlled corporations.
ENERGY COMPANIES
The oil and gas industry's move into mining in the 1970's gave rise to 
expressions of doubt regarding the newcomers' ability to compete. The traditional 
mining community felt that the different scope, strategies and practices involved in 
mineral exploration and development were too alien for adoption by the petroleum 
industry.
Information on some energy company strategies and practices, most tactics, and 
staff characteristics was available from the mail survey of staff geologists, BLM records 
and SME Membership rolls. Results from regression analysis of this data, comparing 
energy company subsidiaries with unsuccessful, traditional mining companies, were not 
very diagnostic. Of all the variables, only exploration budgets and staff sizes were 
significantly different and larger for energy company subsidiaries. These charac­
teristics should have contributed to exploration success (see "Budgets" and "Staff Size"). 
Staff compensation levels and participation in professional events and short courses 
were also higher, but neither of these variables correlated with exploration success or 
failure.
Other variables which served to distinguish successful from unsuccessful 
exploration organizations in this study did not significantly differ, plus or minus,
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between energy company subsidiaries and traditional mining companies. Apparently, the 
empirical characteristics of energy company mineral subsidiaries which might give 
insight to their general failure in Nevada gold exploration were not captured in this
I
investigation.
A hypothesis proposed by other investigators is that,
"A number of oil companies started non-oil mineral groups (in the late 1970's 
and early 1980's) ostensibly to hedge against depletion of oil reserves by diversifying 
into a compatible industry. However, when provided with development opportunities, 
minimum profitability and cash flow criteria applied to oil and petrochemicals were also 
applied to minerals. This invariably put minerals in an unfavorable light owing to the 
inherently smaller size of mineral ventures and long lead times to production which 
result in lower discounted cash flow rates."
Metal Economics Group, 1984
Insufficient data was gathered in this investigation for rigorous substantiation of 
this hypothesis, but a rough test was made by tabulating exploration error rates for 
energy company subsidiaries versus traditional mining companies. Errors of omission 
and commission were counted. These were rejections of valuable opportunities - failure 
to acquire an available property, participate in a joint venture or launch a recommended 
project which later resulted in an economic discovery for a competitor - or the 
exploration and turn-back of a property which later yielded an economic discovery for 
another company (see Staff Geologist Questionnaire, Appendix F). Seven energy 
companies and 21 traditional mining companies were represented in the data base for the 
analysis. Average budgets and duration of effort were roughly equal for the two subsets.
Results of the analysis not only failed to support the hypothesis of excessive 
selectivity by energy companies, but also suggested that the opposite could be true. On 
average, each energy company mineral subsidiary committed 2 reported exploration
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errors between 1976 and 1987. The average, traditional mining company committed 
3.5 such errors. Both types of companies undertook roughly the same numbers of 
projects each year. Energy company mineral subsidiaries neither rejected more 
valuable opportunities nor turned back more valuable properties than did traditional 
mining companies.
Two alternative explanations are proposed for the lower error rates but 
concomitant lack of success by energy company mineral subsidiaries: 1) they were 
insufficiently selective - their resources were wasted in advancing unsound programs 
and projects, so they reviewed and consequently rejected fewer valuable propositions, or 
2) energy company mineral subsidiaries were not afforded the opportunity to accept or 
reject the numbers of valuable opportunities offered to traditional mining companies; 
they focused upon their best opportunities, but these opportunities as a whole were 
substandard.
FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMPANIES
Indicator variables representing foreign versus domestic corporate management 
were regressed on significant strategic, management, staff and tactical variables. The 
foreign suite included Canadian, British, Dutch and Australian subsidiaries. No distinct, 
unifying differences in any of the characteristics were found to distinguish domestic 




Corporate strategies produce more detailed practices and tactics, developed and 
applied by local managers to achieve their division's goals. Long-term exploration 
success for any strategy depends, ultimately, upon the ability of exploration management 
at district level to translate strategy into effective practices and tactics.
According to Mackenzie and Snow (1981), the characteristics of a successful 
exploration manager are:
• The ability to attract, train, keep and motivate quality geoscientists
• Sensitivity to job satisfaction
• Applies management by objective within corporate guidelines
• Provides adequate facilities and state-of-the-art geotechnical support
• Maintains high standards for performance, integrity and ethics
• Has a high level of technical training and experience
• F lex ib ility
• Skilled in evolving working hypotheses
• A sense of mission spurred by urgency
• Has effective planning, mineral economics and land acquisition skills
All researchers appear to agree with the need for these attributes in an effective 
manager, appealing to simple logic as evidence for their value. However, most of the 
attributes are qualitative; their analysis was incompatible with the quantitative nature 
of this investigation. This study focused instead upon empirical management 
characteristics and their apparent association with successful exploration. Some of 




The difference in the total years of exploration experience of managers for 
successful and unsuccessful companies (Figure 61) was not statistically significant at 
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Figure 61. District Geologists' Total Exploration Experience, 
Successful and Unsuccessful Companies. The inset shows management 
experience distribution for 54 organizations in Reno as of 1989.
Success Probability = .48 + (-.12)((Years Exploration Experience - 20)/7.4) 
X-coefficient = -.12 Standard Error of X  Coefficient = .09
r-squared = .17 1-P Value = .76
Local managers for successful organizations had on average obtained higher aca­
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Figure 62. Degrees Held by District Geologists,
Successful and Unsuccessful Companies.
Linear probability regression models of the associations between successful 
organizations, local managers' number of prior employers and academic training are:
Success Probability = .53 + (-.16)((Number of Prior Employers - 2.8)/1.3) 
X-coefficient = -.16 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .12
r-squared = .11 1-P Value = .79
Success Probability = .50 + .08 ((Manager's Degree Index - 1.8)/.7)
X-coefficient = .08 Standard Error of X  Coefficient = .06
r-squared = .10 1-P Value = .80
Degree Index: Bachelors = 1, Masters = 2, Ph.D. = 3
In assessing these associations, consideration was given to the possibility that 
managers interviewed from successful organizations (1989) might be relatively recent 
replacements for prior managers who had gained credit for, and thus promotion to 
another job from, their companies discoveries. This would substantially explain 
current successful company managers' fewer prior employers and higher academic 
degrees. However, regression of 0-1 indicators on district geologist employment dates
failed to show any statistical relationship between these dates and companies which had 
enjoyed exploration success. Local management turn-over is apparently equal among 
both successful and unsuccessful organizations. No other possible cause or effect 
relationships were evaluated.
One training-related variable which failed to significantly differ between 
managers of successful and unsuccessful organizations was their level of formal 
business, economics and management education. During local interviews, each district 
geologist was queried regarding the greatest deficiency in his education. Twenty 
managers from senior organizations cited insufficient studies in business and personnel 
management and economics. These district geologists might appreciate the words of 
Peter Drucker (1963) who wrote,
"Research management is work. It is important work, considering how much is 
at stake. It is difficult work considering how rarely it is well done. What it is 
comprised of we may not yet really know. But it is not “research", it is management".
In view of this and local managers' responses, it is surprising how little formal 
business and management training the district geologists possess, averaging only five 
weeks, mostly through short courses and in-house programs.
WORK TIME DISTRIBUTION
Average work time distribution for district geologists is illustrated in Figure 
63. "Field time" includes time in the field for any purpose. "Project Monitoring" is 
office time spent reviewing progress reports and field data and providing technical 
guidance to staff members. Only non-field time is included in "Acquisition and Joint 
Venture Evaluations”. "Budgeting" includes both planning and cost control functions. 
Averages are for all 60 local managers interviewed for this study in 1988-1989 and
are for the 1984-1989 period.
Figure 63. District Geologists' Average Work 
Time Distribution, All Organizations.
Only two of the management time distribution variables proved to significantly 
differ between the 10 successful and 10 unsuccessful exploration groups considered in 
detailed analysis. A positive association was found between successful organizations and 
the total amount of time district geologists spent in the field (Figure 64); a negative 
association was found between exploration success and the amount of time spent in 
formal corporate reporting.
Success ProbabUity=.50+ .18 ((Portion of time in field - .22)/. 11)
X-coefficient = .18 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .10
r-squared = .15 1-P Value = .91
At least two causes may be at play in lending significance to this relationship. 
Greater management field time may improve exploration efficiency by directly applying 
a higher level of technical and scientific expertise on the ground; management presence 
in the field may also increase staff motivation.
The weak association between formal corporate reporting time (see Figure 55),
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Figure 64. Percentage of District Geologists’ Work Time 
on Field Tasks, Successful and Unsuccessful Organizations. 
The inset shows industry- wide distribution.
success and failure is probably an effect rather than a cause - a symptom of bure­
aucratization. This possibility is supported by an apparent tendency, albeit not at a sta­
tistically significant level, for the managers of unsuccessful organizations to also spend 
a higher percentage of their time on staff administrative management, budgeting and cost 
controls. Managers of groups which have been unsuccessful for a prolonged period of 
time may retreat to these administrative tasks in search of job satisfaction.
Success Probability = .50 + (-.15)((Portion of time reporting - .08)/.04) 
X-coefficient = -. 15 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .09
r-squared = .12 1-P Value = .80
T
LOCAL MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE
Staff geologists were asked to rate their companies for realistic and clear goals, 
plans and objectives. Responses are believed to measure this variable with respect to 
district geologists, just as district geologists' MBO ratings were judgments of corporate 
management qualities. Local differences in this characteristic proved even more 
significant than corporate differences.
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Figure 65. Staff Geologists' Ratings of Local 
Management for Clear and Realistic Objectives 
and Goals, Successful and Unsuccessful Companies.
Success Probability = .50 + ,24((Rating of MBO - 2.1)/.5)
X-coefficient = .24 Standard Error of X Coefficient = . 12
r-squared = .19 1-P Value = .93
Rating Scale: Poor =1, Average= 2, Good = 3
These findings reinforce the concept that a firm commitment to and support of 
exploration, long range planning, achievable goals and top-to-bottom communication of 





MANAGEMENTS' RATING OF EXPLORATION METHODS
District geologists were asked to rate the importance of four primary exploration 
tools - structural and alteration mapping, geochemical surveys, geophysical surveys and 
conceptual geologic models - in contributing to their companies' technical successes. 
All organizations in the select company data base, both successful and unsuccessful from 
an economic standpoint, had experienced at least one technical success. Managers for 
economically successful and unsuccessful organizations differed significantly only in 
their rating of the value of geochemical exploration. The distributions of the results are 























Least Im portan t Im portan t M ost Im portant
E?SSH S u ccess fu l C o’s ^  U nsuccessfu l Co’s
Figure 66. District Geologists' Ratings of the Value of Geochemical 
Exploration, Successful and Unsuccessful Companies.
LPM regression on the managers' numerical ratings of geochemical exploration 
produced the following model:
Success Probability = .47 + ,20((Rating of Geochemical Exploration - 2.5)/.6) 
X-coefficient = .20 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .13
r-squared = .12 1-P Value = .85
Rating Scale: Least lmportant= 1, lmportant= 2 , Most Important = 3
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Managers for successful companies also showed a tendency to place a lower value 
on structural and alteration mapping as an efficient tool, but the difference from 
managers for unsuccessful organizations was significant at only the 78% confidence 
level. The regression model was:
Success Probability=.51+ (-.13)((Rating of Mapping - 2.6)/.6) 
X-coefficient = -.13 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .10
r-squared = .04 1-P Value = .78
Rating Scale: Least Important = 1 Important = 2 Most Important = 3
Figure 67. District Geologists' Ratings of the Value of Structural 
and Alteration Mapping, Successful and Unsuccessful Companies.
Impressions gained from conversations during the course of a number interviews were 
that successful managers found only the minimum level of geologic mapping to be of 
practical use.
No significant differences were found between the two subsets of organizations
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with respect to ratings of the value of geophysical exploration (Figure 68) or the utility 
of conceptual geologic models (Figure 69) in exploration success.
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Figure 68. District Geologists' Ratings of the Value of Geophysical 
Exploration, Successful and Unsuccessful Companies.
Figure 69. District Geologists' Ratings of the Value of Conceptual 
Geologic Models, Successful and Unsuccessful Companies.
MANAGEMENTS' RATING OF STAFF CHARACTERISTICS
District geologists were polled regarding the relative importance they placed 
upon staff technical skills and exploration experience, the criteria by which they 
evaluated staff performance, the most frequently encountered deficiency they found in 
their geoscientists and the impact which they believed their own management style had
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upon group performance.
Responses regarding performance evaluation criteria and staff deficiencies were 
too diverse for meaningful analysis. Managers for successful and unsuccessful organ­
izations did not differ significantly in highly rating the importance of staff technical 
skills, or in regarding their own management methods as the least important factor in 
achieving results.
Managers for successful and unsuccessful organizations differed significantly 
only in their valuation of staff exploration experience as a major contributor to pro­
ductivity. The distributions of their relative ratings are shown in Figure 70 .
Figure 70. District Geologists' Ratings of Staff Experience 
Importance, Successful and Unsuccessful Companies.
Success Probability = .50 + ,20((Rating of Staff Experience - 2.3)/.7) 
X-coefficient = .20 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .11
r-squared = .16 1-P Value = .91









The higher importance attached by managers for successful organizations to staff 
exploration experience is surprising in view of the fact that these managers themselves 
tend on average to be less experienced than their counterparts in unsuccessful organ­
izations ( see Figure 61), although not at a statistically significant level. 
MULTIVARIATE MODEL OF LOCAL MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS
Stepwise linear regression was employed to reduced multicolinearity in a model 
of local management characteristics developed from the foregoing variables. Only four 
variables proved necessary to efficiently capture the extent to which local management 
profiles and preferences evaluated in this study are jointly associated with the total 
variation in success probability between successful (Ps=1) and unsuccessful (Ps=0) 
exploration organizations.
Management x- Standard 1-P
Variable Coefficient Error Value
Constant .46 .08 >.99
Reasonable and Clear Objectives (MBO) .28 .09 .99
Rating of Geochemistry (Pragmatic Exploration) .26 .09 .99
Rating of Importance of Staff Experience .22 .08 .99





According to this model, explicitly specified local management variables and 
colinear characteristics of exploration groups may reflect 56% of the difference in the 
historical probability of economic discovery between companies which have succeeded
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and those which have failed in their Nevada gold programs. As with the multivariate 
regression model of corporate management and strategies, the specified variables make 
some direct contribution to exploration success but also capture portions of other, 
unspecified colinear local management characteristics. These variables as a group, 




Just as the successful implementation of corporate exploration strategy depends 
upon the capabilities of local management, achievement of the company's objectives 
through discovery is the task of staff professionals. Selecting staff members is the 
district geologist's most critical function. Its importance is evident from the association 
between locally vested authority for final hiring decisions and successful exploration 
organizations identified in the section on "Local Authority" in Chapter 12.
Time constraints prohibited a thorough investigation of the differing 
characteristics of staff members for successful and unsuccessful exploration organ­
izations. However, a few of the questions in the survey form mailed to staff geologists 
were designed to provide rudimentary bibliographic information.
WORK TIME DISTRIBUTION
The relative amount of time geologists spend on specific exploration tasks does 
not appear to have varied substantially between companies, with academic degree or 
with time over the past 15 years. Figure 71 illustrates the average work time distri­
bution of staff exploration geologists during the 1976-1989 period, based upon 120 
reports. These 13-year averages have changed little from those of 1970, for which 15 
observations were available.
Evaluation of the details of time distribution by staff geologists for the 18 
companies selected for regression analysis failed to detect significant differences 
between successful and unsuccessful organizations. However, marginally lower time 
investments in field reconnaissance, mapping, sampling and drilling and greater 
emphasis on research, submittal reviews and data analysis, when composited in the
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Figure 71. Staff Geologists' Average Work Time Distribution.
variable "Percentage of Work Time on Office Tasks”, produced the following regression 
model:
Success Probability = .51 + .40((Portion of Work Time in Office - ,46)/.15)
This variable, illustrated in Figure 72, presents the second strongest association 
between empirical practice and exploration success found among all the organizational 
characteristics evaluated in this study. It suggests a greater percentage of staff effort 
devoted to pre-project opportunity screening by successful organizations. More inten­
sive office and laboratory analyses of project field data could be a contributing factor. 
The consequence would be a greater portion of staff time devoted to office tasks as opposed 
to field tasks.
The absence of a specific association between the percentage of geologists' time 
devoted to generative research and exploration success or failure is contrary to the often 
held view that major company exploration departments are overly theoretical, staffed to 
a great degree by academic geoscientists deficient in practical expertise and consequently 
enjoying less success. Generative research should be a hallmark of such organizations.
X-coefficient = .40 
r-squared = .35
Standard Error of X  Coefficient = .13 
1-P Value = .99
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Figure 72. Percentage of Staff Geologists’ Time on Office 
Tasks, Successful and Unsuccessful Organizations.
Results with respect to the amount of total effort spent on office tasks were found to be 
the opposite of what might be expected from conventional wisdom. Increased office time, 
a part of which must be spent on research, correlates positively and strongly with the 
probability of exploration success.
EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE
Figure 73 shows the distribution of academic degrees among all geologists 
responding to the survey as of 1989. The percentage holding graduate degrees ranged 
from a high of 61% in 1981 to a low of 51% in 1989. The average level of academic 
achievement by staff geoscientists did not differ significantly between successful and 
unsuccessful organizations.
Figure 74 illustrates the distribution of total exploration experience among all 
surveyed geologists as of 1989. The mean for all geologists was 8.5 years. The average 
for the 20 companies in the regression data base was 10 years. No significant difference 
was found between the staffs of successful and unsuccessful organizations.
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Figure 73. Histogram of Degrees Held by Geologists, All Organizations
C ell M idpo in t -  \b a rs  o l Experience
Figure 74. Histogram of Staff Geologists' 
Exploration Experience, All Organizations.
These results seem to contradict the previous determination that managers for 
successful organizations place greater value on staff exploration experience and also 
have more influence on staff selection than their unsuccessful counterparts. The distri­
butions of experience levels within the staffs of successful and unsuccessful organiza­
tions were evaluated in an attempt to resolve the apparent conflict.
Intra-group standard deviations of experience were selected as measures of the 
dispersion of staff experience within exploration groups. The distribution of standard 
deviations of average intra-group experience are illustrated in Figure 75.
Figure 75. Spread of Intra-group Experience Levels,
Successful and Unsuccessful Companies. Values are 
standard deviations of the spread of experience in groups
Success Probability = .50 + (-.30)((lntra-group Exper. Std.Dev. - 2.7)/1.5) 
X-coefficient = -.43 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .16
r-squared = .31 1-P Value = .91
Apparently, while district geologists for successful organizations rate staff experience 
more highly, in practice they tend to develop staffs which on average have the same 
average level of experience as staffs for unsuccessful organizations, but with a rela­
tively narrower dispersion of experience.
Two conflicting views of the relationship between staff performance and age and 
experience dispersion prevail in research on organizational behavior. Miller (1986) 
reporting on successful research in the applied sciences, identified 5 typical functional
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roles, 1) idea generation, 2) task oriented worker, 3) practical manager, 4) salesman, 
and 5) administrator. Peak efficiency in each role is experience and age dependent. All 
roles must be filled for maximum productivity. This would argue for an association of 
greater exploration staff experience dispersion with successful organizations, contrary 
to the findings of this study. In contrast, Renson (1988 ), who studied group synergism 
among mid-level corporate executives, concluded that teams of individuals closely 
related in age and experience performed more effectively. The greater effort induced by 
intra-group competition exceeded efficiency costs resulting from competitive friction. 
STAFF TURNOVER
Employee turnover is costly. A 1981 survey by the Bureau of National Affairs 
(1981) placed the direct accounting cost at about $6000 (1990 dollars) for the 
average professional. The mean job stay for all professionals was 7.6 years. The 
unassessable cost of staff turnover probably exceeds the accounting cost. The average 
acclimatization period preceding full productivity for a new professional employee has 
been estimated at approximately 2 man-months, distributed over a six month period 
(Haggerty, 1986). Dissatisfaction, perceptions of inadequate performance, rumors of 
exploration group dissolution or cutbacks which may precede an employee's departure 
may be expected to consume another man-month of productivity. Three months of an 
employee's salary could reasonably be charged against turnover.
Among all organizations exploring for gold in Nevada, the average job stay for 
geologists during 1976 through 1988 was 6.6 years, not radically different from the 
7.6 year average for professionals in general. Turnover varied widely with experience 
(Table 26), but did not change significantly from 1976 through 1988.
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For the 20 successful and unsuccessful organizations subjected to detailed 
analysis, average job stay across all experience levels for the period under study was 9 
years, two years greater than the industry average. Figure 76 illustrates the distri­
bution of the average period of time which staff geologists stayed in the employ of 
successful and unsuccessful organizations. Higher staff turnover was found to signifi­
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Figure 76. Average Staff Tenure, Successful 
and Unsuccessful Companies.
Regression of the 1-0 indicators on job tenure for successful and unsuccessful
organizations yielded the following model:
Success Probability = .51 + (-.18)((Average Years Job Stay - 8.9/3.1) 
X-coefficient = -.18 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .12
r-squared = .14 1-P Value = .84
Higher staff turnover rates for successful organizations are believed to be mostly 
a result of greater performance demands by managers. Evidence for this appears in some 
of Regan's (1971) findings. According to Regan, "The managers of less successful 
companies rate their exploration effort as more successful than do those of more 
successful companies. The more successful managers believed their efforts to be only 
average to slightly above average. Successful managers tend to be more critical of their 
group's performance." Higher staff turnover, voluntary and involuntary, is an expected 
consequence.
An inverted U-shaped function between staff turnover rates and measures 
of organizational performance like profitability is moderately supported by many 
studies (Stedham, 1989). A few of the unsuccessful companies surveyed by Stedham had 
very high turnover; most of the unsuccessful companies had very low turnover. If 
higher performance demands by managers are a major cause of staff turnover, one 
outcome may be progressively enhanced staff quality. According to management scien­
tists, these factors should combine to increase motivation.
SALARIES
The median salary in 1989 of staff geologists for the 20 successful and 
unsuccessful organizations in the regression data base was $45,600, with an average 10 
years experience, and is compared to the 1989 median salaries of 10 year veterans in
other professions in Table 27.
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TABLE 27
COMPARATIVE DIRECT SALARIES 













Compensation includes both direct salaries and fringe benefits. However, 
Stedham (1989) found that the level of fringe benefits does not have a significant bear­
ing upon staff turnover, job satisfaction or performance. Consequently, only gross sal- 
lary information was gathered for this study.
Step-wise regression of individual senior company staff geologist salaries on 10 
bibliographic and job descriptors identified years of exploration experience, years of 
seniority with a company and academic degree as the only consistent and significant 
predictors of salary. The resulting regression model for 1989 was:
Salary = 26.8 + .7(Years Seniority) + .9(Years Experience) + 6.3(Degree)
Predicted salaries are in thousands of 1990 dollars. Variables for academic achievement 
were "0" for a bachelors and “1“ for a masters degree. Ph.D.'s were omitted.
Because salary levels are partially dependent upon experience, seniority and 
academic degree, and because these parameters on average may differ for the staffs of 
successful versus unsuccessful organizations, LPM regression on raw salary data








transformed directly to annual standard deviations would not be a true test of the 
association of salary levels with the probability of historical exploration success. 
Instead, the above regression model was used to predict the salary of each geologist, then 
the deviations of reported salaries from predicted salaries were averaged for each 
company. The indicators "1" for successful and "0" for unsuccessful companies were 
regressed upon the company average deviations in pre-discovery years. The exercise 
detected no significant association between the probability of historical exploration 
success and the deviations of salaries paid by successful as opposed to unsuccessful 
exploration organizations for a given level of training, tenure and experience. The 
absence of an association suggests that both subsets of companies offered similar 
compensation. The motivating effect of compensation level upon exploration perfor­
mance could not, therefore, be tested.
The only notable differences in salary levels detected for any type of organization 
involved in Nevada gold exploration were those offered by the mineral subsidiaries of 
energy companies. Their compensation for a given level of education, experience and 
tenure was, on average, 15% higher than the industry norm. The failure of these types 
of organizations to achieve success reinforces the idea that salary, above a certain 
satisfaction level, does not promote effectiveness. Nor does it appear to reduce staff 
turnover, since the average job stay for energy company mineral subsidiaries was 
below the sector-wide average for the period.
To analyze time trends in the compensation of staff geologists, reported salaries 
during individual years, 1976-1989, were regressed on academic degrees, experience 
and tenure for all respondents to the survey. Resulting partial regression coefficients, 
illustrated in Figure 77, express in thousands of constant 1990 dollars the changing
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value which the market placed upon an additional year of exploration experience, a year 
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Figure 77. Staff Geologist Salary Regression Coefficients.
Three trends are evident.
• Professional experience became progressively less valued after 1977.
• Between 1976 and 1984, new employees were brought in at salaries 
higher than existing employees with the same level of experience and 
academic degree. The seniority coefficient was negative; longevity with a 
company was penalized.
• Graduate studies declined in market value from 1977 through 1982 as 
the percentage of new geologists entering industry with Masters degrees 
increased. The percentage of employed geologists holding graduate degrees 
began to decline in 1982; the salary premium began to improve, but 
remains far below its $10 thousand per year 1977 peak.
While the premium paid for a graduate degree has recovered modestly since 
1982, entry level salaries for baccalaureate holders, though variable through several 
cycles, have increased overall in real dollar terms since 1976 (see "Constant" in Figure 
77). Accordingly, the amount of income foregone by attending graduate school has
198
progressively grown. Also, between 1976 and 1988 the direct cost of graduate school 
more than doubled. Consequently, the average payback period for a Masters degree, 
about 5 years in 1976, is now about 15 years. Ph.D.'s currently bear a negative 
expected net present value at the start of the typical doctoral program.
DISCOVERY INCENTIVES
Many senior companies offer incentive awards and performance bonuses for 
achievement, not necessarily tied to economic discoveries. The most common incentive 
is a percentage of expenditures over a certain base level on a new project found for the 
company. Twenty-seven percent of the senior exploration organizations surveyed also 
offer some form of significant direct profit sharing, either in corporate shares or net 
smelter return participation. Regression on data for both types of incentive programs 
failed to show a statistically significant association between the historical probability of 
discovery and either the presence or absence of special incentive programs. However, 
results are believed to be somewhat unreliable because in most cases incentive programs 
had been introduced relatively recently, so had insufficient time to impact long-term 
performance.
From discussions held with 30 staff professionals in Reno during the course of 
management interviews, geologists are generally aware of the low probability of either 
directly making or gaining personal credit for an economic discovery. The chances of 
direct profit sharing from a discovery may therefore be too remote to provide 
motivation. Responses differed with respect to bonus programs based upon expenditures 
for new projects; no clear opinions emerged. Consequently, It is not clear that special 




It was previously believed that job satisfaction inspired better performance. The 
current hypothesis is that job satisfaction both promotes better performance and is a 
product of performance. On an individual level, some employees may be thoroughly 
satisfied by simply holding a job; others may derive satisfaction from performing a job 
well. Even for the later, job satisfaction as an intrinsic motivator is a mixed blessing 
from the employers standpoint. First, only unsatisfied wants provide motivation and 
finally, the ultimate level of job satisfaction is found mostly among the self-employed.
Job satisfaction has been measured in a number of industries by the Minnesota 
Job Satisfaction Questionnaire - the MSQ. It was administered to 20 geologists for one of 
the least successful exploration organizations involved in this study, with the following 
results:
• There was no significant difference between senior and junior geologists 
in overall job satisfaction.
• The geologists were highly satisfied with the degree of independence - 
the opportunity to work alone - associated with their jobs.
• Seniors were consistently satisfied with the amount of work variety; 
juniors were neutral on the issue.
• Juniors were dissatisfied with salaries; seniors were neutral.
• Seniors were consistently satisfied with the opportunity to utilize 
their abilities; juniors were erratically neutral.
• Juniors were dissatisfied with job security; seniors were neutral.
• Both juniors and seniors were dissatisfied with company practices 
and policies. Equity in awarding pay raises and promotions was a 
major factor.
• Seniors were satisfied and juniors neutral regarding the technical ability 
of supervisors.
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• Both seniors and juniors were dissatisfied to neutral with respect to 
(non-salary) recognition for performance.
Conclusions from the survey of the non-successful staff were that "company 
practices and policies" and "recognition for performance" were sensitive areas for both 
senior and junior geologists, and job security, compensation and advancement were areas 
of concern specific to junior geologists.
The MSQ test results afforded an opportunity to compare job satisfaction for 
geologists associated with an unsuccessful organization to that of other workers. The 
MSQ "general satisfaction" scores were 68 for senior geologists and 59 for junior 
geologists, lower than nearly any other reference group of laborers or professionals for 
which general satisfaction scores have been published. Time constraints and an 
insufficient number of volunteers prevented the development of contrasting data for 
geologists from successful organizations.
PROFESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT AND TECHNICAL TRAINING
Industrial psychologists (Gouldner, 1958; Caplow and McGee, 1958; Lazarsfeld 
and Thielens, 1958) assert that scientists who are active in professional organizations 
(an outer reference group) typically do not exhibit a high level of commitment to their 
employers. The consequence is a greater rate of job mobility (staff turnover).
Regan (1971) found that five out of seven of the more successful companies 
which he surveyed provided in-company technical training programs. Most of the 
companies subsidized and encouraged participation in out-of-company programs for 
continuing technical education.
Questions to test the association between these characteristics and successful 
exploration organizations were included in the survey of staff geologists. The relation­
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ship between involvement in professional organizations and higher rates of staff turn­
over was of interest because of the previously developed association of higher staff turn­
over with successful organizations.
Neither "levels of participation in professional organizations" nor "ongoing 
technical training" proved to differ significantly between the staff members of success­
ful and unsuccessful organizations. The only noteworthy finding of the analyses was that 
staff members of energy company mineral subsidiaries on average attended twice as 
many professional events, short course and seminars as did the staff members of 
exploration groups representing traditional mining companies.
CONTRACTED STAFF PROFESSIONALS
Contracted professionals, as opposed to temporary help, are defined as geoscien­
tists employed full-time for a continuous period of more than six months and involved in 
more than one project for a company.
Contracted professionals became common among some exploration organizations 
in Nevada following widespread staff cut-backs during the 1983 to 1985 period. The 
practice began with a growing utilization of consultants and temporary help via geologi­
cal employment services and evolved to the full-time, long term retention of geoscien­
tists under direct contract. It is not uncommon for individual contracts to be renewed 
annually for a number of years without offers of fully vested employment.
Several motives may underlay the use of contracted as opposed to employed 
professionals. Direct payments to contractors may be lower than those for an equally 
qualified, vested employee. Costs are further lowered through the absence of health, 
retirement and other fringe benefits. Savings are uncertain, however, because the 
average number of effective man-hours delivered per period by contractors as opposed
2 0 2
to vested employees is unknown
Four district geologists in Reno attributed their use of contractors to 
headquarters mandated limits on permanent staff size, but the ready availability of 
project funds. In these cases, contractors were retained continuously over periods of 
years, moving from one project to the next. In most instances, there were no 
distinctions in job assignments between vested employees and contractors paid with 
project funds, in one case, a district geologist used contractors to avoid being saddled 
with ineffective geoscientists whom the corporate personnel office seemed inclined to 
transfer in.
The association between the percentage of a group's professional staff which is 
contracted and the probability of historical exploration success is much clearer than the 
underlying motives. The distributions of contracted staff percentages for successful and 













EfofeJ S uccessfu l Co’s U nsuccessfu l C o 's
Figure 78. Percentage of Staff Contracted, 
Successful and Unsuccessful Companies.
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Success Probability = .54 + (-.22)((Portion of Staff Contracted - .30)/.23) 
X-coefficient = -.22 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .11
r-squared = .19 1-P Value = .94
The significant association between the use of contract professionals and 
exploration inefficiency is believed to be both symptomatic and causative. The excessive 
use of contractors by some organizations is perhaps strong evidence for the lack of long­
term commitment to and planning for exploration. A lack of "organizational commit­
ment" by contractors may contribute to long-term failure.
Organizational commitment is an employee's identification with and involvement 
in an organization (Porter, Crampton and Smith, 1976). It is a function of three 
factors; (a) a strong belief in and acceptance of the organization's goals and values, (b) 
a willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organization, and (c) a strong 
desire to maintain organizational membership (Mowday, Steers and Porter, 1979). It 
is unlikely that contracted geoscientists, aware of the inherently temporary nature of 
their employment, will develop strong organizational commitment. Their productivity 





Regional or generative exploration, district exploration and evaluations of vendor 
properties (submittals and joint venture offers) were the three primary tactical 
approaches evaluated in this study. These were treated as alternative levels of entry 
which might be preferred by a company as the most cost effective route to valuable 
prospects. Most organizations employ all three tactics, but differ in the level of 
resources allocated to each.
The apparent effectiveness of alternative entry tactics was evaluated from 
district geologist interview data and the survey of staff geologists. Data from staff geolo­
gists is specific to pre-discovery periods for successful and unsuccessful companies and 
indicates average tactical differences in play during the entire 1976-1988 period. 
Input from district geologists is believed to reflect preferences during the later half of 
the 1980's.
HISTORICAL TACTICS
Staff geologists were asked to indicate which types of programs and projects - 
regional and district exploration, submittal and reserve acquisition evaluations - 
absorbed at least 25% of their time for the employers on which they reported. Results 
composited for each of the eighteen companies evaluated in regression analysis were in 
the form of the percentages of staff substantially involved in each tactical approach. 
Outcomes for successful and unsuccessful organizations were significantly different with 
respect to emphasis on regional exploration, vendor property evaluations (submittals) 














Figure 79. Percentage of Staff Spending 25% or More Time on 
Regional Exploration, Successful and Unsuccessful Companies.
Success Probability=.52+ (-.23)((Portion of Staff in Regional Exploration -.76)/.28) 
X-coefficient = -.23 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .12
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Successtu l Co's i Unsucceaaful Co's
Figure 80. Percentage of Staff Spending 25% or More 
Time on Submittal and Joint Venture Evaluations.
Success Probability=.51 + ,27((Portion of Staff in Submittals - .50)/.39) 
X-coefficient = .27 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .10











Figure 81. Percentage of Staff Spending 25% or More Time on 
Reserve Acquisitions, Successful and Unsuccessful Companies.
Success Probability=.50+(-.30)((Portion of Staff in Reserve Acquisitions -,13)/.20) 
X-coefficient = -.30 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .15
r-squared = .22 1-P Value = .93
Throughout most of the period under study, ultimately successful organizations 
appear to have invested more effort in vendor property and joint venture evaluations, 
and less in regional exploration and reserve acquisition evaluations, than unsuccessful 
organizations. The association between submittals as a major tactical approach and 
exploration success is one of the strongest found among all of the variables analyzed in 
this study, and its impact upon success probability one of the greatest. It is also opposite 
the more recent opinions and preferences of the managers of successful organizations 
interviewed for this investigation.
RECENT TACTICAL PREFERENCES
Regression on data gathered from current (1988-1989) district geologists pro­
duced models in which those representing successful organizations supported regional 
exploration over district level exploration and submittals as the most cost effective
tactical approach to identifying and gaining entry to valuable prospects. Managers for 
both successful and unsuccessful organizations rated submittal evaluations equally and 
low.
Success Probability = .52 + .18((Rating of Regional Exploration - 2.4)/.6) 
X-coefficient = .18 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .13
r-squared = .09 1-P Value = .81
Success Probability = .49 + (-.21)((Rating of District Level Exploration - 2.4)/.6)
X-coefficient = -.21 Standard Error of X Coefficient = .10
r-squared = .20 1-P Value = .95
Rating Scale: Not Productive = 1, Productive = 2, Very Productive = 3
Although statistical support for the current greater preference of successful 
company managers for regional exploration is only modest, the strong negative view of 
the productivity of district level exploration lends credence to the models.
The shift to regional exploration is an expected consequence of the depletion of 
attractive prospects associated with bedrock outcrops in Nevada ranges. Prospecting in 
the late 1980's began to focus upon pediments with thin alluvial cover. Regional 
exploration, mostly geophysical combined with structural interpretation, is the necess­
ary first step in exploring this relatively new environment.
CHANGES IN TACTICS
Companies have changed their tactical mix through time, perhaps owing to 
management preferences or due to changing characteristics of the exploration environ­
ment. District level entry and submittal evaluations were the tactics preferred by 
early, eventually successful groups exploring for gold in Nevada. By the mid-1980's 
most historic gold districts had been thoroughly prospected; companies which had been
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or were destined to be successful shifted effort from district exploration to regional 
exploration in the search for previously undiscovered evidence of mineralization. Also 
by that time, most vendor properties had been thoroughly tested, often by a number of 
companies, and intense competition for remaining attractive vendor properties drove 
up-front payment and work commitment demands to high levels. Consequently, submit­
tal and joint venture opportunities lost much of their appeal.
The tactical emphasis of unsuccessful organizations appears to have been rever­
sed from that of successful companies. During the earlier period, these companies, on 
average, conducted more regional and some district level exploration and paid less 
attention to submittals and joint venture opportunities. Their approach appears to have 
been a carry-over from tactics successfully employed in uranium and porphyry copper 
exploration, not surprising given knowledge of specific companies in the data base 
(names withheld). These organizations may have shifted emphasis to submittals and 
joint venture opportunities too late to benefit from the experience of successful groups.
A tactical pattern found to be pronounced for three and significant for two other 
unsuccessful organizations subjected to detailed analysis was an early, prolonged period 
of regional exploration and district scale target identification with insufficient follow­
up. Corporate management, impatient for a discovery, withdrew or drastically reduced 
funding. In two cases, more persistent companies fell heir to the resulting data and 
properties and succeeded in making valuable discoveries. Both corporate and local man­
agement were responsible for failure by the earlier organizations. Corporate manage­
ment did not appreciate the time and cost demands of successful Nevada gold exploration; 
local managers failed to accurately assess the patience and financial commitment of
corporate directors.
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MULTIVARIATE MODEL OF TACTICS AND PRACTICES
In addition to tactical direction, major aspects of operations under the daily con­
trol of local managers are opportunity screening, project reviews and terminations, the 
selection of applied exploration methods and the apportionment of group effort between 
field work and office work, including research, data preparation and analysis. These 
aspects of daily operations were combined in a multivariate model to assess the extent to 
which they jointly contribute to successful Nevada gold exploration.
Strategic x  - Standard 1-P
Variable Coefficient Euor v?!ue
Constant .50 .07 >.99
Tactics .13 .04 .99
Rating of Geochemistry (Pragmatic approach) .19 .08 .97




Correlation Coefficient (R) .81
This model assumes that the higher rating of geochemical surveys as an 
exploration tool by managers for successful organizations resulted in the greater use of 
and reliance upon geochemistry in on-going exploration programs. A higher percentage 
of staff time on office tasks is interpreted as a greater emphasis on research, data 
preparation and analysis. The “Tactics" independent variable was computed as the 
1976-1988 percentage of staff in submittal evaluations plus district exploration minus 
the percent in acquisitions plus a factor for local management's post-1984 preference 
for submittals (.33), district level exploration (.66) or regional exploration (1.00).
According to this model, differences in tactical emphasis, preferred exploration 
methods and practices may be associated with 66% of the difference in the probability of 
economic discovery between companies which have succeeded and those which have failed 
in their Nevada gold programs. Compared to the relationship between success prob­
ability and the training, experience and opinions of local managers, practical direction 




Random chance, or "serendipity" is sometimes credited for exploration success. 
While this may be true for results on a single or a few projects, organizational success 
over the long-term has been shown to depend mainly upon effective strategy, good 
management and appropriate tactics.
For exploration organizations with adequate time and budgets, the element of 
random chance in long-term success may be estimated from the random chance of 
failure, or one minus the predicted probability of success (1 - Ps). Numerous empiri­
cal characteristics of exploration organizations have been determined to either contri­
bute to or be associated with exploration success. All which co-vary with success at a 
significant level of confidence are, excluding measurement errors, non-stochastic; 
neither their causes nor effects may be attributed to random chance. The extent to which 
they jointly explain the probability of an organization's long term success may be
measured by the multiple coefficient of determination, R2, in multivariate regression 
analysis.
While R2 measures the difference in the probability of success directly and 
indirectly explained by independent variables, the multiple correlation coefficient (R) 
represents, in addition to cause and/or effect, the degree of simple correlation between 
Ps and the independent variables. Unexplained characteristics which co-vary with 
specified, non-stochastic variables must also be non-stochastic. The maximum random 
element in the probability of success for superior skills organizations is thus 1-R.
To measure R2 and thus R with respect to the organizational characteristics 
evaluated in this study, a multivariate linear probability model was developed consider­
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ing all strategic, management, tactical and staff variables previously found to be 
associated with exploration success at a statistically significant level. Step-wise re­







Constant .52 .03 >.99
Corporate Exploration Orientation .06 .04 .85
Local Autonomy (Low Bureaucratization) .11 .04 .98
Corporate Contact FrequencyfExecutive Support ) . 13 .06 .97
Local Staff Size (Budget) .30 .08 >.99
Expenditure/Staff Member (Science vs. drilling) -.20 .09 .95
Manager's Rating of Geochemistry .17 .04 >.99




Correlation Coefficient (R) .96
As with previous multivariate models, explicitly specified independent variables 
may be proxies for a number of related colinear variables which cumulatively serve to 
distinguish successful from unsuccessful organizations. According to this model, the 
extent to which the probability of long term success may be attributed to characteristics 
and co-varying behaviors measured in this investigation is .93; the maximum element
of random chance in long-term success is therefore 1-.93-5 = .04. This is also the 
expected probability of failure for companies exhibiting all of the organizational char­
acteristics estimated as being associated with exploration success.
Slichter (1960) described prospecting as "the world's biggest and best gambling
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business". Gambler's luck may be the most significant factor in short-term outcomes 
and control the fate of organizations pursuing "windfall" exploration strategies. 
However, according to this model, superior strategy, management and tactics, over the 
long-run, reduce random chance in mineral exploration to surprisingly low levels. A 
more exhaustive investigation of the differences between successful and unsuccessful 




A 1985 study by Whitney & Whitney estimated the exploration efficiencies, for 
the period 1960 through 1983, of ten of the senior exploration organizations analyzed 
in this investigation. Efficiency ratings were on the basis of the gross market value of 
metal discovered per dollar of exploration investment. These are presented, with the 
percentage of each companies worldwide operations developed on their own discoveries 
(Cook, 1983), and counts of their economic Nevada gold discoveries (this investigation) 
in Table 28. Discoveries inventoried by Whitney & Whitney were all world-class and 
included base metals, precious metals and ferro-alloys, valued at 1985 market prices 
but expressed in 1990 dollars. Mean efficiency was $49 per dollar of exploration
investment.
TABLE 28
EXPLORATION EFFICIENCIES OF SOME SENIOR MINING COMPANIES
Percent of 1960-1983 Gross Market Number of
Worldwide Exploration Value of Metal Economic
Operations Investment per Dollar of Nevada Gold
Discovered^) SMillion (2) Exploration(2) Discoveries(3)
.29 441 48 2
.28 161 59 1
.42 129 116 1
.12 218 22 0
.33 121 15 0
.29 205 61 1
.12 311 11 0
0 146 89 0
.67 156 52 2





Whitney & Whitney, 1985. 
This investigation.
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Regression of the number of Nevada discoveries on worldwide discovery percent­
ages, expenditures and returns per exploration dollar resulted in the following multi­
variate regression model:
Strategic X- Standard 1 -P
Variable Coefficient Error Value
Constant -1.652 .417 .993
Portion of Worldwide Operations Discovered .005 .001 .993
1960-1983 Worldwide Exploration Expenditures .009 .004 .957




Correlation Coefficient (R) .91
According to this model, Nevada gold exploration success is reasonably
correlative with worldwide exploration success. By inference, strategies, management 
characteristics, practices and the ability to select optimum tactics found to account for 
higher probabilities of historical success in Nevada gold exploration may be equally 
applicable to other environments and commodities.
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CHAPTER 19
MANAGEMENT SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
SUMMARY
The intensity of exploration for gold in Nevada beginning in 1976 and numerous 
resulting discoveries provided an opportunity to analyze the effectiveness of some 
strategic, management, tactical and staff variables which may be associated with explor­
ation success.
For this purpose, 20 companies, half of which were successful and half un­
successful in their Nevada gold programs, were described by 70 quantitative character­
istics based upon data gathered from district geologists, staff geologists and published 
sources.
Linear probability regression models developed on the quantitative character­
istics transformed to standard deviations from all-company means were found to effic­
iently measure the statistical association between organizational characteristics and the 
probability that a given organization was successful in Nevada gold exploration. Of the 
70 strategic, management, tactical and staff characteristics analyzed in this study, 
twenty-six were found to be significantly associated with exploration success at or above 
the 80% confidence level (two-tailed t test). Table 29 groups the significant variables 
in strategic, management, tactical and staff categories. Listed x-coefficients represent 
the increase or decrease in the probability of historic exploration success associated 
with one standard deviation in behavior by a company from the all-company mean. For 
negative coefficients, less of a characteristic is associated with exploration success.
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TABLE 29
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
X- 1-P
Corporate (Strategic) Variables Coefficient Value
Local hiring authority for new staff professionals (decentralization) .37 .89
Company technical support group (economic inefficiency) —.33 .83
Manager's rating of company response time to opportunities —.33 .83
Mean number of SME members on staff (staff size parameter) .26 .92
Percent of staff time on Nevada exploration (geographic focus) .24 .89
Manager's rating of company for clear plans, goals and objectives .21 .90
Minimum gold exploration target size acceptable to company .20 .88
Start year of Nevada gold exploration —.02 .94
Local Management Variables
Staff rating of local manager for clear plans, goals and objectives .24 .93
Manager's rating of productivity of geochemical surveys .20 .85
Local manager's frequency of contact with corporate management .19 .92
Manager's number of prior employers —.16 .80
Percent of manager's total work time on formal corporate reporting —.15 .80
Manager's academic degree .08 .80
Tactical Variables
Percent of staff engaged in reserve acquisition evaluations —.30 .93
Percent of staff engaged in submittal evaluations (pre-1985) .27 .99
Percent of staff engaged in regional exploration (pre-1985) —.23 .92
Manager's rating of productivity of district exploration (post-1984) —.21 .95
Manager's rating of productivity of regional exploration (post-1984) .18 .81
Staff Variables
Staff intra-group experience dispersion —.30 .91
Percentage of staff contracted (measure of long range planning) —.22 .94
Mean staff seniority at discovery date (staff turnover parameter) —.21 .82
Manager's rating of importance of staff exploration experience .20 .91
Mean staff tenure with company (staff turnover parameter) —.18 .84
Mean annual expenditure per staff member (applied science emphasis) —.18 .81
Composite Variables
Percentage of Staff time on research & data analysis .40 .99
Percent of manager's total work time in field .18 .91
2 1 8
CONCLUSIONS
Strategies, management practices and tactics found to be historically associated 
with exploration success may contribute to future successes. Because companies whose 
Nevada gold exploration programs were successful were also found to be more efficient 
in their worldwide exploration efforts, contributing characteristics identified in this 
study may also apply to the search for other commodities in other geologic environments.
Multivariate regression models of corporate practices and strategies, local man­
agement characteristics, and local tactics and practices yielded multiple correlation 
coefficients (R) of .91, .75 and .81 respectively. The element of random chance in the 
probability of success for superior skills organizations, given adequate time and bud­
gets, was found to have a correlation coefficient of .04. Figure 82 illustrates the nor­
malized relative weights of these organizational and random elements, to the extent 
which they were directly or indirectly specified in this study, in their association with 
exploration success.
C orpo ra te  Management
Local Management Random Chance
P ra c t ice s  & Tact ics
Figure 82. Relative Importance of Identified Organizational 
Behaviors and Random Chance in Exploration Success.
219
No single level of management or practice seems predominantly associated with 
exploration efficiency. Success appears to be the product of firm-wide, top-to-bottom 
planning, management, practices and tactics.
Corporations oriented toward exploration rather than acquisition enjoy a distinct 
advantage in the competition for discoveries on a return per dollar basis. Their 
principal strengths lie in corporate management firmly committed to exploration, a long 
term view of the mineral supply process and concentration of resources. These translate 
to clear strategies, goals, plans and objectives and create a chain of confidence which 
increases motivation and enhances organizational effectiveness.
Successful organizations exhibit greater discretion in both their selection of 
exploration environments and in timing their exploration programs. A measured, 
perhaps slow response to opportunities, even at the project level, proves an asset 
rather than a liability.
Successful organizations tend to focus their effort on specific commodities and 
regions. By design or inertia, they typically enter new exploration environments after 
others have absorbed the costs and risks of the lower part of the learning curve, and 
profit from the mistakes of their competitors.
Successful organizations recognize that an economic overlay is essential to 
translate the scientific-technical basis for exploration success into economic criteria 
that can be related to corporate objectives. Larger minimum exploration target 
requirements illustrate their recognition of the trade-off between short-term technical 
success and the opposing long-term economics of exploration.
Exploration budgets for successful organizations are adequate but not so large as 
to induce bureaucratization; planners resist reaction to short-term commodity price
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fluctuations. Local managers enjoy discretionary authority over a portion of their fixed 
annual budgets, but the merits of various opportunities requiring additional funding are 
closely evaluated at the corporate level by knowledgeable and experienced senior 
executives.
Successful corporate exploration directors are intensively aware of and 
interested in exploration activities at the project level. Local managers are provided 
adequate autonomy, but frequent informal contacts with corporate management prevent a 
sense of isolation and maintain an atmosphere of accountability. Information flow also 
permits closer executive management while providing local motivation. Exploration vice 
presidents who give neither too much supervision nor excessive autonomy, who take 
interest in the work of and interact with their exploration groups, but permit group 
managers to make most decisions, are the most effective.
Successful organizations appear to be non-traditional in their selection of local 
managers. Local managers are typically less experienced than their counterparts with 
unsuccessful organizations. They tend to be applied rather than theoretical scientists and 
are more critical and demanding of their staffs. Through efficient time utilization or a 
willingness to delegate, they devote less attention to administrative functions and more to 
operations in the field.
Local managers for successful organizations are almost uniformly given final 
authority for new staff selections in building their exploration teams. Assuming this 
responsibility, they appear equally willing to encourage the departure of unproductive 
staff members. They place a high value on exploration experience and typically develop 
staffs which are on average less diversified with respect to experience and presumably 
age, but which have the same average level of experience as the staffs of unsuccessful
organizations.
Clear goals, plans and objectives communicated by local managers for successful 
organizations provide exploration staff members with confidence in their ability to con­
tribute to corporate success and engender a higher sense of organizational commitment 
and motivation. The negative effects of employment uncertainty in the face of fluctuating 
budgets and the lower efficiency of temporarily employed contract professionals are 
avoided.
Successful organizations at the local level appear noteworthy for their greater 
use of science versus costly drilling. This is evident from larger staffs (see "Staff 
Size", Chapter 12), lower expenditures per staff member, more projects undertaken 
per staff member and per budget dollar (see "Budgets and Projects per Staff Member", 
Chapter 12). At a given budget level, this translates to more properties evaluated and an 
attendant improvement in the probability of discovery.
Successful organizations, in launching their Nevada gold exploration programs, 
emphasized tactics best suited to the exploration environment of the time, particularly 
as related to Nevada's mining history, the existing data base, and mineral property 
ownership. Although slower than unsuccessful organizations in adopting new strategies, 
successful organizations readily changed tactics through time to suit the maturing 
exploration environment. In contrast, unsuccessful organizations appear to have 
continued tactics and practices previously employed in porphyry copper and uranium 
exploration. Failure to account for the historical characteristics of the Nevada gold 
exploration environment and adjust initial tactics accordingly may, more than any other 
factor, be responsible for their lack of success.
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ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN  NEVADA GOLD EXPLORATION, 1 9 7 6 -1 9 8 8





A D IT  RESOURCES CORP. 
AGGRANDIZE M IN IN G  CO 
AINTREE RESOURCES LTD.
AIRO D R ILL IN G  COMPANY, IN C . 
ALASKA APOLLO GOLDS M IN ES, 
ALCAP RESOURCES 
ALHAMBRA MINES IN C .
A LL MINERALS CORPORATION 
ALLOYED ASSOCIATES, IN C . 
ALMA AMERICAN M IN ING 
ALMADEN 
ALMINE
ALPHA OMEGA COMPANY 
ALTA GOLD COMPANY 
ALTERA
AMAX EXPLORATION 
AMAX GOLD, IN C .
AMBLE RESOURCES
AMERICAN COLLOID COMPANY
AMERICAN COPPER AND N ICKEL
AMERICAN GOLD RESOURCES














AN TILLES  RESOURCES (USA) LT
APOLLO EXPLORATIONS, IN C .
ARCO, IN C . TRUCKING
ARCTBX ENGINEERING SERVICES










D IS T R IC T  32 CORPORATION 
D IV E R S IF IE D  EXPLORATION 
DMEA
DOME EXPLORATION (US) LTD 
DOUBLE 0  RESOURCES INC 
DOUBLE R M IN ING 
DRACO MINES
DRESSER MAGCOBAR MINERALS 
DUELO GOLD CORP.
DUKE
DUTCH FLAT GROUP 
DUVAL CORP 
DYNAGOLD
E AND B EXPLORATIONS, IN C . 
EAGLE I I  COMPANY 
EAGLE PLAINS DEVELOPMENT 
EAGLE-PICHER INDUSTRIES 
EAST WEST MINERALS, IN C . 
EASTERN LIGHTS IN C .
E A S T F IE L D
EASY ORE M IN ING
ECHO BAY EXPLORATION
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CORP.
EGLINTON M IN IN G  (NEVADA) PL
EL PLATA M IN IN G  COMPANY
ELECTRA
ELMWOOD
EMPIRE MINERALS IN C .
ENERGEX MINERALS 
ENERGY RESERVES GROUP 
ENVOY 
EQUINOX
ETRUSCAN ENTERPRISES LTD . 
EUREKA CONSOLIDATED 
EUREKA EXPLORATION AND M IN I 
EUREKA RESOURCES, INC 
EURO-NEVADA M IN IN G  C O R P ., INC 
EVERGREEN M IN ING 
EVERGREEN RESOURCES 
EXCELSIOR M IN ING 
EXPL.RESOURCES 
EXXON CORPORATION 
EXXON MINERALS CO 
E-M M IN ING CO.
E .B .  EKREN ASSOCIATES 
FABRICATION ENGINEERING 
FAIRBANKS ENGINEERING LTD 
FA IR C H ILD
FALCON EXPLORATION INC 
FALLON B U ILD IN G  COMPANY
K IL L IC K
KINGJACK
KINTLA
KLONDEX GOLD AND SILVER  
KM MINING AND DEVELOPMENT 
KNIGHT INVESTMENTS, IN C . 
KNIGHT ROUNDY M IN IN G , IN C . 
KNOBBY LAKE 
KNOX KAUFMAN IN C .
KYLLO ENTERPRISES 
K .M . M IN ING AND DEVELOPMENT 
LA TEKO RESOURCES LTD 
LABRADEX CORPORATION 
LACANA M IN IN G  IN C .




LIG HTNING -STAR M IN ING 
LINCOLN
LINCOLN EXPLORATIONS 
LINDAHL M IN IN G  CO.
LION
LOBELL O IL  AND GAS LTD .
LODESTAR
LODI
LONDON SILVER  
LONG LAC EXPLORATION 
LORD RIVER 
LOUISANA
LOVELL CANYON M IN IN G  CO.
LUCKY BUCK M IN ING 
LUCKY HARD ROCK 
LUXOR
MAC-GEN MINES
MADERA M IN IN G  C O ., IN C .
MAGNUM M IN IN G  CO
MAJOR
MAJOREM
MALACOLLA MINERALS CORP 
MANNY CONSULTANTS LTD . 
MANZANITA M IN IN G  CORP 
MAPCO MINERALS CORPORATION 
MARATHON RESOURCES INC 
MARGE 
MARIAH
MARSHALL EARTH RESOURCES IN  
MARTIN ASSOCIATES M IN ING  C O ., 
MASCOT
MASONIC M IN ING  COMPANY 
MAYLAC
MA-GAR M IN ING  AND EXPLORATION
PUNDATA
Q U AIL M IN ING AND M IL L IN G  CO
QUAKER
QUEENSTAKE
R A JONES AND ASSOC.
R A W  M IN IN G  AND CONSTRUCTION
R AND R M IN ING
RACINGBLOOD
RADCLIFF
RAINBOW MINERALS IN C .
RAJAH VENTURES, LTD .
RANCHERS EXPLORATION 
RANGELAND RESOURCES, LTD .
RARE METALS CORPORATION 
RAVENROC
RAWHIDE MINES IN C .
RAYMOND E . ROBINSON, IN C .
RCJ
REA
RED CORRAL MINES 
RED ROCK MINING USA INC 
REDHILL MINES 
REEDLAKE
REESE RIVER RESOURCES INC 
REGENT M IN ING AND EXPLORATION 
RELIANT
REM M INERALS, IN C .
RENOX
REQUA MINES
RESERVE O IL  AND MINERALS 
RESOURCE ASSOCIATES OF ALASKA 
RESOURCE MINING IN C .
RESOURCE SELECTION IN C . 
REVEILLE EXPLORATION CORP.
RIO ALGOM EXPLORATION, IN C . 
RIOSIERRA
ROARING SPRINGS RANCH CO 
ROCHESTER MINERALS IN C .
ROCKY R IDGE, IN C .
ROSARIO EXPLORATION 
ROUND MOUNTAIN GOLD CORP 
ROWBIIO MINING 
ROYAL GOLD, IN C .
RULE
RUSKIN DEVELOPMENTS LTD 
RWM ASSOCIATES, IN C .
R . J . DALTON AND SONS 
S AND G MINING CO 
SAGA EXPLORATION CO 
SAHARA GOLD CORP.
SALMON C IT Y  GOLD CO.
SANDERS CONSTRUCTION CO
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ARROlfO M INERALS  
ART WILSON COMPANY 
ARTEM IS EXPLORATION  
A R T IL L E R Y  RESOURCES IN C .  
ASAMERA M IN E R A L S , IN C .
ASARCO IN C  
ASPEN M IN IN G  CORP 
ATHENA GOLD CORP.
ATLANTA GOLD CORP USA 
ATLAS PRECIOUS METALS 
ATRONICS IN C  
AUCO IN C .
A UR IC O  CORPORATION
A U R IE S  M IN IN G  DEVELOPMENT CO
AUR ITECH  IN C
AURORA PARTNERSHIP
AURUM EST IN C .
AURUM GEOLOGICAL CONSULTANT 
AURUM H IN E S  IN C .
AURUN
A U S T IN  RESOURCES 
AVF M INERALS IN C  
AZTEC ROYALTY IN C .
A .W . ARNOLD AND A SSOCIATES  
B AND B M IN IN G  CO.
BAGLBY CORP.
BAKER RESOURCES (U SA) IN C  
BAMBOO GOLD M IN IN G  CORP 
BAMCO EXPLORATION IN C  
BANDERA ENERGY AND M INERALS  
B A R IT E  M IN IN G , IN C .
B A R IU M , IN C .
BARNES EXPLORATION  
BARON M IN IN G  CORP 
BARRICK GO LDSTRIKE M IN E S , IN C  
BARSAND
B A S IC  M IN IN G  IN C  
B A S IN  t  RANGE EXPLORATION  
BATTLE MOUNTAIN EXPLORATION  
BATTLE MOUNTAIN GOLD 
BEAR CREEK M IN IN G  CO 
BEAVER RESOURCES, IN C .




B IIP -U T A II IN TE R N A T IO N A L  
B IG  NORN M IN E S  
B IG  SWEDE M IN IN G  
B IL L IT O N  M IN E R A L S , U S A , IN C  
BIOMYNE IN C .
B ISHO P
B ITTERR O O T RESOURCES LTD  
BLACK BEAUTY GOLD 
BLACK BEAUTY RESOURCES 
BLACK CANYON H IN IN G  CO
A p p e n d ix  A ( C o n ' I . )
FEDERAL C LA IM S TA K IN G  AGENCY
FELMONT O IL  CORP
FERRET EXPLO RATION C O .,  IN C .
F IS C IIE R -W A T T  M IN IN G  CO IN C
F IV E  JOKERS M IN IN G
P LY IN G  T IG E R  RESOURCES GROUP
FMC CORP
FMC GOLD COMPANY
FMC M INERALS CORPORATION
FOOTE MINERALS
FORUM IN TE R N A T IO N A L DEVELOP
FOUR R M IN IN G  CO
FRANCO-NEVADA
FREEGOLD
FREELANNCING M IN IN G  
FREEPORT EXPLORATION COMPANY 
FREEPORT -  MC MORAN GOLD C O . 
FRM M IN E R A L S , IN C .
FRONT RANGE M IN IN G  
FURY EXPLORATION  
F .W . LEW IS COMPANY 
G AND M O P E R A TIN G , IN C .
G AND S CONSTRUCTION IN C .  
GABBS RESOURCES LTD  
G A LA C TIC
G A LLE R IA  M IN IN G  CORP.
G A L L I EXPLORATION ASSOC 
GALVESTON
GARRATT G E O S E R V IC E S , L T D .
GEM ENTER PRISES
GENCO IN D U S T R IE S  IN C
GENERAL M IN ER AL DEVELOPMENT
GENEVA M INERALS IN C
GEO D R IL L IN G  FL U ID S
GEO INVESTORS
GEOCHEMICAL SURVEYS
GEORGIA P A C IF IC  CORP
GEOSTAR
GERLE GOLD
GETCHELL RESOURCES IN C .
GETTY M IN IN G  CO 
GETTY RESOURCES 
GEXA GOLD CORP 
G IANTBAY
G IBSO N COAL C O . IN C .
G IL A  M IN E S  CORP 
G ILFO RD  
GLADSTONE 
GLAM IS
GODDARD CONSTRUCTION  
GOLCONDA GOLD 
GOLCONDA M INERALS  
GOLCONDA RESOURCES LTD  
GOLD BOND M IN E S , IN C .
GOLD BUG J O IN T  VENTURE  
GOLD BUG M IN IN G  LTD PARTNER
MC COLL CONSTRUCTION 
MCCONNELL-PEEL 




MERIDIAN MINERALS COMPANY 
MERIDIAN RESOURCES 
MERLIN M IN IN G  
MESA M IN IN G  CO 
METALS, IN C .
METALS AND M IN IN G  INC 
METALS RESEARCH CORP 
MEYER RESOURCES, IN C . 
MICON, IN C .
MICRON M IN IN G  CO 
MICRONESIA




M IL L  C ITY
M ILLER INDUSTRIES
MILPARK
MINERAL SERVICES, IN C . 
MINERAL SYSTEMS 
MINERALS ASSOCIATES, IN C . 
MINERALS U N LIM IT E D , IN C . 
MINEREX
MINERVA EXPLORATION LTD 
MINES MANAGEMENT INC 
MINEX RESOURCES, IN C . 
M IN ING RESEARCH IN C . 
MINPROC (USA) IN C .
MINTER 
MINTEL










MORAGA RESOURCES LTD . 
MOTHER LODE IN C .
MOUNTAIN GATE M IN IN G  CO.
MOUNTAIN WEST
MOUNTAIN WEST MINERALS INC
MSB M IN ING IN C .
MULTINATIONAL
MCM
M .D .M . COMPANY 
M . I .  D R ILLIN G  FLUIDS





SEARLE BROS CONSTRUCTION 
SENATOR 
SENLAC
SERMINBS IN C .
SEYMOUR RESOURCES 
SHANDONB
SHELL O IL  COMPANY 
SHEPARD VENTURES 
SII1IK INC
SHOESTRING M IN ING CO 
SHOSHONES
SIERRA CONTACT MINERALS 




S ILVER  CABLE
SILVER COIN M IN IN G  COMPANY 
SILVER  EAGLE MINES '
S ILVER  H ILL S  MINING 
S ILV E R  KING MINES IN C .
S ILV E R  LAKE
SILV E R  LAKE EXPLORATION
SILV E R  STANDARD
SILVER  STATE M IN ING CORP
SILVER  STRIKE
SILVER TREND
SIMPLOT IN D U STR IES, IN C .
SISKON CORP.
SKEENA
SLEEPING GIANT IN T .




SOUTHERN NEVADA M IN ING





ST GEORGE METALS INC
ST JOE AMERICAN CORP
STANDARD SLAG CO.
STARDUST
STATE L IN E  RESOURCES, IN C . 
STELLAR INTERNATIONAL DEV. 
STOUT CONSTRUCTION 






BLACK ORE M IN IN G  
BLACK ROCK EXPLN. CO.
BLACK THUNDER PETROLEUM 
BLAZER EXPLORATION 
BLUE BONNET M IN IN G  CORP 
B O IL IN G  POT O U TFIT 
BOLERO 
BOND GOLD 
BORA BORA M IN IN G  
BOURNE CREEK M IN IN G  
BOW RIVER
BOW VALLEY M IN IN G  IN C .
BP MINERALS AMERICA 
BR L IM IT E D  PARTNERSHIP 
BRACE 
BRAHMA
BRASS RING RESOURCES 
BRICAN RESOURCES 
BRISTLECONE M IN IN G  CO. 
B R IT IS H  AMERICAN M IN IN G  COR 
BUENA V IS T A  EXPLORATION CO 
BULL RUN
B .A .B L A C K  AND ASSOCIATES 
C AND S M IN IN G  CO.
CACHE CREEK EXPLORATION CO. 
CACTUS
CAL NEVA M IN ING 
CALCAN RESOURCES INC 
CALDERA MINES LTD . 
C A LIFO R N IA  S IL V E R , IN C . 
CALLAHLN M IN ING  CORP. 
CALVADA
CALYPSO DEVELOPMENT LTD . 
CAMBRIDGE RESOURCES, INC 
CAN AM GOLD CORP.
CANADIAN G R IZZLY BEAR MINES 
CANADIAN VENTURE CORP. 
CANAUSTRA RESOURCES, IN C . 
CANDELARIA METALS, IN C . 
CANERTA RESOURCES LTD 
CANU RESOURCES LTD 
CANYON RESOURCES CORP.
CAPRI
CARGILE C O ., IN C .
CARIBBEAN
CARLIN
CARLIN  GOLD M IN IN G  COMPANY
CASAGRANDE






CHECKMATE RESOURCES LTD 
CHEMGOLD INC
A p p e n d ix  A ( C o n ' t . )
GOLD BUTTE M IN ES, IN C .
GOLD C IR C LE M IN E S , IN C .
GOLD CREEK M IN IN G  CORP.
GOLD CREEK S ILV E R  MINES 
GOLD FEVER
GOLD FIELD S  M IN IN G  CORP 
GOLD FIELD S  OPERATING CO. 
GOLD H IL L
GOLD PAN RESOURCES INC 
GOLD PLACER M IN IN G , IN C . 
GOLD ROACH M IN IN G  CORP 
GOLDBELT 
GOLDEN CROWN 
GOLDEN G U LL, IN C .
GOLDEN LIO N







GOLDERN ARC M IN IN G  
GOLDPAN
GOLDQUEST, IN C .
GOLDSEEKER
GONZALES
GOOD HOPE DEVELOPMENT 




GRC EXPLORATION CO 
GREAT BASIN  EXPLORATION 
GREAT BASIN  GOLD IN C .
GREAT HERCULES








H AND G PROJECTS
II AND M MINERALS
HACKWORTH D R ILL IN G
HAMILTON DEVELOPMENT CORP
IIARDROCK M IN IN G  CO. IN C .
IIARRICANA




HEAVY METALS DEVELOPMENT 
IIECLA M IN IN G  CO
NA DEGERSTROM INC SUMMIT MINERALS MANAGEMENT
NANECO SUNATCO DEVELOPMENT, IN C .
NANOMETALS, IN C . SUNDANCE
NASSAU LTD . SUNEVA
NATIONAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENTSUNNY M ILLS  M IN IN G  IN C .
NATIONAL TREASURE MINES 
NATIONWIDE M IN IN G  
NCA NEVADA CORP 
ND PROCESSING CORP 
NERCO MINERALS CO 
NEVADA BULK PRODUCTS INC 
NEVADA COBALT INDUSTRIES 
NEVADA CONSOLIDATED M IL L IN G  
NEVADA GOLDFIELDS, IN C . 
NEVADA GYPSUM AND M IN IN G  CO 
NEVADA KLONDIKE IN C .
NEVADA METALS AND MINERALS 
NEVADA MIDAS M IN IN G , IN C . 
NEVADA MINE SER VIC E, IN C . 
NEVADA MINERALS VENTURE 
NEVADA NORTH 
NEVADA O IL  t M IN IN G  
NEVADA PRECIOUS METALS 
NEVADA PULVERIZER, IN C . 
NEVADA RESOURCES IN C .
NEVADA STAR RESOURCES 
NEVADA WESTERN S IL IC A  
NEVEX GOLD COMPANY, IN C . 
NBVTEX CORP 
NEW BEGINNINGS 
NEW DYNASTY MINES (US) INC 
NEW GOLD IN C .
NEW GOLDEN SCEPTER 
NEW GOLIATH
NEW SIERRA M IN IN G  CORP 
NEWHAWK
NEWMONT EXPLORATION LTD 
NEWMONT GOLD COMPANY 
NEWRIDGE
NICOR MINERAL VENTURES, INC 
NIELSON GEOCONSULTANTS, INC 
N IKA  LEASING LTD .
NL B AR O ID /N L INDUSTRIES 
NOBLE METALS OF AMERICA 
NOR GOLD
NORAMEX MINERALS IN C . 




NORSE W INDFALL MINES INC 
NORSEMONT M IN IN G  COMPANY 
NORTH HART RESOURCES 
NORTH L IL Y  M IN IN G  CO. 
NORTHERN DYNASTY 
NORTHLILLY89A
SUNSHINE M IN IN G  CO 
SUNVALLEY 
SUPERIOR O IL  
SURETY MINES IN C .
SUTTON
SWIFT
S .S .H .K . IN C  




TECK RESOURCES (US) IN C . 
TECO INC
T E L L IS  GOLD M IN IN G  CO. 
TEMPLAR




TERRANE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
TETON
TEXACO, IN C .
TEXAS GENERAL MINERALS CORP 
TEXASGULF MINERALS 
TEXASGULF WESTERN INC 
TEXOKAN ENERGY CORP 
THRUST
THUNDER MOUNTAIN
T I  CUP M IN IN G  CORP.
TIM B ER LIN E  MINERALS, IN C .
TIN TO
TKL M IN IN G
TOGNONI RESOURCES
TONKIN SPRINGS GOLD M IN IN G




T R A IL  CREEK MINES
TRANSWESTERN M IN IN G  CO.
TRANSYLVANIA INTERNATIONAL
T R I DELTA M IN IN G  CO
TRIANGLE





TRUE NORTH, IN C .
TRV
TUNDRA GOLD MINES LTD .
C H EM IC A L AND PETROLEUM  
CHEMSTAR, IN C .
CHEVRON RESOURCES CO 
C H R IS T IE  M IN IN G  CO IN C  
CHROMALLOY AMERICAN  
CIMMARON GOLD CORP 
CINNABAR
C IR C L E  RESOURCES LTD
CLARK COUNTY M IN IN G  CORP
CLC M IN IN G  IN C
CLEAR
C L IF P
C L IM A X  MOLYBDENUM CO 
COASTAL M IN IN G  CO 
COASTRANGE
C O A T E S -S M IT H  M IN IN G  CO 
COBRE EXPLO RA TIO N  USA LTD  
COCA M IN E S , IN C .
COEUR EXPLO RATIONS IN C  
CO EU R-R O C H ESTER , IN C .  
COLDSPRINGS  
COLONY P A C IF IC  
COLUMBUS
COMBINED METALS REDUCTION  
COMCO
COMINCO AMERICAN RESOURCES 
COMMODORE RESOURCES 
COMOX RESOURCES L T D .
COMPASS
COMPLEX METALS R AND D 
COMSTOCK M IN IN G  S E R V IC E S  
CONDOR M INERALS MANAGEMENT 
CONE E N TE R P R IS E S  IN C .
CONOCO, IN C .
CONS C IT E X
CO N SO LIDA TED  M IN E R A L MGMT 
CO N SO LIDA TED  M IN IN G  RESOURCES 
C O N TIN E N TA L  M INERALS  
COPPER RANGE 
CORAL RESOURCES, IN C .
CORDEX EXPLO RA TIO N  C O .
CORNUCOPIA
CORONA GOLD IN C .
CORTEZ GOLD M IN E S  
COSMOS
COSTAL M IN IN G  C O .
CRATER E X P LO R A TIO N , IN C .' 
CRESCENT




CRUSON AND PANSZE  
CUERVO GO LD, IN C .
CUSTOM M IL L IN G  AND SUPPLY  
CYPRUS GOLD D IV IS IO N
A p p e n d ix  A ( C o n ' t . )
I1EMCO
H E R ITA G E  M IN IN G  
HERON
HEWLETT M IN E R A L MANAGEMENT 
H IG H  COUNTRY M IN IN G  
H IG H  RESERVE  
H IL L S ID E  ENERGY C ORP.
H IM AC
H I-G O L D  RESOURCES 
H I-T E C H  M IN IN G  C O . 
HOMESTAKE M IN IN G  CO 
H ORIZO N GOLD SHARES 
H ORIZO N RESEARCH, IN C .
HOT
HOUSTON
NORTHWEST M IN ER AL SE R V IC E S  
NORVAL M IL E S  
NORWEST EXPLO RA TIO N  CO. 
NORWICH 
NOVAGOLD
N P -K  NEVADA M IN IN G  LP 
NU CROWN RESOURCES IN C .  
NUMOT, IN C .
NUSPAR
N .A .  DEGERSTROM, IN C .  
O C C ID ENTAL M INERALS  
OLD S O LD IE R  M IN IN G  
O LYM PIC  WESTERN CORP.
ONAPING
IN T E R N A T IO N A L  M IN E R A LS O N E ID A
HOUSTON M INERALS CORP 
HUMBOLDT EXPLO RATION  
HUMBOLDT M IN IN G  S E R V IC E  
HUNT O IL  COMPANY 
HUNT WARE AND PROFFETT  
HYCROFT RESOURCES 
HYDROMET, IN C .
IB E X  M IN IN G  CORP 
ICARUS EXPLO RATION  
ID A -M A Y  
IM CO S E R V IC E S  
IN D IA N  R IV E R  
IN F IN IT Y  PETROLEUM CORP 
IN S P IR A T IO N  DEVELOPMENT C O . 
IN S P IR A T IO N  GOLD IN C  
IN T E R  GLOBE RESOURCES 
IN T E R A C T IO N  RESOURCES LTD  
IN TE R C O N TIN E N TA L  NEVADA IN C  
INTERGLOBE
IN TE R M E T RESOURCES IN C .  
IN TER M O U N TA IN  EXPLO RATION  
IN TE R N A T IO N A L BELLEVUE  
IN TE R N A T IO N A L B U LLIO N  IN C  
IN TE R N A T IO N A L PLACER  
IN T E R N A T IO N A L  RECOVERY 
IN T E R N A T IO N A L  S C R IP , IN C .  
IN T L .  P A C IF IC  CYPRESS M IN ES  
IN T .C H E R O K E E  
IN T .F L Y E R  
IN T .M A R C H
INVERM AY RESOURCES IN C .  
IR E TE B A  IN TE R N A T IO N A L IN C  
IR O N  HORSE RESOURCE CORP 
IV Y  M INERALS IN C  
J  AND B M IN IN G  IN C  
J  AND J  RESEARCH 
J  K A SSO C IA TES  
J  PROCHNAU AND CO




O R IO N (S IE R R A )
ORO ES IN C
ORO PLATA RESOURCES IN C  
ORVANA RESOURCES CORP.
OSA INCORPORATED  
OSAGE IN D U S T R IE S  
P R C  IN C
PAC IN D U S T R IE S ,IN C .
P A C IF IC  S E N T IN E L  
P A C IF IC  COAST M IN ES  
P A C IF IC  GOLD AND URANIUM CO 
P A C IF IC  M INERALS MANAGEMENT 
P A C IF IC  NORTHWEST 
PACTOLUS CORPORATION  
PALOSKY EXPLO RATION CO 
PANCANA M IN E R A L S , IN C .
PANNOS M IN IN G  
PANORAMA
PARADISE VA LLE Y  M IN IN G , IN C .
P A TH FIN D E R  M IN ES
PAWNEE
PDZ CORPORATION  
PEABODY CALADA IN C  
PECOS
PEGASUS GOLD CORP 
PEMBERTON EXPLO RA TIO N  LTD  
PENWAY
PETGO(NC S IL V E R  ACORN)
PEZGOLD
P F IZ E R  IN C
PHELPS DODGE CORP.
P H IL L IP  M IN ES  
P H IL L IP S  PETROLEUM C O .
P IC
P IC K A N D S - MATHERJ  W IS E  CORP
JAR B RIDG E GOLD « S IL V E R  M IN IN G P IN E  V A LLE Y  B UILD ERS  
J E D E D IA H  M INERALS COMPANY P IN E B E L L
TUNKWA
TU R ISM O
T U -T A H L
U S M IN ER ALS EXPLO RATION CO 
UMONT M IN IN G  IN C .
UNlCHEM  MINERALS  
UNIO N  CAR B ID E  
UNIO N  MOLY CORP.
UNIO N  PETRO C HEM ICA L C ORP. 
U N IO N V IL L E  S IL V E R  M IN IN G  CO 
U N IT E D
U N IT E D  C H IE F T A IN  RESOURCES 
U N IT E D  HERNE
U N IV E R S A L GAS(MONTANA) IN C .
US AG IN C  
US GOLD IN C  
US NEVADA GOLD SEARCH 
US PRECIOUS METALS  
USS RAM EXPLO RA TIO N  CO 
UTAH IN T E R N A T IO N A L , IN C .  
UTAH-W YOMING C ONSOLIDATED O IL  
U .S .  BORAX
U .S .  M INERALS EXPLO RATION C O .
U .S .  S TEEL CORPORATION
VALDEZ M IN E  AND M IL L IN G  IN C
VALPAR
VA N D ER B U ILT
VECTOR ASSO C IA TES IN C
VEK ANDRUS A SSO C IA TES
VENTORA
VENTURES WEST M INERALS IN C .  
VETA  GRANDE C O M P A N IE S , IN C .  
VE TE X  IN C
V IC T O R  IN D U S T R IE S , IN C  
V IL L E N E U V E  RESOURCES 
W II B CHAN AND CO 
WALLSTREET
WAR EAGLE M IN IN G  COMPANY 
WEACO
WELCOME NORTH M IN E S  ( U . S . )
WENATCHEE
WENCARRO
WESTERN GLOBAL M IN IN G  IN C  
WESTERN GOLD AND URANIUM  
WESTERN GOLD E X P LN .
WESTERN MINERALS  
WESTERN REGIONAL E X P L .
WESTERN STATES M INERALS
WESTERN S TR A TE G IC  M INERALS
W E S TFIE LD
WESTGOLD
W E S TH ILL
WESTLAKE
WESTLEY E X P LO R A TIO N , IN C .  










DANNER MINES IN C .
DAY M IN IN G  COMPANY
DCT ENTERPRISES
DEATH VALLEY RESOURCES
DECKER EXPLORATION IN C .
DEB GOLD M IN IN G  CO.
DEGERSTROM
DEKALB M IN IN G  INC -
DELORDA M IN IN G
DENISON MINES (US) IN C .
DEPCO
DESERT COMPUTER SYSTEMS 
DESERT CRYSTAL RESOURCES 
DESERT VENTURES 
DESERT WEST MINERALS 
DICKSON NATURAL RESOURCES 
DIGMOR, IN C .
D IM IC K  D R ILLIN G
A p p e n d ix  A ( C o n ' t . )
JETCO ENTERPRISES
JOHN D . M ILLE R  AND ASSO.
JOHN MEURER AND COMPANY
JOHN POLONI AND A SS O C ., LTD
JOHNSON ENGINEERING
JU N IPER  M IN IN G
J-D E X  M IN ING
J .  M. HUBER CORPORATION
J . D .  WELSH AND ASSOCIATES
J .M .  HUBER CORPORATION
K AND K IN C .
KAPPES, CASSIDY t  aSSOC.
KAY
KELLY GOLD MINES 
KEMCO







K IE W IT  M IN IN G  GROUP IN C .
P IN IO N  M IN IN G  
PINSON M IN IN G  COMPANY 
PIPER AND ASSOC 
PLACER AMEX INC 
PLACER DOME US INC 
PI.ACER U .S .  , IN C .
PLACID  O IL  COMPANY 
P L A C IF IC  S ILV E R  
PLATORO WEST IN C .
PLENTY RIVER M IN IN G  CO 
POINTS WEST PROPERTIES 
POLESTAR EXPLORATION IN C . 
POTOSI M IN IN G  CO INC 
POTTER M IN IN G  CO. IN C .
POWDER RIVER M IN IN G  CO.
PRC IN C .
PREBBLE RESOURCES IN C . 
PRECAMBRIAN EXPLORATION 
PRECIOUS METALS, IN C . 
PRECIOUS METALS RECOVERY CO. 
PREMIUM METALS INC 
PRODUCTION EXPLORATION 
PROQUIP IN C .
WESTSUN
WESTWATER RESOURCES IN C . 
WESTWIHD
WHARF RESOURCES LTD .
WHIM CREEK
WRITE P IN E GOLD M IN IN G  CO. 
WRITE PINE MINERALS NC.
W ILD ROSE EXPLORATION 
W ILLORO, INC 
WINCHESTER 
W INDFALL VENTURE 
W IN D FA LL(ID AH O )
W INPAK, IN C .
WKM GIANT INDUSTRIES
WOLFF M IL L IN G  AND M IN IN G  INC
WORLDWIDE
WULF M IN IN G  CO.
WX SYNDICATE 
WYDMAR







EXPLORATION EXPENDITURE ESTIMATION METHODS
Regression models for expensed exploration presented in this appendix are 
appropriate only for aggregations of company data. A minimum of forty companies were 
represented in the data base from which regression models were developed and applied in 
this investigation.
CAPITALIZED EXPLORATION
Exploration expenditure patterns for successful projects differ substantially 
from those of ongoing general exploration and unsuccessful projects. The cost of ore 
reserve delineation in the final stages of exploration may alone equal or exceed a 
companies normal annual exploration budget and is typically added to regular funding 
allocations. This, and the infrequency of the event, rendered regression estimates of 
expensed exploration on the basis of reported total expenditures by each company 
impractical owing to large disturbance terms. Capitalized exploration was therefore 
separately estimated and entered as a predictor variable in regression models for total 
exploration expenditures. Total exploration expenditures minus capitalized exploration 
equals expensed exploration costs.
Data on 77% of capitalized exploration expenditures for Nevada gold between 
1976 and 1988 was obtained from reports by the Metals Economics Group, corporate 
annual reports and directly from companies. Unreported capitalized costs were estimated 
by multivariate linear regression. In most cases only total projected expenditures 
rather than year by year expenditures were available in the reported data base.
Regression modeling for a single cost for each ore deposit, rather than time 
series estimation, was therefore necessary. Estimated costs were temporally distribu­
ted with respect to the year of mine development start-up as per Table B1.
2 3 9
TABLE B1






Development - 5 .03
Development - 4 .06
Development - 3 .11
Development - 2 .23
Development - 1 .25
Development Year .32
This was the historical time distribution of preproduction exploration costs at 
20 Nevada gold discoveries, weighted on the basis of recoverable ounces. Reported and 
estimated lump-sum capitalized exploration expenditures for 23 small and 8 large ore 
deposits were distributed in accordance with this schedule for economic analyses.
Five independent variables were identified as significant in predicting capitalized 
exploration costs for individual ore deposits in the following model. Values except for 
"CT" are in millions; predicted expenditures are likewise in millions of constant 1990 
dollars.
Yc = Capitalized exploration expenses
TF = Tons of ore at point of development decision
SO = Mineable reserve ounces at point of development decision
TY = Design tons per year at production start-up
AO = Ounces added through mine area exploration
CT = Classification of exploring organization
B = Parameters
E t are independent










N (Cases = Mines) 20
Degrees of Freedom 15
Overall F Value 51
Adjusted R2 .9259
Dummy variables (CT) were "2" for experienced junior producers, “1“ for 
junior organizations developing their first mine and "0" for senior companies.
The seeming reversal of the ”CT" values of “2" for experienced junior producers 
and "1" for junior organizations developing their first mine was based upon trial 
regression analyses. In the initial model these values were reversed but resulted in a 
lower x-coefficient and larger standard error. Regression did not identify the reason for 
the greater development cost per unit of ore, reserve ounce and design capacity 
experienced by new small producers, as opposed to experienced juniors, with still 
higher costs for senior mining companies, it may only be speculated that junior 
organizations are less economically efficient in exploring and developing reserves at 
their first mine than juniors with some operating experience. Such companies may also 
have focused much of their prior exploration in a single limited area, thus allowing 
capitalization of a larger portion of their total exploration expenditures against a 
discovery in the area. Finally, companies just emerging from the promotional stage may 
be inclined to capitalize a greater part of exploration costs than normal to maintain the
241
highest possible asset book value per share.
The "CT" value (0) for senior companies, resulting in higher estimated 
expenditures, stems from their practice of more thoroughly exploring a discovery 
before development than do less financially able organizations. This practice yields 
benefits to seniors in that ultimate reserve potential is more firmly established, 
permitting optimum initial sizing of production facilities for maximum profitability 
through economies of scale.
EXPENSED EXPLORATION
A large number of potentially significant predictor variables for the regression 
estimation of unreported expensed exploration costs were extracted from eight primary 
sources:
• Bureau of Land Management Mining Claim Location Files
• Bureau of Land Management Annual Proof of Labor Records
• Bureau of Land Management Notice of Intent Files
• Bureau of Land Management Plan of Operation Files
• U.S. Forest Service Notice of Intent and Plan of Operation Files
• SME Membership Rolls
• Corporate Annual Reports
• Canadian Mines Handbooks
Before regression modeling, the distributions among individual organizations of 
all potential predictor variables were tested for normalcy. Those found to have a chi- 
square with a p-value exceeding 0.20 relative to a normal distribution were rejected 
from further use to maintain model simplicity. Potential predictors were also evaluated 
for non-linear functional relationships with the dependent variable. Variables exhibit­
ing significant non-linear functional relationships with expenditures were likewise 
rejected.
All remaining, normally distributed and functionally linear predictor variables, 
aggregated by year for each type of organization, were tested in step-wise regression
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against the dependent variables, aggregate annual Nevada gold exploration expenditures 
reported by each type of organization for each year, 1976 through 1988. Final models 
were selected on the basis of maximum adjusted multiple coefficients of determination
(adjusted R2) and appropriate signs for coefficients. While a high level of 
multicolinearity was found to exist between many of the independent variables, this 
problem does not affect the validity of the models for prediction (Gujarati, 1988).
"Y j-jj" in each of the following models includes both expensed (Y ^je) and 
capitalized (Y^jc) exploration costs. Expensed costs were estimated as Y£je= Y^-jt - Y^-^ 
for each class of organization for each year. Pre-production exploration expenditures 
were obtained directly from the companies or published sources, or estimated by 
regression as previously described. It should be noted that the models developed for 
various classes of organizations are valid only for predictions of expenditures by 
aggregations of companies; they should not be used for estimations of expenditures by 
individual organizations.
Expenditures bv Senior Organizations
Information accounting for roughly 50% of total senior company exploration 
expenditures in Nevada from 1976 through 1988 was obtained directly and indirectly 
from these companies. The following regression model was developed to estimate unre­
ported aggregate annual expenditures by senior organizations. Expenditures are in mill­
ions of constant 1990 dollars.
YI i t = 3 1SXit+B 2NCXit+3 3PDXit+B 4AU t+B 5A U t-1+3 6PXXit+3 7ERXit+B 8Ct+ E t
Y^-jj = Total Nevada gold exploration expenditures in year t
SXit = Number of company staff who were SME members
NC^jt = New lode mining claims located by senior companies in Nevada, year t
2 4 3
PD^jt = Fraction of senior companies which were Nevada gold producers,year t 
AUt = Current dollar gold price in year t 
AUt_.| = Current dollar gold price in year t-1
PX£jt = Capitalized exploration expenditures by senior companies in year t 
ER^n = Average number of provinces under exploration per company, year t 
Ct = Number of companies in aggregation
3 = Parameters











N (Cases = number of years) 13
Degrees of Freedom 5
Overall F Value 2327
Adjusted R2 .9993
Exploration Expenditures bv Junior Companies
Of the total exploration expenditures ultimately estimated for junior companies, 
35% were directly reported by solicited organizations. Step-wise linear regression on 
17 independent variables available for analysis resulted in the identification of an 
efficient model containing 6 predictors of unreported junior company expenditures:
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YXit = B1NCXit + B 2PXXit + B 3Mt + B 4Tt + B 5 Ct + E t
Y ^ jt = Nevada gold exploration expenditures by junior companies in year t
N C ^ j t  = N e w  lode mining claims located by junior companies in Nevada,year t
PX^jt = Capitalized exploration expenditures by junior companies in year t
Mt = Average number of metals as exploration targets by juniors, year t
Tt = Time trend variable; 1976=1
Ct = Number of junior companies in aggregation in year t
B = Parameters
E t are independent
PREDICTOR PARAMETERS STANDARD
VARIABLE (B) ERROR





N (Cases = number of years) 13
Degrees of Freedom 8




Exploration Expenditures by Canadian Stock Companies
Expenditure data was solicited by mail from all Canadian stock companies 
recorded in the CMH as having conducted gold exploration in Nevada between 1976 and 
1988. Responses were received from only 20 of the approximately 300 organizations 
of record. Those which did respond were mostly larger companies and reported upon
only 10% of the exploration expenditures in Nevada ultimately estimated for this class 
of organization. Company reported expenditure data was supplemented with some
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records of Nevada project expenditures in the CMH, providing direct information on 
another 10% of total estimated expenditures. Direct information on an additional 20% 
of Nevada gold exploration expenditures was obtained from corporate annual reports 
which in many cases explicitly record project-by-project exploration costs. The 
remaining 60% were estimated by regression.
Predictor variables as described in the following model were separately 
aggregated for each year for reporting and non-reporting Canadian stock companies. 
Aggregated annual variables were regressed on grouped annual expenditures. The 
predictor variable, "total corporate expenditures" for each year ( T E ^ ,  was estimated 
from CMH data as working capital at the end of year t-1 plus stock proceeds, borrowings 
and income during year t minus working capital at the end of year t. "Mining claims 
located" and "notices of intent" filed proved insignificant as predictors because of the low 
numbers of claims and notices attributed to Canadian stock companies.












£ jt+B 2TA£ it+3 3NAI i t +R 4AUt+R 5AUt-1+B 6GI i t +B 7DI t +B 8Ct+ E t
Nevada gold exploration expenditures, U.S. dollars/100000, year t
World-wide exploration costs, 1990 U.S. dollars/100000, in year t
World-wide acreage of mineral rights held by companies, year t
Nevada mineral acreage attributed to companies, year t
Current dollar gold price in year t
Current dollar gold price in year t-1
Aggregate number of projects mapped and sampled
Reported number of drilling projects














N (Cases = number of years) 13
Degrees of Freedom 5
Overall F Value 708
Adjusted R2 .9979
Exploration Expenditures by Unclassified Organizations
By definition, “Unclassified Organizations" were those for which no direct 
expenditure data could be obtained, and whose activities were evidenced almost solely by 
notices of intent filed with the BLM. Their aggregate annual exploration expenditures 
were estimated by analogy, relying wholly upon the few variables contained in notice of 
intent filings. A regression model was developed using "notice of intent" and associated, 
reported cost data for junior organizations and Canadian stock companies and assumed 
expenditures by individuals. Data on projects for which notices of intent had been filed 
by these classes of organizations, and for which expenditures were known, were aggre­
gated for each year, 1981 through 1988. Inputs to the regression data base were 
weighted according to the relative proportions of identified junior company, Canadian 
stock company and individuals' records in the entire Notice of Intent file. Expenditures 
by individuals in connection with notices of intent were assumed to be at the legally
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required level of assessment for the number of claims cited in the notices. The resulting 
regression model was:









Aggregate expenditures on projects listed in notices of intent for year t 
Aggregate number of mining claims associated with projects 
Current dollar average gold price in year t
Number of individual organizations in aggregate data base for year t
Time trend variable; 1981 = 1, 1988 = 8
Number of notices for drilling in year t








 ♦ .00104 .00012
Ct -.02389 .01300
Tt .04779 .00843
DI i t .02976 .00988
ADXit -.07623 .00238
N (Cases = number of years) 8
Degrees of Freedom 1
Overall F Value 2466
Adjusted R2 .9699
This regression formula was applied to aggregated annual independent variables 
associated with “unclassified organizations" in the BLM notice of intent data base for each
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year, 1981-1988.
Notices of Intent were not required by the BLM prior to 1981. Lacking pre- 
1981 NOI data from which exploration expenditures could be estimated, exploration 
costs were factored as a percentage of expenditures by junior and Canadian stock 
companies and individuals, weighted as per the regression model, for each year 1976- 
1980. No capitalized exploration costs were assumed.
MINE AREA EXPLORATION EXPENDITURES
The following regression model was generated to estimate the 53% of total mine 
area exploration expenditures in the state for which direct reports could not be obtained.
YI i t  = B1GYXit + B2AU t + B3LXit + B4Ct + R5 ^ t + E X
Y ^jt = Exploration expenditures at operating mines in year t
GYj-jt = Gross revenues of mines in year t
AUt = Current dollar average gold price in year t
L^.jt = Total acres of mineral rights associated with mines in year t
Ct = Number of operating mines in aggregate data base in year t.









A Xit -.03521 .00480
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N (Cases = number of years) 1 3
Degrees of Freedom 8
Overall F Value 349
Adjusted R2 .9960
The regression model developed for mine area exploration expenditures between 
1976 and 1988 was tested against reported expenditures at ten operations in 1989 and 
1990. Predicted values were significantly below reported values. This is believed to 
reflect a major shift of exploration investments by producers in the state away from 
outside exploration to the thorough testing and development of properties held in 
association with their operations. Owing to structural changes in the allocation of 
exploration funds, the above model is generally invalid for years after 1988.
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APPENDIX C
LIST OF OPERATING UNITS AND ORE DEPOSITS(1)
DEVELOPED!2) Lone T ree Gold Quarry
Manhattan Lantern
Adelaide-Crown Marigold Maggie Creek
Alligator Ridge McCoy North Star
Alligator Ridge (North) McLean Pete
Atlanta Mother Lode Post
Aurora (Minerex) Northumberland Tusc
Austin Paradise Peak SMZ
Bald Mountain Pinson-Preble-Kramer
Big Springs Rabbit Creek UNDEVELOPED!4)
Borealis Rain Ashdown
Boss Rawhide Baxter Springs
Buckhorn Ruby Hill (Glister) Bell Mountain
Buffalo Valley Relief Black Point
Bullfrog Robertson Bruner
Candelaria Robinson Buckskin National
Casino-Winrock Rochester Buffalo Mountain
Chimney Creek Round Mountain Bunce
Cortez-Gold Acres Santa Fe Cobb Creek
Cove-McCoy Sixteen:One Delamar
Crofoot-Lewis Sleeper Dixie Comstock
Dee Sterling Doby
Divide Sullivan (Cuervo) Emigrant Springs
Easy Junior Taylor Fire Angel
Flowery Toiyabe Fireball Ridge
Fondaway Tonkin Springs Goodsprings
Getchell T rin ity Hasbrouck
Gold Bar-Gold Pick (Atlas) Tuscarora Hilltop
Goldbar (Angst) White Pine Isabella
Golden Butte W illard Kinsley
Gooseberry Wind Mountain Klondike
Green Springs Wood Gulch Longstreet
Goldstrike/Betze NFWMONT AOI (3) Mary Drinkwater
Haywood-Santiago Bobcat Mindoro
Hog Ranch Bootstrap Montgomery
Ivanhoe Capstone Mt. Hamilton
Horse Canyon Carlin Mule Canyon
lllipah Blue Star Oliver Hill
Jerritt Canyon Emigrant Pan
Kingston Genesis Ratto Canyon
Little Bald Mountain Gnome Rock Creek
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LIST OF OPERATING UNITS AND ORE DEPOSITS (CONT'D)























(1 ) Operating units may consist of more than one ore deposit and mine within an 
economic haulage distance of and feeding ore to a single processing facility. An operating 
unit may be referred to simply as a mine, even though a number of distinct ore deposits 
and extraction pits may compose the unit. For example, the Jerritt Canyon Mine 
consists of nine ore deposits and pits located from six to eighteen miles from the Jerritt 
Canyon mill.
( 2 )  Gold-silver deposits with production or under development between 1976 and 
1990. Detailed financial records and reserve data acquired and used in analyses.
( 3 ) Developed and undeveloped gold deposits in Newmont Gold Company's Area of 
Interest. Detailed financial records for each operating unit available 1976-1984; 
aggregate financial records only thereafter.
( 4 ) Undeveloped as of the end of 1990. Includes some mines which produced prior to 
1976 but not significantly reactivated in the current gold mining economic cycle. 
Intermediate level of data on reserve grade and tonnage, wasterore ratios and 
metallurgical characteristics available for cursory cash flow analyses. Also includes 
some deposits which may have sustained minor production during the 1976-1990 
period but net proceeds tax files not available and production not reported by Nevada 
Bureau of Mines and Geology.
( 5 ) Small mines, no one of which had produced more than 10,000 ounces as of the 
end of 1990. Detailed pre-1991 financial information available for inclusion in 





Cash flow models were prepared for each Nevada gold and silver mine operated 
between 1976 and 1990 and for which some records were available, mines under 
development in 1990 and undeveloped ore deposits which might sustain future 
production at a reasonably foreseeable gold price. Models were also developed for the 
reactivation of mines historically operated but placed on stand-by to assess their 
potential contribution to industry cash flows at higher metal prices. Omitted from the 
analyses were a number of small precious metal heap leach projects operated in the late 
1970's and early 1980's by the Erickson Mining Company, its subsidiaries, affiliates 
and co-venturers, and the Atlanta Mine, operated from 1980 through 1986. Records 
for these operations were unavailable. Owing to small size, their omission should not 
significantly affect estimated industry values and conclusions.
LIMITATIONS OF DATA BASE
The general goal of cash flow modeling for this investigation was to portray, as 
accurately as possible, true industry economics. However, despite the availability of a 
detailed tax report data base for most operations in the state, two conditions limited 
achievable accuracy. Lacking detailed mining plans for each operation, the time 
distribution of waste removal and mining grades for remaining reserves reported in 
terms of averages at the end of 1990 were unknown. Uniform grades and waste:ore 
ratios were assumed for the remaining life of each mine. Finally, some capital and 
operating costs incurred by operators are not deductible from revenues in estimating the 
Nevada Net Proceeds Tax, so are not reported. It was necessary to estimate these costs 
for each mine to develop cash flow models.
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PRODUCING MINES
The pre-1991 cash flow characteristics of the development and production 
phases for each producing gold and silver ore deposit in the state were estimated from 
capital and operating costs and revenues reported to the Nevada State Department of 
Taxation.
Cash flows beyond 1990 were based upon reported capital investments as of 
1990, 1988-1990 average mining, processing, marketing and insurance expenses and 
1990 royalties. Reported capital and operating costs were adjusted for mines undergoing 
expansion or significant preproduction stripping or which had announced expansion 
plans at some future date. Tax reported costs were augmented for non-deductible 
expenses and ultimate reclamation costs as described elsewhere in this appendix. 
Future revenue per ounce estimates were based upon the average ratio of operators' 
realized prices to annual average London spot prices for 1988 through 1990, times the 
price level used in various cash flow models, assuming a continuation of each operator's 
historical gains and losses from hedging.
DEVELOPING MINES
For mines in development during 1989-1990 and for which no net proceeds of 
mines tax reports had yet been filed, expected capital and operating costs, either 
publicly announced or obtained directly from the developers, were used in cash flow 
projections, if available. Operator-predicted costs were compared with those 
experienced by producing mines of similar size and technology and, where in reasonable 
agreement, were used directly in modeling. Some required significant adjustments.
Economic parameters for developing mines for which no company estimates could 
be obtained were generated by analogy with comparable, existing operations and through 
conventional engineering cost estimating methods.
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Estimates of future sales revenues were based upon each developer's historically 
realized hedging gains at other operations or, for new gold producers, upon the 
unadjusted gold price level specified for each set of cash flow projections. 
UNDEVELOPED DISCOVERIES
Cash flow models were generated for each non-producing gold and silver deposit 
in the state which had some level of publicly announced measured reserves or resources 
as of the end of 1990. Property owners were also contacted for the results of any pre­
feasibility or feasibility studies which had been completed for their undeveloped 
deposits. Complete reports were available for a few properties; many owners 
volunteered information on laboratory metallurgical recovery factors and probable 
mining and processing methods. This information was incorporated in the cash flow 
models.
Mineable reserve grades and tonnages as reported by owners were used when 
available. When only geologic reserve information was available, mineable reserve 
tonnages were estimated as 75% of geologic reserves. Mineable reserve grades were 
estimated as announced geologic reserve grades diluted by 5% for open-pit and 10% for 
underground mineable deposits. Overall wasterore ratios, where not published, were 
obtained directly from owners or geologists who had investigated the deposits. 
Metallurgical recovery factors, if unreported, were assumed to average 50% for run- 
of-mine leaching, 75% for crushed and heap-leached ore and 92% for milled ore.
Where preliminary feasibility data was not available, production rates, capital 
and operating costs were estimated by analogy with ore deposits of similar size, grade 
and metallurgical characteristics. Mining costs were estimated on the basis of mining 
costs per ton of rock at mines extracting comparably sized ore deposits, adjusted for
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differing waste:ore ratios. Revenue estimates were based upon standard gold price levels 
unless owners or probable developers had a history of hedging at other operations. 
Reclamation costs, corporate general and administrative expenses and taxes were 
estimated as for operating mines. Other income against which to write-off losses were 
assumed for all projections.
The modeling goal for undeveloped deposits was to achieve a bench-mark accuracy 
of ±25% in each major operating and economic parameter, commensurate with the level 
of accuracy suggested for pre-feasibility studies. For certain industry-wide financial 
analyses, undeveloped but economic ore deposits were assumed to be in development in 
1990 with production beginning in 1991. Those deposits with projected gross annual 
revenues of less than $15 million or negative net present values at a 10% real dollar 
discount rate at the start of development at the $384 spot price gold level were deemed 
uneconomic and dropped from further consideration. Production, cash flows and net 
present values estimated for undeveloped but potentially economic deposits are 
separately identified in the text of the report.
ORE RESERVES
Ore reserves employed in most projections were those in corporate annual 
reports at the end of 1990 or provided directly by operators. For some companies with 
fiscal years differing from the calendar year, reserves as of mid-1991 were used. In 
those few cases where significant reserve additions were announced before July of 
1991, these were added to 1990 reserves. In all cases, probable reserves, when 
separately inventoried, were assumed to be 100% realized. Very few operations 
reported probable reserves in inventory. Possible reserves were not considered.
For modeling purposes, mineable ore grades were taken as average reserve
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grades reported by operators, adjusted for mine dilution as necessary, with dilution 
factors obtained directly from most operators. Where dilution factors were 
unobtainable, dilutions of 5% and 10% of total tonnage at one-half the cutoff grade were 
assumed for open-pit and underground mines respectively.
MINING RATES
Annual ore mining rates were assumed to remain at 1990 levels for most 
operations. Exceptions were those mines which had announced expansion plans as of the 
end of 1991 or which had reported estimated production levels differing significantly 
from 1990 levels in forecasts required by the State Department of Taxation. Mining 
rates were adjusted up or down in these cases as appropriate. Annual tonnage rates were 
assumed to remain constant at all gold price levels considered in this study.
The assumptions of uniform waste:ore ratios, equal annual ore mining rates, 
uniform mined grades and recoveries for each operation introduced errors in the 
temporal sequence of net cash flows. However, these assumptions were necessary in the 
absence of detailed mine plans and development schedules. While estimated year-to- 
year cash flows may vary from those to be actually realized, overall averages are 
believed to be sufficiently accurate for subsequent analyses and conclusions.
COSTS
Many of the following cost items are not deductible from revenues in computing 
net proceeds taxes and were therefore not a part of most tax reports. However, a number 
of operators have intermittently included comprehensive cost and revenue data, 
including non-deductible expenses, with their annual tax reports to the state. This data, 
augmented from other sources, served as the basis for regression estimations of non- 
reported expenses incorporated in cash flow models.
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Intra-lndustrv Payments
With the exception of a few very large payments for mineral rights to some 
owners not otherwise involved in the mining industry, major acquisition payments for 
properties, mineral rights and plant to individuals or organizations were not explicitly 
included in cash flow models. Most of these payments are intra-industry cash flows and 
do not affect net profits or losses of the mining sector as a whole. Major lease and 
purchase payments, sales receipts and royalties on which information could be obtained 
were considered in estimating returns on exploration for select individual companies.
Exploration costs reported by cooperating organizations included, by request, 
lease, option and advanced royalty expenses which were considered a normal part of 
annual budgets. These and production royalties, detailed in net proceeds tax files, were 
charged against individual operations and organizations in computing mine cash flows, 
exploration investments and returns on exploration from the standpoint of the firm and, 
by aggregation, against industry-wide revenues.
Mine Development
Pre-production mine development costs incurred prior to the first year of 
production, including access road construction, are not allowed as either expenses or 
depreciable capital costs in state net proceeds tax filings. Those incurred during the 
first tax year of production are combined with mining and haulage costs and fully 
expensed in that year.
Total preproduction mine development costs for each operation in the state were 
obtained from published sources and directly from operators. To estimate the percentage 
of these costs included in mining and haulage costs reported to the State Department of 
Taxation in the first year of production, the average per ton mining and haulage cost in 
years 2 and 3 of production was computed. This estimated cost, free of preproduction
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expenses and adjusted for inflation, was multiplied by the tonnage mined in the first 
year of operation. Tax reported mining and haulage costs in excess of the resulting 
product were assumed to be preproduction mine development costs. The excess was 
subtracted from total preproduction mine development costs reported by operators or 
from published sources. The remainder, representing development costs not reported in 
net proceeds tax filings, were charge against project cash flows in the year preceding 
start-up for each mine.
A similar estimation procedure was employed for mines with an insufficient 
operating history upon which to base estimates of average per ton mining and haulage 
costs. In these cases, costs experienced at mines similar in size and operating 
characteristics were used as the basis for calculating reported and unreported 
preproduction development costs in the year preceding start-up (FCY-1).
On-going, production-stage ore development costs are also combined with mining 
and haulage costs in annual tax reports. An averaging procedure similar to that used in 
estimating non-reported preproduction development costs was employed to detect 
expenses attending major advanced reserve development programs. Where identified, 
further information regarding these costs were obtained from operators and published 
sources. Based upon this information, the one-year excess costs were averaged over the 
number of years of production relevant to the advanced development in estimating 
average annual development+mining+haulage costs for post-1990 cash flows.
Capital Management Expense
Declared investments in mine and plant were increased by 2.5% for uncapital­
ized costs associated with development, construction and expansions, consisting mainly 
of owners' management expenses (personal communication, RTZ Consultants 1991).
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Capital Equipment Replacement
Future mine equipment replacement rates and costs assumed haulage truck 
operating lives of 10 years, service and explosive truck lives of 8 years, and dozer, 
loader and other rolling stock lives of 5 years, with a further assumption that one-half 
of mine equipment investment is in haulage trucks. Replacement costs were taken at 
original costs as reported in net proceeds of mines tax files, escalated to 1990 dollars.
Annual replacements of fixed plant, including leach pads, were estimated as 3.5% 
of property improvements and buildings plus 5.4% of fixed machinery and equipment. 
These categories coincide with 20 year Class A and 20 year Class B depreciable assets 
reported to the State Department of Taxation. Replacement coefficients were estimated by 
no-constant regression on historical replacement costs at Nevada mines.
Property Improvements (20A Assets) Fixed Machinery (20B Assets)
X-coefficient: .035




Error of Coefficient: .014
R2; .830
N: 10
Five year life equipment replacements were assumed to end two years before ore 
reserve depletion; annual replacements were assumed to end in the year preceding shut­
down. Replacements of eight and ten year life equipment were assumed to end at four 
years prior to the end of production.
Minina and Haulage
Tax reported annual expenditures for mining and haulage were converted to costs 
per ton of rock, relying upon mined waste and ore tonnage data from Metal Economics 
Group publications, corporate annual reports or obtained directly from operators. 
Where information from none of these sources was available, annual rock tonnage and
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derived costs per ton were estimated from publicly announced ore deposit overall grades, 
waste:ore ratios, metallurgical recoveries and planned or realized annual production 
ounces. Derived estimates of waste and ore mined each year were checked against 
operator reported ounces of production and annual mining and processing expenditures 
for reasonableness. Appropriate adjustments were made in those few cases where 
obvious discrepancies were discovered.
Royalties
Royalties were entered at 1990 percentages as reported to the State Department 
of Taxation. Errors which may result for those mines which experience buy-out before 
depletion are insignificant in view of their magnitude compared to total cash flows.
Mine Area Exploration
Mine area exploration costs are lumped with mining and haulage costs in reports 
to the State Department of Taxation. These were separately estimated and subtracted, 
where appropriate, from reported annual expenditures before estimating mining and 
haulage costs for future cash flow projections. Because it was not possible to estimate 
future reserve gains from mine area exploration, no reserve additions, mine area 
exploration or associated costs were assumed in post-1990 cash flow estimates. 
Insurance
Only hazard insurance, workmens' compensation insurance, workers health and 
accident insurance, unemployment and social security directly covering in-state 
property and employees are deductible for state tax purposes and are included in net 
proceeds tax reports. These constituted insurance costs in cash flow models. Other types 
of insurance costs (liability, etc.) were estimated and included in the "Miscellaneous" 
cost category of cash flow models.
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Miscellaneous Costs
Certain types of insurance, personnel employment and relocation costs, 
technology licenses, audits, public relations expenses and certain legal fees may not be 
deducted from revenues in computing net proceeds taxes, so were not recorded in the 
available data base. These were estimated by regression, using a limited number of 
detailed cost and revenue reports incidentally contained in net proceeds tax records. The 
X-coefficient in the following no-constant regression model is the percentage of allowed 
operating costs equalling non-allowed costs.
X-coefficient: .030
Standard Error of Coefficient .015
R2; .800
N: 12
Out-of-state corporate general and administrative costs are also disallowed for 
net proceeds tax purposes. A no-constant regression model was developed to estimate 
these costs on the basis of capital invested at each operation. Regression of corporate 
general and administrative expenses on firm-wide total assets yielded the following 
model. The X-coefficient is the portion of the sum of depreciated mine development, 
construction and replacement costs which equal apportioned corporate office G&A 
charges.
X-coefficient: .03





Decommissioned mines do not file annual net proceeds of mines tax reports which 
were the principal source of operating cost data for this study. Moreover, too few gold 
mines had closed before 1990 to provide a valid data base for the estimation of 
reclamation expenses. Site reclamation costs were therefore estimated using unit costs 
developed by Richins (1986). Unit costs were applied to a simple model of each 
operation in the state based upon approximate ultimate surface disturbance and total tons 
of ore and waste to be mined. Average terrain and stringency of reclamation 
requirements were assumed. In the case of new and potential future operations, 
simplifying assumptions were also required with respect to areal disturbance, waste to 
ore ratios and processing methods.
To assess the general validity of reclamation costs estimated as above, final 
reclamation costs for 10 current operations were also estimated using the Bureau of 
Mines computerized Cost Estimating System. Simple OLS regression of reclamation costs
previously estimated on a unit basis upon the CES values yielded an R2 of .90 and a 
percentage estimation error at the mean of 20%. In view of this level of accuracy and 
the minor role which reclamation expenses play in overall economics, the unit cost 
estimation method was deemed sufficiently accurate for the purposes of this study.
The average reclamation cost per ton of ore calculated in this study was $0.68 in 
1990. This compares reasonably with Newmont's current set-aside of $0.75 per ton of 
ore for future reclamation, and Dobra & Thomas' (1991) estimate of 5% of operating 
costs for environmental compliance at Nevada's gold mines. Five percent of state wide 
average development and operating costs translates to about $0.67 per ton of ore. Site 
reclamation costs were entered as lump sum, end-of-life charges against cash flows.
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TAXES
Historical tax rates and regulations were used in estimating pre-1991 cash 
flows. Current (early 1991) federal corporate income tax, sales and use taxes, net 
proceeds and property taxes for the county in which each ore deposit is located were 
incorporated in projection models.
Depreciation
For federal tax computations, preproduction development for all mines was 
assumed to be 70% expensed in the year costs were incurred, with the remaining 30% 
amortized over five years. The unamortized portions of these costs for mines less than 
five years old as of 1990 were entered as sunk costs to be amortized over the shorter of 
the remainder of the 5 year time period or the life of the reserves.
Installed costs for plant and equipment as reported to the State Department of 
Taxation, converted to constant 1990 dollars, were entered as the basis for depreciable 
capital for state tax computations. Pre-1991 depreciation at each operation was 
extracted from tax reports. Post-1990 state tax computations assumed straight-line 
depreciation beginning mid-year in the year of asset acquisition. Book values at the end 
of 1990, based upon the accelerated depreciation of assets for federal tax purposes, were 
entered in cash flow models in 1991 for projections of post-1990 depreciation for 
federal tax purposes.
State Sales Taxes
State sales taxes on equipment and supplies in Nevada are 5.75%. They are not 
reported separately, but are included in the “supplies" component of operating costs and 
in mine and plant equipment replacement costs reported to the Department of Taxation. 
They were not independently estimated in cash flow models generated for this study.
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Local Property Taxes
Property taxes for each mine were extracted from records of the State 
Department of Taxation for years preceding 1991.
Valuations of mine and plant improvements for local property tax assessments 
are made by the State Department of Taxation, Division of Assessment Standards. 
Regression of the division's valuations on the straight-line depreciated book value of 




Standard Error of Coefficient: .080
R2; .855
N (mine years): 40
Property taxes for projection models were taken at the constant ($millions) 
plus 92% of straight-line depreciated book value of plant and equipment each year times 
.35 (assessment rate on taxable value) times the 1990 county average property tax rate 
for the county in which each mine is located.
Net Proceeds Taxes
Net proceeds of mines taxes were computed for each model year at statutory rates 
on the basis of the ratio of net proceeds to gross yield. Mines with net proceeds exceeding 
$4 million were taxed at the 5% rate. Straight-line depreciation allowed as a deduction 
from gross revenues was computed on the basis of initial acquisition costs for 20, 10 
and 5 year life assets reported to the State Department of Taxation in 1990, adjusted 
progressively through each model year for retirements and replacements.
2 6 5
Federal Taxes
Federal income taxes were estimated at statutory rates assuming other income 
against which to write off losses each year (no loss carry-forward or carry-back). 
Investment tax credits available under pre-1987 tax laws were assumed to be used in 
the year in which they were earned; no transition regulation investment tax credits 
were considered.
Double declining balance switching to straight line depreciation using published 
mid-point ADR class lives (Stermole, 1987) was assumed. Improvements to leaseholds 
and buildings were assigned a 15 year recovery period, fixed plant and equipment a 10 
year recovery period, rolling stock excluding pickups a 7 year recovery period and all 
other equipment a 5 year recovery period. These categories coincide with the state's 
20A, 20B, 10 and 5 year depreciation life classifications respectively.
METAL PRICES
Initial cash flow projections were at 1990 average spot prices of $384 gold and 
$4.07 silver, plus the margin above or below spot which each operator realized from 
hedging.
A second set of cash flow projections were prepared assuming base prices of 
$350 and $4.00 per ounce gold and silver during 1991 and $330 and $4.00 per ounce 
gold and silver thereafter, in 1990 constant dollars, again adjusted for historically 
realized hedging profits by each operator.
Applying the wash-out assumption, gold prices were escalated 4% annually 
beginning in 1991, in step with assumed inflation.
The second set of cash flow projections at lower gold and silver prices required 
adjustments to reported 1990-1991 reserve tonnages and grades which were computed 
at cut-offs commensurate with $384 per ounce gold prices. For this purpose, grade-
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tonnage curves were acquired for ten representative mines. For each mine, 1990 cutoff 
grades were adjusted upward by the ratio of $384/$330 and tonnage losses and grade 
gains were estimated from the curves. The average of these factors for the ten mines 
suggested reserve tonnages at 0.85 and average grades at 1.07 times 1990 reported 
levels. Tonnages and grades were adjusted accordingly for the second set of cash flow 
projections at $330 per ounce gold and $4.00 per ounce silver.
The aforementioned adjustments assumed that all mines in the state employ 
dynamic cutoff strategies. As of 1991, among 30 operators contacted for this 
investigation, roughly half adjusted cutoff grades at least annually in response to price 
levels and some as often as quarterly. The remaining half, representing more than 70% 
of Nevada's annual gold output, maintained fixed mine plans, cutoff grades and production 
rates. Assuming adjustments to all mine tonnages and grades may therefore understate 
remaining mine lives and overstate net cash flows for some mines. However, these 
adjustments have their greatest economic impacts at the ends of mine lives, so potential 
errors in economic parameters are reduced through discounting. It may also be argued 
that operators employing fixed grade policies in 1991 may have since changed their 
strategies in the face of low gold and silver prices.
TYPICAL MODEL
Table D1 presents the details of a typical cash flow model, including both 
historical and projected economics.
DEFLATION FACTORS AND GOLD PRICES
Table D2 lists GNP implicit price deflators, current and constant dollar gold
prices used in economic analyses.
TA B LE  D1. DATA PREPARATION
J 1 1 L - 1111- - 1111- - l l i f l -----
Information Prom PubH ahtd Sourca* and Paraonal Com m unlcalfona with Q p i n l o f i  /IC u ffin t  M H U flnil,
PreproducBon ExploraBon A DellnaaBon Coils Capltaflied:
PreproducBon Capital Invaalmenl. Excluding ExploraBon: $79 A U 
Phae# I Ovarburden Removal Ufa;
Waite:Ore RaBo:
Or* ProducBon, Million* ol Ton*:
ProducBon 6Ug* Mine Are* ExploraBon:
IrBlaJ Or* R*»«rv*. Million* ol Recovarebl* Ounc«ia $394 A u  
Min* Area Explortlon Reoovarebl# R***rv* Addtfon*. $354 Air.
Mlneabl* Raaarvaa *1 End of 1990, Minion* of Ton*:
Avareg* Recovarebl# Reaarv* Qred* al End of 1990, Ounc*i p«r Ton Qcfd: 
Avareg* ReoovarebU R***rva Qred* al End of 1990, Ounca* p*r Ton Silver. 
ROM Loach orvitream In 1991 al 5.3 mJBon ion* p*r y*ar.




20 Y*ar Class A Uf* AddBone<2): 1 64 16 009 3 56
20 Year Clase B Uf* ReBremenU 0 0 0 0
20 Y*ar Class B Life Additional): 0.72 4057 4 05 0.12
20 Year Claes B Ule ReBremenU: • . 0 0 0 0
10 Year Ufa AcfclBon*<4): 5 9 6 64 3.49 0.17
10 Year LJI* ReBrement* 0 0 1.61 0
5 Year Uf* AddBons(5): 0.33 0 02 0.06 0 33
5 Year Uf* ReBrements: 0 0 0 02 0.09
Net Proceeds Tax Straight Une Dep rede Boa- 0.79 4.41 4.66 5.08
O p en in g  Coats 
Mining (6): 11 03 11.59 13 97 1324
Proceaelng: 2 39 tO.16 10.65 11.57
Marketing: 001 0 05 0 05 0 06
Insurance: 0 07 009 0.14 0.14
RoyslBes: 0 0 0 0
G d d O u x e e S d d 16683 213736 225556 217365
Gold Inventory: 
Gold Revenuee: 6.16 93 33 67.13
3915
6543
Silver Ounces Sold: 1635 47662 55953 55000
Silver Inventory: 
Silver Revenue*: 001 032 0 3
6502
0 2 7
Total Inventory Value al spot pile*: 









Nat Proceed* Tax: 0 1.26 266 2.76
(1) Coat* not slowed aa nal proceed* tax deducBone.
(2) Laaaahold Improvement* and txildng*.
(3) Fixed machinery and eqJpment
(4) MotJIa machinery *nd ecyJpment
(5) UcM aarvlca vahldaa. oftlca and lab acyjlpmenl 
(0) Indudea haiiage and nine area exploraBoa
(7) Indude* oonlnuou* redamalon ooata.
End ol 1990 Reaerv* Ton*, $354 Gold; 92.6 M.T.
End of 1960 R*a*rva Grad*. $354 Gold: .037 opt 
Toroage al $330 Price Laval: (62.9 M.T.){ 97) -  72 M.T.
Grad* al $330 Pile* Laval; ( 037 opljjl 09) -  .040 opt
‘No ad|u*tmanf made lor aihrer grade* below 1 o*noe per Ion.
Eallm allon of U ndeclared P reprod ucllon  Mina D evelopm ent C oala (319*01
Reported PreproducBon Capital Excluding Exploration (I960 through198B) $69 3 M
D«dar*d 1967 Caplul Expendture *$9.9 M
D*d*r*d 1969 Caplul Expendure ______ -$70 6 M
Undeclared Preproducllon Mina Development ($7 5 In 1966 OoHare)________________ $6 6 M
Standardised RedlelrlbuHon o f P r*p ro d u cllo n  Explorallon Co»l* |
($2.2 M)(t.t9)(.S2)e<S3 9 M)(1 . 15)(.52>e(SO 3 M)(1.12X 95)- $7.3 M After Tax Total
_________ 1 9 6 1 ______ __________ lfllU ______ l f l t l ______ 1965
% of Total: 3 9 11 23 25
$1990 Coat $0 3M $0.4 M $0 5M  $1.7 M $1.9 M
$Cunenl Coal:___________$0 2M $0 3 M $06 M $14 M $1 5 M
J I M
32 
$2 4 M 
$2.1 M
0 2 1 2 5 2 5 2 5




1667 Reported Mining Coal $13.9 M 
1697 Tons x 1989 61690 Average Cost par Ton -  .21 X $5 5 5 - -$1.2 M
0037 1969 Mining Coals Included In 1997 Reported Expenses
0007 Expected CoeU2 5 x $5.55 per ton- $13 9 M
Reported 1986 Mining Coal _______ $12 6 M
EeHmated Phaa* I Push back Coal: $ 1 1.3/(2.5 x 5>*$0 90 par ton of ora $11.3 M
*2.5 M.T. per year al $0  60 per Ion wael* removal charge |liem 00400) beginning In 1963. 
*Pre-l69l ROM leach material daaaflad  a* wael*._________________________________
Eetlm allon of of Futur* Operating Coat* (>1990)
1989 -  ($14 5 Mining Coal $2.0 Explore I on Y 2  5 M.T. -  
I960 ■  ($13 2 Mining Coat $1.9 Expforatfon)/2 5 M.T. ■  
I960 51690 Avareg*, Millng Or* Mining Charge 
1969 51990 Proceaelng - ( $ 1 13»$110)/(2 S»2 5)- 
1689 51960 Marketing -  ($0 05*10 06)42.542 5 )-  
1689 51990 Insurance -(SO IS *  $O.I4)/(2.5e2.5)>
Net Proceed* Tax Reported Mil Ore Coat Total ($1990)- 
ROM L«ach Coal •  0.005 opl recoverable cutotl x $354
$5.00 per Ion
$4.76 p*r ton 
$4 56 per Ion 
$0.02 per Ion 
$ 0  0 6  p*r ton
$9 42 per ton 
$1.90 par Ion
Estimated Post-1990 Average Net Proceed* Tax Reported Cost P*r Ton:
Milling Ore* (2 5 M.T. )($9.42 per Ion) « $23.6 Minion
Leach O r* . (5 3 M.T.) ($1.00 per ton) -  $ 10 1 Million___
$33.7 Million
Average* $33.7 Million /7 6 Million -  $4 32 per ton (7)______________
Eallm allon of R ealized Melel Prices (11880)
1969 Gold Revenuee ■  $90 62 MilUon/225,556 Ounces ■ $402 per ounce.
1969 Average London Spot Price ■ $397 per ounce.
Groae Gold Hedging Premium « $5 per ounce
I960 Gold Revenues ■  $65.43 Milllon/217.365 Ounce# ■ $393 per ounce
I960 A ven ge London Spot Price ■ $364 per ounce
Grose Gold Hedging Premium ■ S9p«r ounce
Gold Hedging Premium « ($5 *  $9)41397 ♦  $364) - 2'A ol spot price
Silver Hedging Prerrtum «($5.36»$4 9l)/(S5.72*$$4 07)*5%  ol spot price
N on-d*olar*d L o cal, Corporate Q 5A  and R eclam ation  C o a t*  ($1990)
Miscellaneous Undedared Coats ■  ( 03)($4 32 per 1onX7.9 M.T.)*$1.0 M year 
Eelimaled Corporate G6A In 1991 ■  ($71 M){03) ■  $2.1 M year
Closure Redamallon C oat 91 M.T O $0 15 per Ion; 76 M.T. O $0 17 per ton.
Replacement Equipment Coat Estimation ($1690) jReplacement OperaBng
iaa> 1989 1989 I960 Coal Ufa
10 Year Ule $6 6M 
6 Year Ule $0.4 M
$7.3 M $3 9 M 
$0.1 M $0.3 M




Annual Replacements ol Fixed Plant and Leach Pads: 
20A Ule (12.1 M *$19.6 M 4$0.1 M 
20B Ule ($0.6 M *$43 9 M *$4 3 M






T a b l e  D - 1  ( C o n ' t . )
EXPLORATION
DEVELOPMENT
20A YEAR L IFE  INVESTMENTS
20A YEAR L IFE  RETIREMENTS
20B YEAR L IFE  INVESTMENTS
20B YEAR L IFE  RETIREMENTS
10 YEAR L IFE  INVESTMENTS
10 YEAR L IFE  RETIREMENTS
5 YEAR LIFE  INVESTMENTS
5 YEAR LIFE  RETIREMENTS
YEAR.S CAPITAL INVESTMENT
CUMULATIVE CAPITAL INVESTMENT
DEPRECIATION FOR NET PROCEEDS TAX
DEPRECIATED CAPITAL INVESTMENT
OPERATING COST FOR NET PROCEEDS TAX (1 )
SALVAGE
ROYALTY




LOCAL PROPERTY TAX RATE
PROPERTY TAX
BEGINNING BOOK VALUE 20A YEAR L IFE  INVESTMENTS 
ACRS DEPRECTION 20A YEAR L IFE  INVESTMENTS 
CARRIED VALUE 20A YEAR L IFE  INVESTMENTS 
BEGINNING BOOK VALUE 20B YEAR L IFE  INVESTMENTS 
ACRS DEPRECIATION 20B YEAR L IFE  INVESTMENTS 
CARRIED VALUE 20B YEAR LIFE  INVESTMENTS 
BEGINNING BOOK VALUE 10 YEAR L IFE  INVESTMENTS 
ACRS DEPRECIATION 10 YEAR L IFE  INVESTMENTS 
CARRIED VALUE 10 YEAR L IFE  INVESTMENTS 
BEGINNING BOOK VALUE 5 YEAR LIFE  INVESTMENTS 
ACRS DEPRECIATION 5 YEAR L IFE  INVESTMENTS 
CARRIED VALUE 5 YEAR L IFE  INVESTMENTS 
DEPRECIATION FOR FEDERAL INCOME TAXES 
PREDEPLETION INCOME 




UNADJUSTED FEDERAL INCOME TAX
fORICAL CASH FLOW ANALYSIS
1985 1986 1987
2 .1 9  3 . 81
7 . 5 0
1.84  
0 . 0 0  
0 . 72  
0 . 0 0
5 . 90  
0 . 0 0  
0 . 33  
0 . 0 0  
8 . 80  
8 . 80  
0 . 79  
8 . 0 2
13. 51
0 . 0 0
0 . 0 0
0 . 65
8 . 17
- 6 . 1 2
0 . 0 0
1 . 6 1  1 . 6 5  1 . 93
0 . 0 5
1.84  
0 . 18  1 .6 6 
0 . 72  
0. 14  
0 . 58
5 . 90  
1. 71  
4. 19  
0 . 33  
0 . 13  
0.20
2. 17
- 2 . 1 9  - 1 1 . 3 1  - 8 . 4 6
0 . 0 0  
1 . 23  
0 . 0 0
- 2 . 1 9  - 1 1 . 3 1  - 8 . 4 6
0 . 0 0
1988 1989 1990
18 . 00 0 . 09 3 . 56
0 . 00 0 . 00 0 . 00
40 . 57 4 . 05 ' 0 . 12
0 . 00 0 . 00 0 . 00
6. 04 3 . 49 0. 17
0 . 00 1 . 61 0 . 00
0 . 02 0 . 0 8 0 . 33
0 . 00 0 . 0 2 0 . 09
65 . 41 7 . 7 1 4 . 17
74 . 21 81 . 92 86 . 10
4 . 41 4 . 86 5. 08
69 . 02 71 . 87 70 . 97
21. 88 2 5 . 01 25 . 00
o.oo' 1 . 30 0 . 01
0 . 00 0 . 00 0 . 0 0
2. 66 2. 84 2 . 81
93 . 65 87 . 43 85 . 70
67 . 36 57. 57 55 . 62
1. 28 2. 88 2 . 78
1 . 90 1. 97 2 . 16
0 . 42 0 . 46 0 . 49
19 . 65 17 . 77 19 . 55
1 . 97 1. 78 1. 96
17 . 69 16 . 00 17 . 60
41. 14 36 . 96 29 . 69
8 . 2 3 7 . 39 5. 94
32 . 91 29 . 57 23 . 75
11 . 03 9 . 71 7 . 0 7
3 . 20 2 . 82 2 . 05
7 . 8 3 6 . 90 5 . 02
0 . 22 0 . 19 0 . 3 5
0 . 09 0 . 08 0. 14
0 . 13 0 . 11 0 . 21
13 . 48 12 . 06 10. 08
52 . 03 45 . 27 44 . 42
26 . 01 22 . 63 22 . 21
14 . 05 1 3 .1 1 12 . 85
14 . 05 13 . 11 12 . 85
37 . 98 32 . 15 31.56
18. 23 15 . 43 15 . 15
268
T a b l e  D - 1  ( C o n ' t . )
EARNED INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT (IT C ) PRE-1987 TAXES ONLY
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT USE L IM IT PRE-1987 TAXES ONLY
USED INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT PRE-1987 TAXES ONLY
TRANSFERRED INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT PRE-1987 TAXES ONLY
MINIMUM TAX ON TAX PREFERENCE ITEMS PRE-1987 TAXES ONLY
INTERMEDIATE FEDERAL INCOME TAX - 1 . 8 6 12 . 91 10 . 93 10 . 73
LOSS TRANSFER 1. 05 5 . 4 3 2 . 88 0 . 00 0 . 00 0 . 00
RECAPTURE OF EXPENSED EXPLORATION & DEVELOPMENT 9 . 92 0 . 00 0 . 00 0 . 00
CAPITALIZED EXPLORATION S DEVELOPMENT S . L .  DEPRECIATION 0 . 99 0 . 99 0 . 99 0 . 99
UNAMORTIZED CAPITALIZED EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 8 . 93 7 . 94 6. 94 5 . 95
START OF YEAR S . L .  DEPRECIATED VALUE 20B L IFE  ASSETS 0 . 72 41 . 18 3 9 . 05 33 . 31
S . L .  DEPRECIATION 20B L IFE  ASSETS 0 . 11 6 . 18 5 . 86 5 . 00
END OF YEAR BOOK VALUE 20B LIFE  ASSETS 0 . 61 35 . 00 33 . 19 28 . 32
START OF YEAR S . L .  DEPRECIATED VALUE 10 L IFE  ASSETS 5 . 90 11 . 50 10 . 97 8 . 84
S . L .  DEPRECIATION 10 L IFE  ASSETS 1. 24 2. 42 2 . 30 1 . 86
END OF YEAR BOOK VALUE 10 L IFE  ASSETS 4. 66 9 . 09 8 . 6 6 6 . 98
START OF YEAR S . L .  DEPRECIATED VALUE 5 L IFE  ASSETS 0 . 33 0 . 25 0 . 24 0 . 40
S . L .  DEPRECIATION 5 L IFE  ASSETS 0 . 10 0 . 07 0 . 07 0 . 12
END OF YEAR BOOK VALUE 5 L IFE  ASSETS 0 . 23 0 . 17 0 . 16 0. 28
ALLOWED DEPRECIATION FOR ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX 1. 63 10 . 63 10 . 01 8 . 93
DEPRECIATION ADD-BACK (ACRS DEPRECIATION -  ATM DEPRECIATION) 0 . 54 2 . 85 2 . 0 5 1 .1 6
TAXABLE INCOME FOR ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX 1 . 01 53 . 88 46 . 33 44 . 58
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX 0 . 20 10 . 78 9 . 27 8 . 92
AFTER-TAX CURRENT DOLLAR NET CASH FLOW (2) - 1 . 1 4 - 5 . 8 0 - 1 2 . 4 1 - 1 2 . 8 2 38 . 69 39 . 60
(1)  INCLUDES M INING, HAULAGE, PROCESSING, MARKETING, INSURANCE AND MINE AREA EXPLORATION.
(2 ) INCLUDES GREATER OF ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX OR ORDINARY FEDERAL TAX.
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1 0 72 M tons 9.2 Ore Reserve
1 0 7.8 M tons 1 Mining Rate
1 0.04 $1,55/ton 1 Exp. Ore+Waste Mining Cost (3)
3 0 15 M tons 5 Overburden Removal
3 0.04 $0.75/ton 5 S.L. 5 year Overburden Removal Cost
1 0 7.8 M tons 1 Processing Rate
1 0.04 $2.77/ton 1 Exp. Processing Cost (3), (4)
1 -0.06 $2.1 M 1 Exp. Corporate G& A (5)
1 0.04 $1.0 M 1 Exp. Miscellaneous
10 0.04 $12.2 M 1 Exp. Closure & Reclamation
1 0 0 0 Exp. Royalty
1 0 0.0216 1 Exp. Property Tax (6)
1 0 0.05 1 Exp. Net Proceeds Tax
1 0 0.34 1 Write-off Federal Income Tax (7)
5 0.04 $17.5 M 9 DDB-SL 10 Year Life Equipment
1 0.04 $0.8 M 4 DDB-SL 5 Year Life Equipment
1 0.04 $3.6 M 1 E Annual Replacements
1 0 $41.4 M 9.2 1.75 DB-SL Sunk 20 Year Investment
1 0 $5.0 M 5 DDB-SL Sunk 10 Year Investment
1 0 $0.2 M 1 DDB-SL Sunk 5 Year Investment
1 0 0.15 Percentage Depletion
1 0 .040 opt Gold Grade (8)
1 0 1 Gold Recovery Factor
1 0 $357/ounce 1 1991 Gold Price (9)
2 0.04 $337/ounce Post-1991 Gold Price (9)
1 0 .007 opt Silver Grade (8)
1 0 1 Silver Recovery Factor
1 0.04 $4.27/ounce Realized Silver Price (9)
(1) Escalation begins in 1991 for all applicable cost components.
(2) Values in 1990 dollars.
(3) Includes allocated portion of local G & A costs.
(4) Includes marketing and insurance.
(5) Annual cost escalation minus average project depreciation (.04 - .10 = -.06)
(6) Sales taxes included in operating and capital investment costs.
(7) Federal income tax assuming other income against which to write off losses.
(8) Includes refinery deductions.
(9) Historically realized price above spot through hedging.
TaNe 01 (Cool'd) SAMPLE COMPUTATION OF NET PRESENT VALUES, 10% DISCOUNT RATE, 1330 PER OUNCE GOLD PRICE LEVEL 




































ie a i 1.40 ■0.10 1.00 -0.10
1082 1.31 -0.20 0.01 -0.1 B
1083 1.26 •0.40 0.83 -0 33
1084 1.22 -0.00 0.75 -0.68
1085 -1.14 1.18 -1.35 121 -1.63 1.00 -1.35 -1.00 0.68 -0 68
1088 -58a 1.15 •6.76 1.10 -4.93(1) 1.10 -7.44 0.01 -6.15 •5.81 0.62 -3.60
1087 (FCY-1) •12.41 1.12 -13.00 1.00 •1300 1.00 -13.00 0 83 -11.54 -13.00 0.56 -7.78
1088 -12.82 1.08 -13.85 001 -12.60 001 •12.60 0.75 -10.38 -1385 0 51 -7.06
1080 38.60 1.04 40.24 0.83 33.40 083 33.40 0.68 27.36 40.24 0.47 1801
1000 39.60 1.00 39.60 075 20.70 0.75 29.70 0.62 24.55 39.60 0.42 16.63
1001 48.39 0.96 4645 068 31.59 068 31.50 056 26.01 46.45 03 0 18.12
1902 49.14 0.02 45.21 062 28.03 0.62 28.03 0.51 2306 45.21 0.35 15.82
1003 41.43 0.89 36.87 0.56 20 65 056 20.65 0.47 17.33 36.87 0.32 11.80
1004 48.07 0.85 40.86 0.51 20 84 051 20.64 0.42 17.16 40.86 02 9 11.85
1005 30.26 0 82 24.81 0.47 11.66 0.47 11.66 0.30 8.68 24.81 0.26 6.45
1006 48.84 0.70 38.58 0.42 1621 0.42 1621 0.35 13.50 38.58 0.24 926
1997 48.63 0.76 36.06 0.39 14.41 030 14.41 0.32 11.83 38.06 0.22 8.13
1008 4567 0.73 33.34 0.35 11.67 035 11.67 0.29 0.67 33.34 0.20 667
1090 50.85 0.70 35.60 0.32 I t  39 0.32 11.39 0.26 025 35.60 0.18 6 41
2000 6.57 0.68 4.47 1.30 0.20 130 0.24 107 4.47 0.16 0.72
Development NPV: 190.40 Projed NPV: 105.30 Exploration NPV: 161.1 Explorallon Expecled Value NPV: 110.40DEFINITIONS. . .
Development NPV: Net preaenl value ol cash flowa, excluding preproduclion explorallon coala, dlacounled a l 10% lo year proceeding Ira l year of commercial production (FCY-1).
Pro)ecl NPV: Nel pteaenl value ol caah flowa, Including preproduclion exploralon coala, discomled a l 10% to yeai proceeding firal year ol commercial production (FCY-1).
Exploralon NPV: Nel preaenl value ol cash Iowa, Including preproduclion exploration coala, dlacounled al 10% lo year of exploration program Inifalion leading lo dlacovery.
Exploration Expected Value NPV: Nel preaenl value o l caah flowa, w ltr reported exploration expendlluree dalribuled ovor alandard fl year preproduclion explorallon period, dlacounled al 10% lo Ihe atari of the alandard 6 year period. 
(1) Preproducfon mine development coat orty. SAMPLE PREPARATION OF EXPECTEO EXPLORATION VALUE CASH FLOW MODEL
Dfacpuilcd Ciah flowa. Economic EHacovcrica
(A) (B) (C) (A«B«C)/3 (D) (D *(A «B «C )/3
Expeded Prorated Expensed Full Coal Caah
FCY-6 -0.10 •0.30 0.40 -027 -4.67 -4.04
FCY-5 -0.18 •0 60 •0.70 •0.40 -4.67 -5.16
FCY-4 •033 -1.10 -1.32 •0.92 -4.67 -5.50
FCY-3 •0.68 •2.30 -2.76 -1.91 -4.67 6.58
FCY-2 •360 -250 -3.00 •3.03 -4.67 -7.70
FCY-1 •7.70 -320 -364 -4.04 -4.67 -961
FCY •706 1.70 -12.23 -586 •586
1861 4 30 1022 11.14 11.14
1863 4.10 12.15 10.06 10.96
18.12 -3.50 11.06 858 858
15.82 8.20 0.62 11.28 11.28
11.60 730 12.00 10.37 10.37
11.85 6.40 11.50 002 092
6.45 6.40 11.33 8.06 8.06
026 6.40 6.51 7.30 7.39
8.13 4 20 10 97 7.77 7.77
667 . _____lL5Q_______ 10.15 5.11 *5.11
6.41 0.67 5.36 5.36
07  2 6.75 2.49 2.49





Explorallon NPVs: 11104 34.00 120.43 91.49 Expecled NPV of Exploration: 63.47
EXPECTED VALUE OF EXPLORATION CASH FLOW
f r M  P ro d u ctio n  C a s h  Flow  
I ' l  D evelo pm en t & Prod.
E x p lo ra tio n
E x p lo r.S  D evelo pm en t
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Constant $ Gold Price 
_____ in Economic Analyses
Current $ Gold Price 
_____ in Economic Analyses
Current $/Oz $330 Basis $384 Basis $330 Basis $384 Basis
1976 63.10 125 261.1 261.1 125.0 125.0
1977 67.30 148 289.8 289.8 148.0 148.0
1978 72.20 193 352.3 352.3 193.0 193.0
1979 78.60 307 514.8 514.8 307.0 307.0
1980 85.70 613 942.7 942.7 613.0 613.0
1981 94.00 460 645.0 645.0 460.0 460.0
1982 100.00 376 495.6 495.6 376.0 376.0
1983 103.90 424 537.9 537.9 424.0 424.0
1984 107.70 360 440.6 440.6 360.0 360.0
1985 110.90 317 376.7 376.7 317.0 317.0
1986 113.80 368 426.2 426.2 368.0 368.0
1987 117.40 446 500.7 500.7 446.0 446.0
1988 121.30 437 474.8 474.8 437.0 437.0
1989 126.30 381 397.6 397.6 381.0 381.0
1990 131.80 384 384.0 384.0 384.0 384.0
1991 137.1* 350* 384* 364* 399*
1992 142.6* 330* 384* 356* 415*
1993 148.3* 330* 384* 370* 432*
1994 154.2* 330* 384* 385* 449*
1995 160.4* 330* 384* 400* 467*
1996 166.8* 330* 384* 416* 486*
1997 173.4* 330* 384* 433* 505*
1998 180.4* 330* 384* 450* 526*
1999 187.6* 330* 384* 468* 547*
2000 195.1* 330* 384* 487* 568*
2001 202.9* 330* 384* 507* 591*
2002 211.0* 330* 384* 527* 615*
2003 219.5* 330* 384* 548* 639*
2004 228.2* 330* 384* 570* 665*
2005 237.4* 330* 384* 593* 692*
2006 246.9* 330* 384* 616* 719*
2007 256.7* 330* 384* 641* 748*
2008 267.0* 330* 384* 667* 778*
2009 277.7* 330* 384* 693* 809*
2010 288.8* 330* 384* 721* 841*
2011 300.3* 330* 384* 750* 875’
2012 312.4* 330* 384* 780* 910*
2013 324.8* 330* 384* 811* 946*
2014 337.8* 330* 384* 844* 984*
2015 351.4* 330* 384* 877* 1024*
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APPENDIX E
DISTRICT GEOLOGIST INTERVIEW FORM
1. In what year did the company first begin to explore for gold in Nevada? Please 
omit years in which gold was only a minor target among a number of commodities which 
were considered in a general exploration program.
2. In what year did you become district geologist?
3 . Who was your predecessor?
4 . How long did he hold the job?
5 . What was your previous job?
6. How many years of mineral exploration experience do you have?
7. How many years of mineral exploration experience in Nevada do you have? 
Please include in your estimate the sum of partial years of work in the state.
8. What is your highest university degree?
9. For the following, please estimate the percentage of your total work hours line by 
line, w ithout trying to normalize the total to 100%. What percentage of your work 
hours, on average and over the full term of your employment as district geologist, have 
been spent on:
(a) Program and project planning:
(b) On-going project monitoring:
(c) Staff management (administrative):
(d) Budgeting and fiscal control:
(e) Corporate reporting, both in writing and in presentations:
(f) Acquisition, jo int venture and submittal reviews and proposal preparations:
(g) Field reconnaissance, property and prospect examinations:
(h) Field monitoring of on-going projects:
10. For the company's operations in Nevada, and within the framework of overall 
company financial constraints, do you have significant influence in establishing:
(a) The annual budget for ongoing projects: No ___  ___  Yes
0 1
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(b) The number of salaried staff professionals: No ___  ___Yes
0 1
11. When authorized to increase professional staff, do you have the final word on 
employing a particular individual?
12. What is the minimum size target, in mineable ounces, which the company will 
consider for exploration or acquisition? If policy does not include a minimum size 
criteria, what is approximately the smallest size ore deposit which would be considered, 
based upon your knowledge of the company and familiarity with the industry?
13. With respect to the following, you:
(a) The company is realistic and clear
in its goals, plans and strategies.
(b) With respect to corporate strategy: 







1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
14. Please rank the following with respect to importance in the company's approach 




(a) In regional exploration:
Conceptual Geologic Models 
Regional imagery and geophysics 
Trend and facies analysis
(b) In district level exploration:






Submittal reviews _________  ________  ________
Grass-roots exploration _________  ________  ________
District level exploration _________  ________  ________
(d) Personnel characteristics
Staff technical skills _________  _________  _______
Staff experience _________  _________  _______
Your management of staff _________  _________  _______
15. Does the company offer a reward, in the form of royalty participation, a cash 
bonus or stock shares, either to the individual or the office, for a discovery? If so, when 
was this practice begun?
16. What has been the average size of your full-time professional staff, including 
geologists, geophysicists, geochemists and landmen, during your tenure as district 
geologist? [Exclude the district geologist from the count.]
17. What percentage of your full-time professional staff has consisted of contracted 
employees rather than permanent, fully vested personnel? Exclude from your estimate 
professionals contracted intermittently and for short periods on a project basis 
(temporary hires), but include those who, though hired from project to project, have 
been essentially full-time with the company for more than six months and have worked 
on more than one project.
18. Does or has the company engaged in grubstake agreements?
19. For a proposed project or lease which is just beyond the limits of local 
discretionary authority, but is the smallest proposal which would be submitted for 
corporate consideration, how long on average does it take to get a decision? Exclude 
obvious windfall opportunities.
20. With a drilling campaign underway:
(a) How frequently do you report results to your manager, by phone or in writing?
(b) Does management make any recommendations for changes in on-going programs?
Seldom_____ Sometimes______  Frequently______
21. Since you became district geologist, has the company made any significant 
strategic changes with respect to:
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(a) Metals targeted for exploration_____ . (b) Geographic focus_____ .
(c) Minimum target criteria_______ (d) Emphasis on regional exploration-------
22. Does the company have a centralized technical support group for exploration and 
development (geochemists, geophysicists, economists, engineers)?
23. What level of annual funding and how many years do you believe are necessary 
for your exploration group to make a gold discovery which the company would develop?






From________ to :________ From_____ to :_______ From________to:
2. For this question, please estimate line by line without attempting to normalize to 
100%. What percentage of your total work hours were spent in the office on:
(a) Generative Research_____Generative Research_____Generative Research_____
(b) Submittal Evaluation____ Submittal Evaluation____ Submittal Evaluation____
( c) Acquisition Evaluation___ Acquisition Evaluation___ Acquisition Evaluation____
( d) Field Data Prep/Analysis_Field Data Prep/Analysis_Field Data Prep/Analysis__
3. For this question, please estimate line by line without attempting to normalize to 
100%. What percentage of your total work hours were spent in the field on:
(a) Reconnaissance______ Reconnaissance___________ Reconnaissance_________
( b) Mapping & Sampling___Mapping & Sampling_____ Mapping & Sampling_____
( c) D rillin g ______________ D rilling__________________ D rillin g ___________________
4. For targets apparently meeting minimum criteria for rate of return, what was 
the company's smallest acceptable deposit in mineable ounces for exploration or 
acquisition consideration? Please estimate, based upon your experience with the 
company, if no minimum size was formally specified.
5. What were the company's primary exploration tactics? Please number, 
beginning with "1", from most to least important, those tactics which were a part of the 
company's program. Consider only tactics which required 25% of your time over your 
entire term of employment. Do not number tactics which were not practiced or were 
insignificant.
(a) Grass-roots Exploration__Grass-roots Exploration__ Grass-roots Exploration_
( b) District Evaluation____ District Evaluation_______ District Evaluation_______
( c) Submittal Evaluations___ Submittal Evaluations____ Submittal Evaluations___
(d) Acquisition of Reserves___ Acquisition of Reserves___Acquisition of Reserves__
2 7 8
6. Please rate the company with respect to:
(a) Rapidity of response to potential valuable acquisition or exploration 
opportunities:
S low___  ___  ___Fast S low____ ___  ___ Fast Slow____  ___  ___ Fast
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
(b) Clear definition of realistic exploration objectives, target criteria, long range 
plans, staff duties and performance evaluation measures:
Poor___  ___  ___Good Poor____ ___  ___ Good Poor____ ___  ___Good
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
7. "Type I" errors are errors of omission resulting from failure to take positive 
action. Three possible subtypes in exploration are:
i) rejection of a submittal on which another company later made a discovery,
ii) refusal to enter a joint venture which later succeeded in making a discovery,
iii) failure to implement an internally or externally proposed program
or approach which later resulted in a discovery for another company.
Please list the following for any such errors by the companies for which you 
have worked and of which you have direct and specific knowledge:
Subtype of Error Approximate Resulting
Company (i. ii. iih Year Discovery
8. "Type II" errors are errors of commission, resulting from positive actions 
which later proved to be incorrect. Possible subtypes with respect to exploration are:
i) dropping a property which later yielded a discovery for another company,
ii) withdrawing from a joint venture which later made a discovery, and
iii) ending a program which, had it been continued, would have resulted in a 
discovery which was subsequently made by another company.
Please list the following for any such errors by the companies for which you 
have worked and of which you have direct and specific knowledge:
Subtype of Error Approximate Resulting
Company (i. ii. iiil Year Discovery
2 7 9
9. During your employment with each company, how many times each year, on
average, did you attend:
(a) Professional Meetings___Professional Meetings___ Professional Meetings.
(b) In-house Training_______In-house Training________ In-house Training.
(c) Short Courses________Short Courses___________ Short Courses______
10. For each company, what was your annual salary, to the nearest $1000?
Starting______________Starting______________Starting_______________
Ending_______________ Ending_______________ Ending________________
11. How many years of exploration experience did you have when first employed by 
each company?
(a) All Metals_____________All Metals______________ All Metals_____________
(b) Nevada Gold___________ Nevada Gold____________ Nevada Gold___________
12. What was your highest university degree during most of your employment with 
each company?
A p p e n d i x  Q
TABLE 0 1 . REDUCTION AND LPM REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DATA ON ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS.
Start Geologist Questionnaire, Question 5. "What were the company's primary exploration strategies. Consider only strategies which required at least 25% of your lime over your entire term of employment." 
Response Scoring: If 25% or more of time on "Submittal Evaluations*, score *  t; if not. score » 0.
. . . .  Shaded box denotes discovery year for successhi company.
________________ Open box denotes pre-dlscoveiy years for suocessfii companies and corresponding years for unsuccessM  companies for which values were averaged for regression analysis.
STEP 1. RAW SCORE AVERAGING (One Com pany)
Company N 1919 1998 1997 1999 1996 1994 1983 1692 1981 1980 1979
Geologist 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Geologist 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Geologist 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Geologist 4 0 0 0 0
Geologist 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Geologist 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
Geologist 7 1 1
Geologist 8 0 0 0
Geologist 9 1
Company Year Mean 0.33 0 25 0.25 1  0.17 0.2 0.2 025 0.4 0.2 0 0.5
STEP 2. CALCULATION O F ANNUAL MEANS AND STANDARO DEVIATIONS
Company A Mean 0.50 0.50 0.66 0.80 0.57 0.44 0.50 0.40 0.50 0.25 1.00
Company B Mean 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Company C  Mean 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.33 0 33 033 033 0 3 3 0.33
Company DMean 0.13 0.33 0.40 020 0.20 0.30 0.33 0.40 0.40 0.33 0.33
Company E Mean 1.00 060 066 0.66 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.50
Company F Mean 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.66 1.00 0.68 0.66 0.50
Company G Mean 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.16 0.10
Company H Mean 0.50 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
Company 1 Mean 0.50 005 0.00 000 0.00 0.05
Company J Mean 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.75 0.75 0.66 S  “ 1 1.00 1.00 1.00
Company K Mean 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 TOO 1.00 1.00 1.00
Company L Mean 050 0.40 060 0.33 060 0.20 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.05
Company M Mean 0.66 0.66 020 i.oo 1.00 1.00 005 1.00
Company N Mean 033 0 2 5 0.26 3  0.17 020 020 0.25 0.40 0.20 0.55 0.50
Company O Mean 0.75 050 050 0.40 0.40 0.50 ■ ■ :.: 0-50 ■ 0.50 050
Company P Mean 0.50 066 1.00 1.00 1 1.00 1 00 0.90 0.75 1.00
Company Q Mean 000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 090
Company R Mean 0.17 020 0 20 020 0.20 020
Year Mean 058 0.57 060 0.48 0 5 2 0.54 0.57 0.58 0.53 0.54 0 53
Year Std Dev. 0.38 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.42 0.42
STEP 3. CALCULATION OF INDIVIDUAL COMPANY STANDARD DEVIATIONS FROM ANNUAL MEANS 
Company Deviation In Year T = (Company Mean • Year Mean)/Year SUndard Deviation; l.e. Company N Deviation In 1987 = (.25 - .6)/.37 » -.95
1989 1989 1997 1986 1986 1984 1983 1982 ____ i n i __________ m o ____ 1979
Company A Dev. -0.21 •0.2 0.19 0.89 0.15 -0.31 •° 2 _____ •0.49 -0.08 •0.69 1.12
Company B Dev. 1.11 1.23 1.08 -1.21 •1.63 •1.68 •1.63 -1.56 •1.36 •1.28 -1.26
Company C Dev. 1.11 1.23 -0.73 •0.34 •0 56 •0 66 -0.69 -0.68 •051
Company D Dev. -1.18 -0.6 •0 59 -0.76 -1 •078 •068 -0.49 -0.33 •0.5 -0.48
Company E Dev. 1.11 0.26 0.16 0.53 0.68 0.66 0.51 0.48 058 0.5 •0.07
Company F Dev. 1.11 1.23 1.08 1.42 1.41 144 026 1.14 0.33 029 -0.07
Company G Dev. •1.52 • 1.62 •163 -1.82 - 121
Company H Dev. _____________ ■ 0.2 -1 •1.4 -1.28 -1.34
* 0 -1.5 •1.56 •1.3 ’ -1.3 -1.18
Company J Dev. 0.58 1.23 1.08 1 0.78 0.66 0.26 ► 0.22 1.21 1.1 1.12
Company K Dev. 1.18 1.42 1.41 144 1.23 1.2 1.11 1
Company L Dev. -0 21 -0.38 -0.04 •0.38 0 24 1.22 1 1.08 1.31 1.21 1.15
Company M Dev. 0.52 0.44 •1.05 14 5 1.14 1.21 1.1 1.09
Company N Dev. -066 -0.91 •0.M •0.76 •0.94 •1.06 -0.91 •0.41 -0.81 •1.17 -0.07
Company O  Dev. 0.45 •0.2 -0.27 -0.16 -0 26 •0.13 : -0 * •022 -0.05 0
Company P Dev. •0.17 026 1.08 1.42 14 1 1.44 1 0.5
Company Q Dev. •1.52 •1.63 •1.62 •1.21 -008 •0.13 1.23 1.14 0.96 1









D to D-1 D to D-2 Yes =1 No = 0
Company A -0.49 -0.29 -0.42 -0.04 0
Company B -1.63 -1.6 -1.52 -1.4 0
Company C -0.66 -0.68 -0.68 -0.64 0
Company D -0.69 -0.59 -0.5 -0.5 0
Company E 0.68 0.67 0.62 0.58 0
Company F 0.26 0.7 0.58 0.51 0
Company G -1.63 -1.63 -1.49 -1.49 0
Company H - 0 2 -0.6 -0.87 -0.97 0
Company I 0 -0.8 -1.02 -1.45 0
Company J -0.22 0.5 0.7 0.8 1
Company K 1.23 12 2 1.18 1.14 1
Company L 1.22 1.11 1.1 1.15 1
Company M 1.45 1.3 1.27 1.23 1
Company N -0.95 -0.86 -0.88 -0.88 1
Company 0 -0.2 -0.21 -0.16 -0.12 1
Company P 1.41 1.43 1.28 1.09 1
Company Q 1.23 1.19 1.11 1.08 1
Company R -1.06 -1.06 -1.05 -1 1
Step 5. Output of Regression on Time Period Averages
D Only D to D-1 D to D-2 D to D-3
Constant 0.5 0.5 0.51 0.5
Std. Error of Y 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.46
R Squared 0.22 0.27 0.31 0.25
Observations 18 18 18 18
X Coefficient 0.24 0.26 0.28 0.26
Std Er. of Coeff. 0.11 0.11 0.1 0.11
1-P Value 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99
The relative consistency of the x-coefficient when up to three pre-discovery years are 
included in averages and the maximum difference between successful and unsuccessful 
companies indicated for year D-2 suggests this successful company behavoir to be a 
pre-discovery condition, rather than resulting from discovery._______________________
Step 6. Pre-discovery vs. Post Discovery Behavior of Successful Companies






Company J 1.26 0.8
Company K 1.1 1.36 Constant 0.44
Company L 1.41 -0.15 Std. Error of Y 0.5
Company M 1.14 -0.03 R Squared 0.11
Company N -0.79 -0.81 X Coefficient 0.19
Company O -0.1 -0.09 Coeff. Error 0.13
Company P 0.98 0.65 1-P Value 0.91
Company Q 1.03 -1.03
Company R -0.98 -0.85
The positive x-coefficient of 0.19 indicates that successful companies invested more 
in submittal evaluations during pre-discovery years than after having made a 
discovery. This is believed to be related to an industry-wide change in strategy in 
the later 1980's rather than resulting from the discovery itself.__________________
